Kodak: Funtime Film

The problem in this case is concerned with Eastman Kodak losing its market share in film products to lower-priced economy brands. Over the last five years, in addition to being brand-aware, customers have also become price-conscious. This has resulted in the fast paced growth of lower priced segments in which Kodak has no presence.

Polaroid’s overall growth strategy was to be the number one and only instant photography company through the invention of it’s own technology in its own laboratories. “Growth objectives are a key part of an organization’s overall strategic plan. Almost all strategic plans deal with the size the company wishes to be in the future” (Human Resource Management pg. 110). One of the ways in which Polaroid planned to be the only instant photography company—in turn would also make it the greatest—was through 533 patents. “Polaroid is still characterized by many as a company that hold too tight a grip on its patents” (Human Resource Management pg. 130). Polaroid’s strategic plan was always to stick with their one invention, improve on it’s technology, and target the sole market. This affected HR planning and strategy because Edwin H. Land did not want to enter other markets; Land wanted Polaroid to be about instant photography. The decision to stay in only one market affected HR from doing what they are suppose to do. It prevented them from being creative or innovative.

In December 2006, Bob Prescott, the controller for the Blue Ridge Mill, was considering the addition of a new on-site longwood woodyard. Two primary benefits for this new addition include eliminating the need to purchase shortwood from an outside supplier and creating an opportunity to sell shortwood on the open market. Also, the new woodward would reduce operating costs and increase revenues. Blue Ridge Mill currently purchased

Kodak is known for providing the quality services, innovative products offering the best quality to customers. It developed competitive advantages and satisfied its customers during many years. Kodak has evolved different strategies in the field of traditional photography where it brought innovations and modification. Kodak has a successful history in the industry. According to the case study, the main reason behind the success of Kodak in the industry is its quality.

The problem in this case is Kodak's steadily eroding market share and shareholder value in the film rolls market. This is especially undesirable given the fact that the market has been growing at a tepid 2% annual rate and the steadily increasing threat from competition. Kodak needs to come up with a strategy for corrective action so as to arrest this decline, regain market share and increase share holder value. Kodak's strategy is to reposition itself by targeting a new segment of price sensitive customers and re-segmenting the super premium customers’ space by including a wider segment of special occasion customers.

By charging a high price for a high quality product and keeping all unrelated costs low, such as administrative costs, labor, depreciation, we were able to triumph all other competitors at large profit margins with large market share in entry level and the best multi featured camera.

The names of Kodak and Fujifilm are well known around the world. They are two companies that have made a name from photos, film, cameras and printers. They are competitors that started in the same business and took different paths. Though they shared similar products their management direction and company direction differed. The differences led one company to be successful and the other to struggle.

It is considered that photography only became widely available to the public when the Kodak Eastman Company introduced the box shaped Brownie Camera in 1900. (Baker, n.p.) Its features became more refined since its original placing on the market; one of the reasons why it has become considered the birth of public photography is because of the processing. Using a similar image capture system, the brownie exposed the light to a 120mm roll of film, which could be wound round, meaning six photographs could be taken before the slides needed removing. The first Brownie used a six-exposure cartridge that Kodak processed for the photographer. (Kodak.com, n.d.) Realistically, the armature photographers did not need to understand darkroom processes,

He started his business of photography in 1881, advertising dry photographic plates. He moved on to patenting his film in 1884, and then in 1889 he patented a roll film. He introduced his first camera, the Kodak camera (shown in picture two) in 1888 (Carlisle 247.) This is when the magic and joy of photography first began. “He called it a Kodak because he liked the strength of the letter K and reckoned it was a word that would be pronounced the same in every language,” (Buckland and Lefer 250). In 1889, Eastman fit his Kodak cameras with transparent nitrocellulose film. This was a major breakthrough in the photography industry because it allowed easier processing and developing of a photo (Buckland and Lefer 250).

When Kodak began making changes to its organizational architecture in 1984, its current architecture did not fit the business environment for the industry. The largest factor that motivated Kodak to make this change was increased competition and decreased market share. Until the early 1980’s, Kodak owned the film production market with very little competition. This suddenly changed when Fuji Corporation and many other generic store brands began producing high quality film as well (Brickley, 2009, p. 358). Another factor in this change was technology advancements. As technology rapidly expanded in the 1980’s, other

Kodak currently has no position within the ink market. The ink business is a $45 billion a year sector that could regenerate Kodak’s position in the printing sector. The market for ink is dominated by HP, followed by Epson, Canon, and Lexmark. Entering a complete new market may be beneficial in its current position. According to Kodak, the greatest obstacle to printing at home is the cost of ink and supplies. Kodak can develop a cost efficient solution that will be more appealing to consumers. With the launch of this product, Kodak must focus on several sectors of business: marketing, pricing, distribution, and production. Onesource (2011).

In late March 1996, Ralph Norwood was faced with the task of restructuring Polaroid’s capital structure. In the past, Polaroid had a monopoly in the instant-photography segment. However, with upcoming threats in the emerging digital photography industry and Polaroid experiencing recent losses in their market share due to Kodak’s competition, Gary T. DiCamillo, recently appointed CEO of Polaroid, headed a restructuring plan to stimulate the firm’s performance. The firm’s new plan has goals such as to aggressively exploit the existing Polaroid brand, introduce product extensions, and enter new emerging markets such as Russia in order to secure Polaroid’s future.

To account for their miscalculation in film sales, Kodak is undergoing a massive digitally based shift. Kodak plans on building a stronger base in its consumer, medical, and profession imaging products. However, this shift does not come without a price tag. Kodak’s projected spending could reach as much as $3 billion in future investments to aid the shift. With these investments Kodak claims a tremendous turnaround in revenue. Kodak anticipates reaching $16 billion in revenue by 2006 and $20 billion by 2010. To pay

Background Eastman Kodak Company, headquartered in Rochester New York, was founded in 1889. The corporation, now multinational and focusing on imaging and photographic equipment, posted revenues in excess of $6 billion in 2011. During most of the 20th century Kodak was dominant in the photographic film industry in 1976 it held 90% of the market but began a downward slide once the Internet, digital cameras and computer processing grew. By 2007, Kodak ceased making a profit and in January 2012 filed for bankruptcy protection and ceased making cameras, video cameras and began to focus on the corporate digital imaging market (De La Merced, 2012). In evaluating Kodak's corporate strategy from the mid-1980s onward, we find that there four major management paradigms in place during this transitional period:

According to the definition, a relevant product market includes “all those products which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer by reason of the products characteristics, their prices and their intended use”. We can presume that the relevant market for film includes all of the five firms: Kodak, Fuji, Konica, Agfa and 3M. However, not all of these firms’ products are viewed as fully interchangeable and substitutable by the consumer as stated in the definition. According to statistics, about 50% of consumers will only buy Kodak film despite of substantial price increases. This phenomenon indicates the consumers’ adamant belief in the superior quality of Kodak film. There were two different viewpoints on the relevant geographic product market for film discussed in the case. According to the district court, the relevant geographic market for film is worldwide, since foreign manufactures sell considerable amounts of film in the United States and Kodak’s market share is only 36% globally. However, the government argues that this determination is wrong and that the relevant geographic market in this case should be limited to the United States. The main explanation here is that a relevant geographic market comprises an area where the firm can exercise the market power. Taking into consideration the fact that Kodak charges much higher prices in the US comparing to other countries, the relevant geographic market