Economic Loss

Last of all, Cost of avoiding harm needs to be taken into account. The argument that a danger was too costly to eliminate is not a legitimate argument. However courts do recognise a balance between the risk and the cost of eliminating it. If the risk is remote and the precautions needed to be taken are very expensive, the defendants lack of action by not doing anything may be justified. The greater the risk is and the more likely it is, the consideration is given towards the cost of the eliminating measures which the defendants may have taken to safeguard. The decision in these circumstances relies on whether the courts decide that the defendants had acted reasonable in the given

In this essay, the focus is on whether it is morally objectionable for a person to recover damages from another’s breach of contract that results in a better financial position than they would have been if the breach had not occurred. This is because in deciding whether to preserve the principle in Clark, law-makers would place high regard on the analysis of Clark’s normative outcome. The following points are the key arguments against awarding a sum to a higher pecuniary advantage??? Such as Clark, which can be subsequently rebutted in this analysis with “normative” research.

As a starting note, any mention of concurrent liability should be assumed to mean concurrently liability in tort and contract. Traditionally the distinction between contract and tort was that contract concerns the improvement of the claimant 's position, whereas tort is concerned with dealing with their position worsening. There has been dispute around concurrent liability and its ambiguity has led to varying decision in cases and statute making as Taylor puts it “the basis of concurrent liability uncertain”. This essay will argue Tort has and is extending itself beyond its traditional role due to judges presumption of morality leading to the unclear concurrent liability we see today. Whilst this concurrent liability shows some

Following Bridge’s comment that “the juridical basis of the duty to mitigate is obscure”, the first section of the essay will examine whether mitigation is best explained as an aspect of causation. It will be considered if causation explains mitigation, whether causation is the superior explanation, before discussing an alternative approach based on a reformulation of the compensatory principle. The second section of the essay will examine the true basis for the rules of remoteness in contract and tort, and will ask whether the

contributory negligence is tort rule that is “abolished in most jurisdictions” and (2) the fact that

In this paper I shall focus on the Knowing Receipt doctrine, and it shall consist of twofold: First, A study of the basis of the liability and the knowledge requirement under the knowing receipt doctrine, through a review of the English and Australian case law; and secondly, I will relate to proposal by some scholars to recognize knowing receipt as a strict liability claim.

The losses compensated for in this case include difficult-to-quantify losses such as disability, emotional distress, suffering, and pain, and economic losses such as lost earnings and medical expenses (Greene, Coon and Bornstein, 2001). Again here, capping or limiting the jury award would imply that even after suffering economic and noneconomic damages in the hands of the defendant, a plaintiff would not likely get back to the position they were in before the injury.

Negligence cases and their analyses have dominated our judicial system from its very inception. This can be attributed to the human need to find fault and administer blame for wrong-doings and the mere fact that committing negligence is so simple one may not even realize that it is being committed until one is served with court documents. For example, pretend your home has a very steep step leading to the front door. You are aware of this – after all, you live there – but you want to ensure the safety of all visitors to your home. Suppose each day you place a sign by the driveway that states, “Caution! Beware of steep step;” however, one day you decide to take a vacation and decide that is unnecessary to put the sign out for the duration

However, assuming a duty was owed, it was consequently breached when Mr Stephens failed to advise Mr Dick of the live connection. Factual causation was satisfied, as had Mr Stephens warned Mr Dick, Mr Harley would not have died. The scope of liability does not extend to classes of persons with which Mr Harley falls within. Ultimately, Mr Stephens is not liable.

. However, neither English nor Nigerian case-law recognize the existence of a general duty of care as regards the damage which the claimant might suffer as a result of the conduct of third parties

Arguments that an extension of liability for negligence would lead to a flood of litigation or to fraudulent claims were once granted greater credence than they are today. But other arguments, such as the possible commercial or financial consequences, the prospect of indeterminate liability, the possibility of risk-spreading (e.g., through insurance)

The impact of Williams v Roffey Bros & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd [1989] EWCA Civ 5 on the doctrine of consideration.

Despite the general principle excluding liability for omissions, liability may arise in certain exceptional circumstances. Although these situations where a duty may arise on the basis of an omission are difficult to classify, what is usually required in all of them is some element of proximity. This may be created in a number of situations which will now be looked at. In addition, in such cases, the factors for establishing a duty of care (forseeability, proximity, fair, just and reasonable) laid down in Caparo will also need to be looked at.

Relative Law: Keeping in view the provisions contained in Civil liability Act 2003 (Queensland) and the judgement passed in the case of Donogue V/S Stevenson 1932 and in case of Du Pradal & Anor v Petchell [2014] QSC 261 there was a breach of duty in the issue discussed above to take precautions on the part of defendant (Wayne) causing a damage to the plaintiff (Paul) and that risk of harm i.e. injury caused to Paul could have been avoided by doing something in a different way or by taking adequate precautionary measures.

Perhaps the greatest insight provided by my colleague's discussion is the deconstruction of the process by which the concept of negligence did ultimately emerge as a new tort standard. Here, the discussion illustrates the challenge before a judicial body when a legal conflict appears to bring about a new and previously unforeseen point of contention. In this case, as my colleague highlights so effectively, the charge of fraud would be the only theretofore existent way of legally addressing liability for a business or organization such as the defendant in this case. The great insight provided by my colleague is in acknowledgement of the exhaustive review of existing legal documents engaged by the ruling parties and arguing parties. This process demonstrates well that even where no precedent existing for what would become the charge of negligence,