Economics Of Banking Chapter Summary

There are various categories of banking; these include retail banking, directly dealing with small businesses and persons. Commercial and Corporate banking which offers services to medium and large businesses (Koch & MacDonald 2010). Private banking, deals with individuals, offering them one on one service. The last category is investment banking. These help clients to raise capital and often invest in financial markets. Most global banking institutions provide all these services combined. With all these institutions in existence within the same localities and offering similar services, there is a need to regulate the industry so as to protect the consumer and provide fair working environment for all banks (Du & Girma, 2011).

Claessens, S. (2009). Competition in the Financial Sector: Overview of Competition Policies. Retrieved on 8/22/2013,

Morrison suggests that government should try to make regulations that can make TBTF policy effective rather than, try to end the policy, which is impossible. Morrison discusses the role of the policy in designing suitable capital regulations, in the restriction of bank scope and in institutional design. The author argues that financial institutions receive help from taxpayers and government because regulatory authorities believe that its failure would have severe effects on the country’s economy.

Differences in banking regulations across borders permit the most efficient channeling of funds from lenders to borrowers, leading to increased investment and thus increased GDP. Therefore it is imperative that policy makers prudently evaluate the possible consequences and benefits of harmonized banking regulations, as demonstrated by similar regulations instituted domestically, before any such endeavor is embarked upon.

Accordingly, banking regulators assessed minimum values for each of these key measures. At 2007, “adequately capitalized” (i.e., minimum) levels were 4% for the Tier 1 capital ratio, 8% for the total capital ratio, and 3% for the leverage ratio; “well capitalized” levels were 6% for Tier 1 capital, 10% for total capital, and 5% for leverage. Well capitalized banks qualified for, among other things, lower premiums assessed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Undercapitalized banks (e.g., below the 8% minimum required total capital) received a warning from the FDIC; continued violation of capital requirements triggered further regulatory costs, including intervention or (in the extreme) takeover by government regulators.

In addition to the above the internal incentive to bank should be reduced by requiring greater capital requirements as well as improving upon the definition of what qualifies to be capital. Further in line with the answer to question 3, risk management systems in financial institutions need to be redefined and strengthened to more comprehensively identify, evaluate, manage and monitor risks.

Since the onset of the financial crisis 2008, the sovereign debt crisis in western economies and the new financial regulation with Basel III coming up, the financial industry faces the challenge of reinventing itself. The ring-fence for Commercial and Investment Banking, and new economic and regulatory capital requirements will determine the kinds of products banks will be able to distribute. It will have a huge impact in the Investment Banking business, which will suffer tough regulation and supervisory procedures. At the same time, credit risk models will be reviewed because they have failed to predict the crisis of 2008. The current financial and economic crisis doesn’t have any precedent in the past.

First, high capital requirements could enable institutions to be more flexible facing financial stress and crises. Second, the CFPB strengthens the oversight responsibilities, lessens the regulatory infrastructure risky gaps, and improves the protection for consumers. Third, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) single-point-of-entry strategy installs standard procedures to wind down failed financial institutions,

Briefly explain the rise and fall of LTCM. What was the moral hazard issue the fed was worried about? How did they try and get around the moral hazard issue? What specifically was the Fed's role in the bailout? What roles specifically did Bear play and not play in the LTCM's life and death?

Recent studies have investigated the impact of the 2007-2009 financial crises on banks’ capital. Berger and Bouwman (2011) emphasised the importance of capital during financial crisis. Their empirical study concludes that banks with solid capital base have some benefits during the crisis than those that are poorly capitalised. Well capitalised banks are more able to withstand the shocks due to liquidity squeeze, and therefore had higher chances of surviving the crisis period. Other benefits accrued to well capitalised banks include increase in their market share and profitability, as customers withdrew their funds from less capitalised to a well-capitalised banks. This conclusion was also reinforced by a recent empirical study conducted Olivier de Bandt et al (2014) on a sample of large French banks over a period of 1993 – 2012. Similarly, Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez (2011) demonstrate the existence of structural changes during the period of financial crisis. They conclude that banks with weaker core capital positions, greater dependence on market funding and on non-interest sources of income restricted the loan supply more strongly during the crisis period. Using a multi-country panel of banks, Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache and Merrouche (2010) find among others results, that during

The investment banks, and subsequent stock brokerage firms, was regulated by the Security and Exchange Commission. The banking entities, in this portion of the financial sector, were used to dealing in high risk business that were structured on the business’ equity and debt capital, instead of the commercial banks’ deposits of customers. The activities in this sector of the financial system were underwriting stocks and bonds, insurance markets, the investments in subprime debt markets and mortgages.

In this essay I will be addressing the “Too Big To Fail” (TBTF) problem in the current banking system. I will be discussing the risks associated with this policy, and the real problems behind it. I will then examine some solutions that have been proposed to solve the “too big to fail” problem. The policy ‘too big to fail’ refers to the idea that a bank has become so large that its failure could cause a disastrous effect to the rest of the economy, and so the government will provide assistance, in the form of perhaps a bailout/oversee a merger, to prevent this from happening. This is to protect the creditors and allow the bank to continue operating. If a bank does fail then this could cause a domino effect throughout

The goal of financial regulation is to increase efficiency in the market, as well as enhance the market 's ability to absorb shock caused by financial instability. There are many reasons for financial instability, but it can be narrowed down to

Abstract We develop a variation of the macroeconomic model of banking in Gertler and Kiyotaki (GK2011) that allows for household liquidity risks and bank runs as in Diamond and Dybvig (DD1983). As in GK, because bank net worth ‡ uctuates with aggregate production, the spread in the expected rates of return on bank credit and deposit ‡ uctuates countercyclically. However, because bank assets have a longer maturity than deposits, bank runs are possible as in DD. Whether a bank run equilibrium exists depends on the condition of bank balance sheets and an equilibrium liquidation price for bank assets. Thus

axrate)y$, in return of its loans.footnote{ To focus on the main mechanism, we lump the financial and production sectors together. The mechanism, however, does not depend on this assumption and would be at work even if firms were modeled separately, banks received only a share of the output produced, and firms distributed the rest to households as dividends.} It also receives the payoff, $assetpayoff(Y)$, of its financial assets and government bonds. If the sum of the two is less than the face value of its liabilities, i.e., $(1-