Edmund Gettier 's Argument That Justified True Belief

Cleanthes replies to Philo’s second objection through directly attacking Philo’s first premise. He does this through presenting an example of a library filled with books. He states that know that a human minds produced the books, although we have not actually seen those human minds produce the books. Thus, although we did not see that the authors of the books produce them, we can still know that human minds produced them. This reply to Philo’s second objection can be presented as:

The topic of knowledge and belief has been a subject of investigation and a primary field in philosophical research for centuries. Whether it was Aristotle or Descartes, multiple ideas on knowledge and belief arise, such as the epistemological theories of foundationalism or coherentism, which provide philosophical explanations to this debate. For the sake of this essay, and in my own opinion, knowledge should be distinguished from belief. Everyone is subject to different types of beliefs based on upbringing, however knowledge of basic items is universal, therefore it immediately becomes apparent that there is a clear distinction between the two concepts.

However, questioning how we can know sensible objects involves complex questioning. Can anyone know a true object? This leads to issues of elitism.

William James (1897), on the other hand, attempts to define the permissible cases in which it is intellectually respectable to believe without sufficient evidence. James (1897) begins by providing three criterion for judging beliefs: either beliefs are 1) living or dead; 2) forced or avoidable; or 3) momentous or trivial.

Blaise Pascal argues that the existence of God cannot be determined by reason. Therefore, one should believe in god based on self-interest. He argues that people have the choice to either believe or not believe in god. Pascal argues that if one believes in God and they are correct, they are rewarded with heaven. If they believe and are wrong, they only miss out on some finite goodness. He then says that if God does exist, but someone does not believe in Him, they will het infinite badness and suffer eternal damnation. If God does not exist, and one

Also, Moore suggests that a deductive argument such as this one is sound if and only if that, 1. The premises are different than the conclusion. 2. The conclusion must logically follow the premises. 3. One must know each of the premises. As a fallibilism argument, it is not necessary for any individuals to know all the facts and truths in the world, instead, he could actually infer things from one to another by constructing solid arguments. Even the things

William Kingdon Clifford’s argument in “The Ethics of Belief” that it is morally wrong to form beliefs upon insufficient evidence has been widely debated. One such objection to Clifford is William James’s “The Will to Believe,” which argues, under certain circumstances, it can be morally justified to form beliefs without adequate evidence. In this paper, I shall argue that James’s position on belief is stronger than Clifford’s on the basis of being able to reveal more truths while not violating morality.

Since the 19th century, William Clifford and William James have been the foremost religious theorist and have attempted to answer significant creation and theological mysteries. However, Clifford and James have varying views on the belief debate, each formulating a rational argument of what the basis for belief should be. Clifford’s, Ethics of Belief and James’ The Will to Believe outline their respective arguments which are vastly similar and but have marked differences. Both articles will be examined for these similarities and difference and stated within this paper.

The Gettier Problem is a widely acknowledged philosophical question, named in honour of Edmund Gettier who discovered it in 1963, which questions whether a piece of information that someone believes for invalid reasons, but by mere happenstance is correct, counts as knowledge. Before the Gettier paper was published, it was widely believed that the Tripartite Theory of Knowledge- which states that Justified True Belief equaled knowledge- was fact. This means that with three conditions, one could know something. Firstly, if you believe something, secondly, if you have justification for believing, and thirdly, that your belief is in fact true. If all three of these conditions were met, then this amounted to knowledge. However, with the publication of Gettier’s paper, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”, he attempted to prove, with the aid of a number of problems, that it was not sufficient to have only these three conditions in order for a belief to become knowledge.

One consistency in both texts of the Meno (Meno 99c) and Republic (Republic 472d) is that people who use true belief cannot show or explain how their belief is the truth. I believe this is one of the largest distinctions between knowledge and true belief. Knowledge is

In this counterexample of the traditional view of knowledge that Gettier illustrates, a true justified belief evolved from a false justified belief. What the Gettier problem shows us is that in order for a true belief to qualify as knowledge, it must satisfy two conditions; it must not be a lucky guess (that is, it must be justified), and it must not be a lucky truth. A true belief that isn't a lucky guess, it may still be a lucky truth, and thus fall short of being knowledge. So where must knowledge come from?

In this paper I argue that the Strong Program purpose to provide robust explanations of belief aquirement is limited by its commitment to the symmetry principle. the symmetry principle is intended to drive home the fact that epistemic norms are socially consists. My debate here is that even if our epistemic norm are fully naturalized even relativized they anyway can play a pivotal part in why human being adopt the beliefs that they do. In fact, sometimes the fact that a belief is locally endorsed as rational is the only reason why an human conttrol it. In this way, norms of rationality have a powerful and unique role in belief formation. But if this is true then the symmetry principle’s emphasis on ‘sameness of type’ is misguided. It has the

Even though the coherence theory of truth differs from the coherence theory of knowledge, which states that a belief is justified if the belief coheres with a set of beliefs that forms a coherent system (Audi,

Epistemology is purposed with discovering and studying what knowledge is and how we can classify what we know, how we know it, and provide some type of framework for how we arrived at this conclusion. In the journey to identify what knowledge is the certainty principle was one of the first concepts that I learned that explained how we, as humans, consider ourselves to know something. The certainty concept suggests that knowledge requires evidence that is sufficient to rule out the possibility of error. This concept is exemplified in cases like The Gettier problem in the instance that we suppose (S) someone to know (P) a particular proposition. As Gettier established the Justified True Belief as a conceptual formula for knowledge, certainty

The production of knowledge is a process that occurs through a sequence of related actions, these series of actions allows for the Ways of Knowing to interact in a way that works to develop the knowledge that is being produced. From the prescribed title we can claim that while the Ways of Knowing may appear to be acting in isolation when forming knowledge, they are actually working in a variety of different ways in the construction and formation. In some cases, the Ways of Knowing are interacting so closely together that it is often hard to differentiate between them, for example emotion and reason, or imagination and memory. Given the right circumstances faith can be isolated to a point where it can be acting by itself to produce knowledge. However, this knowledge is often deemed as unreliable, due to faith being seen as one of the more “subjective” ways of knowing. This inability to differentiate the ways of knowing from each other during the production of knowledge, raises the questions “Can any knowledge in any Area of Knowledge be produced by a single Way of Knowing?” and “Is it possible to distinguish between Ways of Knowing if they are working together?”. While reason is used in almost all production of knowledge, it is the other Ways of Knowing used that can determine whether the knowledge is reliable or not, as some Ways of Knowing are more subjective than others. This essay will attempt to