Edmund Gettier's Is Justified True Knowledge?

In this paper I will be discussing Pascal’s Wager. What I first plan to do in this paper is explain the argument of Pascal’s Wager. Next I will explain how Pascal tries to convince non-theists why they should believe in God. I will then explain two criticisms in response to Pascal’s argument. Finally, I will discuss whether or not these criticisms show Pascal’s reasoning to be untenable.

The topic of knowledge and belief has been a subject of investigation and a primary field in philosophical research for centuries. Whether it was Aristotle or Descartes, multiple ideas on knowledge and belief arise, such as the epistemological theories of foundationalism or coherentism, which provide philosophical explanations to this debate. For the sake of this essay, and in my own opinion, knowledge should be distinguished from belief. Everyone is subject to different types of beliefs based on upbringing, however knowledge of basic items is universal, therefore it immediately becomes apparent that there is a clear distinction between the two concepts.

Because Smith never offers up any backing for his word, the reader is left to speculate how he came up with all his information and why they should believe anything he has to say. Smith goes on and on, mentioning example after good example while never once backing up what he has to say.

Edmund Gettier’s argument that justified true belief is not a sufficient definition for knowledge is correct. There are many scenarios in which the conditions for justified true belief are met but cannot be said to qualify as knowledge; therefore justified true belief is not a sufficient definition for knowledge.

James(1897) argues that certain actions and convictions need pre-existing beliefs which do not require sufficient evidence. He uses Pascal’s Wager as an example – James (1897) argues Pascal’s Wager may force individuals in choosing to either believe in God or not, regardless of there being sufficient evidence to prove the existence of the former or latter. However, James (1897) argues that different propositions

In this paper, I will argue that The Paradox of Confirmation, or, The Paradox of the Ravens is solvable by accepting the conclusion. My argument proceeds by first stating any major assumptions. I will then explain The Paradox of the Ravens and why it is considered a paradox. Next, I will detail the three ideas that compose this paradox. Finally, I will explain my solution.

The Gettier Problem is a widely acknowledged philosophical question, named in honour of Edmund Gettier who discovered it in 1963, which questions whether a piece of information that someone believes for invalid reasons, but by mere happenstance is correct, counts as knowledge. Before the Gettier paper was published, it was widely believed that the Tripartite Theory of Knowledge- which states that Justified True Belief equaled knowledge- was fact. This means that with three conditions, one could know something. Firstly, if you believe something, secondly, if you have justification for believing, and thirdly, that your belief is in fact true. If all three of these conditions were met, then this amounted to knowledge. However, with the publication of Gettier’s paper, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”, he attempted to prove, with the aid of a number of problems, that it was not sufficient to have only these three conditions in order for a belief to become knowledge.

The main issue addressed in this exposition is if “reliabilism is true, could we ever know whether we know anything? (If not, how big a problem would that be?)” According to the following evidence that will be presented, it is suggested that there is no way of knowing whether we know anything, when using the reliabilist form of justification as a way to reach truth. To begin, reliabilism is a form of justification where we do not need to account for the exact sources our beliefs come from because it “is externalist in character” (Handout 10). Moreover, a belief is justified if it was formed by an unconditionally reliable process, or by a conditionally reliable process that receives input from other conditional reliable processes that are

This section provides us with two selections from the essays of William K. Clifford (1845-1879) and William James (1842-1910). Clifford's essay, The Ethics of Belief, is based on the concept of evidentialism. This concept 'holds that we should not accept any statement as true unless we have good evidence to support its truth'; (Voices of Wisdom, 346). James wrote his essay, The Will to Believe, as a response to Clifford's essay where he endorsed a philosophy called pragmatism.

In this counterexample of the traditional view of knowledge that Gettier illustrates, a true justified belief evolved from a false justified belief. What the Gettier problem shows us is that in order for a true belief to qualify as knowledge, it must satisfy two conditions; it must not be a lucky guess (that is, it must be justified), and it must not be a lucky truth. A true belief that isn't a lucky guess, it may still be a lucky truth, and thus fall short of being knowledge. So where must knowledge come from?

In the selection, ‘Skeptical doubts concerning the operations of the understanding’, David Hume poses a problem for knowledge about the world. This question is related to the problem of induction. David Hume was one of the first who decided to analyze this problem. He starts the selection by providing his form of dividing the human knowledge, and later discusses reasoning and its dependence on experience. Hume states that people believe that the future will resemble the past, but we have no evidence to support this belief. In this paper, I will clarify the forms of knowledge and reasoning and examine Hume’s problem of induction, which is a challenge to Justified True Belief account because we lack a justification for our

It is logical to say that things happen for a reason. A ball, kicked by a child in a playground, flies through the air and eventually comes down to the ground. The child has kicked the ball enough times to expect that once the ball reaches its highest point, it will fall. Through experience of kicking the ball and it coming back to the ground, the child will develop expectations of this action. This thought process seems sound, yet a question of certainty arises. Can we be certain that future events will be like past events? Can we be certain that the ball will fall once it has been kicked? This concept was one of David Hume’s most famous philosophical arguments: the Problem of Induction. This paper will outline Hume’s standpoint, as well give criticism for his argument.

David Hume is recognised as one of the first philosophers to question the validity of induction, and the father of ‘The Problem of Induction’, a lasting philosophical question. He began by doubting the ability and validity of a posteriori knowledge to demonstrate causality. Hume speculated whether induction provides reliable evidence, and whether it is rational for us to believe inductive knowledge if the basis is not objective, and whether we can rationally justify beliefs that stem from the unobserved (Hume, pp. 193-4) [4], a rational being would not trust conclusions drawn from the uncertain. Hume acknowledges that humans instinctively use induction, through

Epistemology is purposed with discovering and studying what knowledge is and how we can classify what we know, how we know it, and provide some type of framework for how we arrived at this conclusion. In the journey to identify what knowledge is the certainty principle was one of the first concepts that I learned that explained how we, as humans, consider ourselves to know something. The certainty concept suggests that knowledge requires evidence that is sufficient to rule out the possibility of error. This concept is exemplified in cases like The Gettier problem in the instance that we suppose (S) someone to know (P) a particular proposition. As Gettier established the Justified True Belief as a conceptual formula for knowledge, certainty

The production of knowledge is a process that occurs through a sequence of related actions, these series of actions allows for the Ways of Knowing to interact in a way that works to develop the knowledge that is being produced. From the prescribed title we can claim that while the Ways of Knowing may appear to be acting in isolation when forming knowledge, they are actually working in a variety of different ways in the construction and formation. In some cases, the Ways of Knowing are interacting so closely together that it is often hard to differentiate between them, for example emotion and reason, or imagination and memory. Given the right circumstances faith can be isolated to a point where it can be acting by itself to produce knowledge. However, this knowledge is often deemed as unreliable, due to faith being seen as one of the more “subjective” ways of knowing. This inability to differentiate the ways of knowing from each other during the production of knowledge, raises the questions “Can any knowledge in any Area of Knowledge be produced by a single Way of Knowing?” and “Is it possible to distinguish between Ways of Knowing if they are working together?”. While reason is used in almost all production of knowledge, it is the other Ways of Knowing used that can determine whether the knowledge is reliable or not, as some Ways of Knowing are more subjective than others. This essay will attempt to