Epistemology : What Conditions Are Necessary And Sufficient For Propositional Knowledge?

(A) All claims with religious content and all religiously motivated actions and practices are subject to the same kind of rational scrutiny and evaluation as any other claim or form of behavior i.e., the religious and the secular are at parity as far as the jurisdiction of reason is concerned. By contrast, pure fideists reject (A) without comment; ratiocinative fideists reject (A) but attempt to explain their rejection, and conditional rationalists refuse to accept (A) until the kind of rational scrutiny to which religion is to be subjected is spelled out.

However, questioning how we can know sensible objects involves complex questioning. Can anyone know a true object? This leads to issues of elitism.

William James (1897), on the other hand, attempts to define the permissible cases in which it is intellectually respectable to believe without sufficient evidence. James (1897) begins by providing three criterion for judging beliefs: either beliefs are 1) living or dead; 2) forced or avoidable; or 3) momentous or trivial.

If you have no good reason to think that your belief is true, then you cannot rationally maintain it. 4. REVISION. We cannot rationally maintain our evaluative beliefs. [2, 3]

William Kingdon Clifford’s argument in “The Ethics of Belief” that it is morally wrong to form beliefs upon insufficient evidence has been widely debated. One such objection to Clifford is William James’s “The Will to Believe,” which argues, under certain circumstances, it can be morally justified to form beliefs without adequate evidence. In this paper, I shall argue that James’s position on belief is stronger than Clifford’s on the basis of being able to reveal more truths while not violating morality.

The second of which Principles of sufficient reason is defended is by “claiming that although it is not known to be true, it is, nevertheless, a presupposition of reason, a basic assumption that rational people make” (Rowe 55). A person for principle of sufficient reason says that all of us already think that principle of sufficient reason is true. The problem with this is that even if we do believe that principle of sufficient reason is true, us believing in it does not make it true. I believe in one thing and another person might believe in something completely different. Holding ones belief in some subject does not make it true nor does it make it false.

William Clifford argues that we should never “believe anything on insufficient evidence” (Philosophy of Religion, p. 103)1 and if we do decide to believe in God without any evidence it would be considered “wrong,” however, William James’ The Will to Believe essay argues, in response to Cliffords essay, that believing anything without sufficient evidence is “an irrational rule” (James, p. 109)2. James’ essay suggests that there is some level of truth to the fact that no one can decide what it is that you truly believe in because if that were to be true somewhere along the way someone else probably forced those beliefs on you, either directly or indirectly. He suggests that your true beliefs are the ones that you have without any rhyme or reason. James goes to say that it is better to believe in something wholly, even if there is no evidence to prove it because that may be the only way to find your true faith, while Clifford believes that it is safer to believe in nothing until you have clear evidence so you do not have to run the risk of possibly believing in a inauthentic belief.

James attempts to establish a will or right to believe. On the other hand, Pascal establishes reasons for logically believing God. This paper will discuss their individual arguments and proceed to show that Pascal’s argument is the more convincing argument of the two. 2. James James view was formulated in response to William Clifford’s view, who argued that “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything on insufficient evidence.”

People read from an abundant number of sources and retain the information presented. However, if people forgot the source of the information, would they be justified in the knowledge they have gained? Having a justification for knowledge is a necessary condition to have epistemic justification. According Earl Conee and Richard Feldman epistemic justification could be gained through internalism. Internalism should be understood as a person’s beliefs that are justified only by ideas that are internal to oneself.

In Plato’s Theaetetus, the dialog between Socrates and his student, Theaetetus, sets up the argument that knowledge is true belief that is adequately justified. Although there are many examples that prove Plato’s suggestion, people such as Edmund Gettier have questioned and disproved the notion of knowledge as justified true belief. In response to Gettier’s findings, many have tried to modify or find an alternative to the Justified True Belief model in search for the true definition of knowledge. In this paper, I will outline and discuss Plato’s Justified True Belief argument, outline and discuss Gettier’s response to Plato’s argument, and lastly, present and analyze four solutions to the Gettier problems.

In this paper, I will discuss the truth-belief-justification conceptual analysis of knowledge, which I will refer to as TBJ, Gettier cases, and an example that refutes TBJ. Conceptual analysis is an analysis of a proposition P with given premises to acquire knowledge of that P. The truth-belief-justification analysis of knowledge fails to provide sufficient conditions for someone to possess knowledge. For a condition to be necessary, it has to be satisfied to have knowledge of a proposition. If a condition is sufficient, then the person x will have some information to know something about proposition P. Jointly sufficient conditions are conditions that all need to be satisfied together to have knowledge about some P. They are necessary and supposedly jointly sufficient, but Gettier cases prove that extra conditions on top of TBJ are required to be jointly sufficient.

One consistency in both texts of the Meno (Meno 99c) and Republic (Republic 472d) is that people who use true belief cannot show or explain how their belief is the truth. I believe this is one of the largest distinctions between knowledge and true belief. Knowledge is

In this counterexample of the traditional view of knowledge that Gettier illustrates, a true justified belief evolved from a false justified belief. What the Gettier problem shows us is that in order for a true belief to qualify as knowledge, it must satisfy two conditions; it must not be a lucky guess (that is, it must be justified), and it must not be a lucky truth. A true belief that isn't a lucky guess, it may still be a lucky truth, and thus fall short of being knowledge. So where must knowledge come from?

Throughout history, philosophers have been trying to come up with a clear way to provide the justification of our beliefs and knowledge. Noah Lemos offers readers explanations of both foundationalism and coherentism for theories of justification. These two different theories offer very different ways to explain the basis of our beliefs. For a foundationalist, they believe that all of our beliefs can be broken down until we reach a basic belief. This belief would be largely independent of other beliefs and not derived from other beliefs. A coherentist feels that a belief can be reasonably justified if it is coheres with our other beliefs.

Evidence implies that an entity presents itself to the knowing cognition of man in such a way that it can be looked at in a direct and immediate manner and be regarded as meaningful. Evidence originates when a given, in its disclosure, is experienced as sense by the human soul, by means of an immediate intuition or observation. The correlation between intuition and the given in its disclosure, constitutes the experience called evidence, and is therefore a composite factor of evidence (Theron, 1995).