Essay On Israel

• President Carter arranged the Camp David Peace Accords between Israel and Egypt. (In the Middle East, America favored the country of Israel. The Soviet Union favored Israel’s Arab neighbors.)

The country of Palestine has a unique history that distinguishes it from other nations. In 1948, Israel became an independent nation, covering a large portion of another country called Palestine. Eventually, as time continued, Israel seized the rest of Palestine by 1967. This dominance resulted in the Palestinians lack of a homeland. Due to this, various altercations between both groups of people, the Israelis and the Palestinians, arose. The prospects for a peaceful settlement between both, Israelis and Palestinians, are minimal.

The relationship between the State of Israel and the United States of America has blossomed into a significant bilateral alliance. The ‘special relationship’ between the two countries has been the driving force behind much of the progress of the United States’ push into middle east democracy, and has helped place Israel in the company of countries who will stand by her in times of trouble. As of late, there have been increasing pushes by the Untied States for Israel to once again enter into peace talks with the Palestinians, a topic which seems to be the source of constant international commentary. These developments have brought to the forefront a rather interesting facet of the Israeli/American relationship, one which this author

Most important agreement was between US and Israel then between Israel and Egypt (Telhamy 630).

Sadat became a militant leader who threatened Israel between1970-73. He was responsible for the war on Israel which began in October 1973 and ended in a stalemate. The weak financial situation in Egypt at the time precipitated riots. The failure of his military initiative resulted in a change in tactics and Sadat became a voice for political negotiation. It was in this context that the ‘Statement to the Knesset’ took place. His visit to Israel was unprecedented for an Egyptian. The purpose of the speech is for Sadat, perhaps following his own personal intuition and instincts, or his conscience, to go to Israel to broker a peace settlement, in order to save further massive Israeli and Arab bloodletting from occurring. The speech shares the underlying theme of justice and unity; he expresses these themes through the use of rhetorical questions and religious allusions.

On behalf of the State Department I was involved in an Israeli foreign policy and decision-making simulation where members were to agree upon various minimal peace terms and implementations. This brief for General H. R. McMaster will provide the most thorough analysis of the outcomes from this simulation to provide the best suggestions for the United States involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The opening remarks by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu were that the ministers must agree in consensus or the proposition shall not pass, the cabinet must decide on their most minimal peace terms, and at the conclusion of deliberations all ministers must agree or resign. (February 27 Minutes) Netanyahu met

The Camp David Accords were signed on September 17, 1978 at the presidential retreat Camp David. It was a peace treaty between the two warring nations Israel and Egypt and was paired with a shuffle in territory. U.S. president Jimmy Carter accompanied Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian leader Anwar El Sadat for the negotiations. These events led to more interaction with Egypt and Israel, paved the way for future diplomatic meetings, and contributed to a psychological shift in Israel.

At the White House in Washington, D.C. Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin sign the Camp David Accords, laying the groundwork for a permanent peace agreement between Egypt and Israel after three decades of hostilities. The accords were negotiated during 12 days of intensive talks at President Jimmy Carter’s Camp David retreat in the Catoctin Mountains of Maryland. The final peace agreement–the first between Israel and one of its Arab neighbors–was signed in March 1979. Sadat and Begin were jointly awarded the 1978 Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts.

As well as the Three ‘Operational Objectives’ from the Sinai Campaign, it consisted of three political aims; to overthrow Nasser, expand Israeli borders and establishment of a new political order in the Middle East. Unlike the successes from their operational objectives, they failed to achieve the political aims. In the first political aim, Israel paid a heavy political price for ganging up with Britain and France against the emergent forces of Arab nationalism. In the second political aim involving Israel’s borders, Israel was forced to disgorge all the territory it had conquered. The third aim however, written by Shlaim tends to contradict Moshe Dayan’s view that the ‘victory in Sinai meant that Israel emerged as a state that would be welcomed as a friend and ally.’ While this may not be directed at Arab nations, it may have been implied in terms of relations with foreign powers. Although Ben Gurion failed to topple Nasser and achieve his political aims, the Suez War had allowed Gurion to force Sharett’s resignation which initially gave him the option of launching a war against Egypt. Moreover, Shlaim contends that Israel and Ben Gurion learned two important lessons from its experience in the Suez War. Firstly, Israel must rely on nuclear deterrence to protect its borders rather than expanding it. Secondly, Israel was to depend on the US in future decision making and must deal and directly consult with the US

According to an apocryphal story, Pope John Paul once said that he believes there are two possible solutions to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the realistic and the miraculous. The realistic being divine intervention, and the miraculous being a voluntary agreement by both parties. On September 13th, 1993, it looked like the miraculous had happened when the Oslo Accords were signed by Prime Minister Rabin and PLO Chairman Arafat on the White House South Lawn. However, the objectives of the accords were never fully implemented and the Palestinians remain stateless. Further steps toward peace, including Oslo II and Camp David, have fallen short of the goals of both sides. In the book International Relations of the Middle East the chapter titled “The Rise and Fall of the Oslo Peace Process” details the slow process of the formation of the Oslo accords, as well as attempts at implementation and the fall of the Declaration of Principles. The author outlines the events between 1990 and 2001 and makes the argument that Oslo failed because: (1) it had a bad foundation, (2) the accords did not account for the core issues of the conflict, (3) Israel did not complete of their side of the agreement, (4) Palestinian violence, (5) Israeli West Bank settlements, and (6) the failure to create a Palestinian state.

The Camp David Accord of 1978 were secret negotiations between Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin that was arranged by President Jimmy Carter. These secret negotiations took place place at Camp David and lasted for 12 days from September 5, 1978 to September 17, 1978. As result of these negotiations between Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, two sets of agreements were made. The first agreement was to determine the future of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. More specifically, it called for Egypt, Israel, Jordan and other members of the Palestinian group to figure out the question of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The Arab nations strategically planned to attack during the Jewish Yom Kippur holiday as they believed that the Israelis would be unable to tend to matters of national security (O’Ballance). Ultimately their goal was to repossess the Suez Canal, the Golan Banks, and the West Bank. Anwar Sedat, the President of Egypt at the time, had several reasons for taking this position as he was influenced by several high ranking Egyptian political figures who “viewed the War of Attrition as comprising two main areas: First there existed the Palestinian problem. Israel’s creation left territorial expense, of the Palestinians in particular, and the Arab nations, wholly. Secondly, the Israeli occupation of Arab lands in the Six-Day War, lead the Egyptian leadership to realize that an activist line aimed at attaining an immediate and total solution to both issues would end in failure. Therefore, it chose to proceed in stages: first a solution to the 1967 problem, then a solution to the 1948 one” (Shah). Although Sedat aimed to have victory over Israel, he realized that peace could come come out of this war between the two countries. In order for this to come to fruition, Sedat began tactically relocating from Egypt 20,000 Soviet advisors (Rabinovich 17) and reopened relations with the United States, who was

On October 2, 1979, Pope John Paul II made a pivotal address to the U.N. General assembly, pointing out that “while being prepared to recognize the value of any concrete step or attempt made to settle the conflict, I want to recall that I would have no value if it did not truly represent the first stone of general overall peace in the area, a peace that, being necessarily based on equitable recognition of the rights of all, cannot fail to include the consideration and just settlement of the Palestinian question.”8

The Difficulties of the Attempts to Find a Peace Settlement Between the Palestinians and the Jews

Keeping these thoughts in mind I will investigate some key issues that affect the progress towards peace in the region including the relationship that exists between the United States and Israel; the 2002 Road Map to Peace and why it failed; and finally the effect of Arafat?s death and the implications for the future.