Essay On The Iran Nuclear Deal

Kim Jongun, has mentioned before that he wants the world to look up to his strong country as a nuclear power, rather than just a mere country with multiple sanctions shouting big words. This in the past has led to various consequences from hegemonies all around the world who feel threatened by the implications of a young tyrant in charge of ICBMs. This is a clear example of the security dilemma in which the entire world, the anarchy that it is, has to control minor nations that strive for hegemony at the expense of the larger nations’ security and loss of leverage. Unfortunately, it seems that despite the clear warnings from the superior nations, the North Korean dictator has no interest in abiding by international rules and is far more fascinated with realist ideologies of projections of power.

In January 1979, Iranians opposed to the Shah’s rule invaded the American embassy in Tehran and held a group of 52 American diplomats and other hostages for 444 days. The Shah left Iran and the victorious Ayatollah Khomeini returned that February. Of the approximately 90 people inside the embassy, 52 remained in captivity until the end of the crisis. The reputation of the Ayatollah Khomeini and the hostage taking was further enhanced with the failure of a hostage rescue attempt that cost lives. The Ayatollah Khomeini set forth several demands to be met prior to the release of the hostages. The US had options of their own; however, the risk to the hostages required the utmost consideration. In order to secure their freedom, outgoing

The U.S. helped to divide the Korean peninsula at the end of World War II, and then waged war against North Korea in the 1950s. Although the U.S. signed a peace agreement rather than a peace treaty with North Korea after the war, its policy toward the country changed. Instead of trying to overthrow the North Korea government, the U.S. government adopted a policy of containing communism. During the 1980’s, associations between North Korea and the U.S. start to take on a new diplomatic form. North Korea’s nuclear weapons program had become a pressing international issue

Since the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA), or Iran Deal, was signed in Vienna on July 14, 2015, there widespread debate as to whether the agreement would benefit both sides of the pact. Due to the numerous amount of steps taken to ensure Iran’s compliance, the accord between Iran China, France, Russia, the U.K, the U.S, Germany and the EU (P5+1+ Eu countries) provides both sides with comfortable allowances that allow each state to thrive. Though highly contested, as demonstrated from the varying opinions in the supplied articles, the JCPOA solidified the deconstruction of Iran’s uranium enrichment program, which is one of the hardest objectives to achieve in the field of international relations. As shown by the world’s quandary

This paper will seek to identify three key aspects of US sanctions imposed on Iran. First the paper will briefly introduce the reasons as to why US and Iran relations have worsened since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Secondly, this paper shall outline some of the key sanctions imposed on Iran which have influenced Irans’s behaviour. After sanctions are reviewed, the paper will then summarise the impact of sanctions on Iran. Last but not the least and most importantly, the paper will elaborate how Iran is resisting stringent US sanctions. This paper will argue that despite punitive measures adopted by the US, Iran has found alternative mechanisms to fight them and has reoriented its

North Korea’s commitments were broad and suggested that the Six-Party denuclearization agreement and the Six-Party Talks would resume. The collapse of the Leap Day Agreement now leads us to ask. what do we do now? (Revere 2) The proposal that Pyongyang set forth offers to temporarily stop nuclear testing if Washington cancels its future military drills with South Korea. Although it might not seem like a good idea to help North Korea and their economy because they might use that to further their development on nuclear weapons, if there is a slight chance to let them see that they need the United States and for them to denuclearize, we should take

When the deal was signed on July 14, 2015, it successfully achieved the limitation the aforementioned threats, as Iran will have no nuclear weapons and be subject to intense U.N oversight for at least ten years. This oversight, sanctioned by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), consists of stringent daily facility and centrifuge inspections, with a clause that states “the IAEA will have access where necessary, when necessary” (Chin and Lincy, Iran Watch). To quote President Barack Obama, the Iranian Deal “is not built on trust; it is built on verification” (Chin and Lincy, Iran Watch). Lifting sanctions placed on Iran in exchange for these allowances is not a difficult decision. A deal that restricts and checks enrichment, and also renders Iran a non nuclear- weapon possessing country is a good deal that allows states around the world to sigh a breath of relief.

JCPOA stipulated each party commitments and rights. It also defined how to settle differences among parties, if appeared and each part might what to do in case of unilateral violations done by another party. Under JCPOA and Security Council resolution 2231, If Iran does not comply its commitments and these noncompliance verified by IAEA, then snap back sanctions being activated. If US does not comply its

have nuclear and hydrogen weapons, but for Iran, which is not a member of NATO and its security is not guaranteed by any country in the world, the simple principle of self-defense becomes so problematic?” (Vaez, 2017). The JCPOA satisfies Iran’s demand for increased influence while maintaining the priority of international nuclear stability. With worldwide peace and proliferation safeguards an international interest, the United States should utilize a selective engagement mindset, specifically in regards to a great powers focus, to maintain leverage and unity within the multilateral agreement, “Selective engagement endeavors to ensure peace among powers that have substantial industrial and military potential – the great powers” (Posen, & Ross, 2000). By prioritizing vital interests, the great powers can develop a collaborative and effective strategy to force Iranian nuclear cessation and maintain unity to avoid Iranian partnerships with nations seeking to increase their sphere of influence. Additionally, the international response to Iran establishes a

For example, the US can negotiate a freeze in North Korea's nuclear program in exchange for a reduction of US and South Korean military exercises. By doing so, NK might perceive a reduced threat to its regime and could be open to more negotiations about its nuclear program. Currently, NK seems to view its nuclear weapons program as a 'security blanket' for its country. This view is evident in an article by The Washington Post, which mentioned that "North Korea has used its emerging weapons capability as a deterrent" (Fifield, 2017). So, by offering negotiations instead of war threats, the US can alleviate some of NK's fears of a regime change. These fears might be linked to the fact that it is the last standing 'Axis of Evil' labeled by President George W. Bush and have seen what happens when the other ‘Axis of Evil’ gave up their nuclear

Throughout many years, Iran has been known for its interest in weapons of mass destructions and the nuclear power they have. Iranians and Americans have had their fair share of problems, especially with the capturing of the American Embassy employees in 1979. Since Iran has a great advantage of obtaining weapons of mass destructions in exchange for commodities such as oil and protection, the Iran deal would be ineffective in some a form of way. China has been conducting economic relations with Iran in recent years, despite the presence of international sanctions on Iran for continuing to develop its nuclear program. China’s relations with Iran may support the latter’s military

The debate around the Iran Deal is a funny thing. Most political debates revolving around foreign policy focus on typical partisan divides. As a conservative, I may have ideologically been opposed to much of the Obama-era (and Trump-era) policy. From the sequence of withdrawal in Iraq to military sequestration, I wholeheartedly believe that former President Obama’s foreign policy was a complete and utter disaster.

While the Iran-Iraq War during the 1980's may have permanently altered the course of progress in Iran and Iraq, the war also altered the resulting permanent involvement of the rest of the world in the middle-east. The rich and complicated history in Iraq has established numerous cultural and ethnic traditions that all play a part in where the country is today. The Iran-Iraq War brought into focus some of those traditions and how they conflicted, while also bringing Iraq and its economic situation into the spotlight. Being on top of some of the most mineral rich soil in the world makes Iraq a major contributor to the world's economy through petroleum and crude oil exports. This, among other reasons, ties nations

There is no dispute that the Middle East, for the past century, has been a region plagued with tension and conflict. Differences in religion and ethnicity have been the source for hundreds of thousands of deaths, and the progression of those issues have shown very little evidence of slowing down as the bloodshed continues. Many parties on the global scale fear that the combination of evolving technology and weaponry, and desire to harness nuclear power, is fueling the hatred that some of the countries in the area have for one another and will eventually lead to an extremely disastrous nuclear war. As a result, international global organizations, such as the United Nations, have been working to prevent such an outcome. They are

Before advancing further, it is necessary to analyze the events of 2003 – 2005 to understand the role of the IAEA during this period and why such broad international assistance was needed to achieve the slightest of results. After receiving the Board of Director’s resolution of September 2003, Iran immediately questioned its authority as it was outside of the Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocol. Iran believed the resolution and request for cooperation “had no legal base and would be accepted not as an international obligation but as a gesture of goodwill and a confidence-building measure” (Mousavin 74). It was not until Iran was threatened with referral to the S.C. under Article XII, Paragraph C of the IAEA statute that they began to comply. Iran was not prepared to handle the consequences of a referral, “which would threaten the country with isolation” (Mousavin 76). In addition, suspicion of Iran had spread from the Western countries to Russia, China, and its Middle Eastern neighbors. It was only after immense