Ethical Disaster of the Hyatt Regency Collapse

Now thats hard work and detication. The article states, "The engineers worked throughout the winter measuring, designing, and drawing." This took a lot of hard work to complete the building by spring. This is why intelligence and pysical strength is such an imortant roll in working together to create something big and by being able to get it done in time.

During this part of the report, I will be discussing what problems could occur during each phase (pre-construction, construction, post construction) and how you can go about preventing this from

This situation happened three weeks before collapse and it continue without experience workers considering concern of the load not properly distributed. The project engineer should have been in charge with the stockpiling of materials on the bridge because construction inspector was in charge that materials met standards. A safety engineer noted that the gusset plate was bowing during his inspection and consulted another engineer on the problem. The other engineer said the connection did not show deterioration or signs of deterioration and other design problems was not their job, so the bowing was not noted in the inspection report. The safety engineer was knowledgeable to know that the bowing was a problem in the structure of the bridge but taking the suggestion from the other engineer suggest that safety engineer duty did not align with their will that bowing was the problem but it was not their job to suggest

Construction appears careless or haphazard. Many details need refinement for a strong or attractive product.

The mutually agreed upon contract was to build a 20,000 square foot (sq.ft) parts warehouse at 1265 E. 20th Street in Chico, California. The constructed tilt up building was built and equipped with all the newest and latest technology. The plans and specifications were prepared in collaboration by the architect, Ellerbe Becket (referred to herein as “AR”), and the engineer, Degenkolb (referred to herein as “ER”) and provided to GCA by FORG. ER was founded in 1940 and has a long history of engineering many different projects including hospitals, high rises, and concrete tilt ups. AR was founded in 1909 and has a very good reputation in the industry of designing quality structures all over the country. This project was open to all bidders that were able to meet the prequalification requirements. All prospective qualified bidders were able to view all plans and specifications on the website www.box.com, (referred

After the collapse of the dam, many independent investigators were hired to inspect the dam site for damages. They discovered that the dam was not constructed accordingly to the design specifications. According to reports they noticed that the dam width did not exceed 140 feet as it was specified in the design. This suggests that the bottom portion of the dam may not have been adjusted to be proportional to the height. During the initial stages of construction, cracks appeared on dam, however Mulholland did not seem to be concerned. When the dam was completed, Mulholland inspected the dam by himself without any support. Even prior to the collapse of the dam, Mulholland was notified of cracks along the dam in which he concluded to be safe. As a result, the dam collapsed and took the lives of hundreds to his poor judgement. Furthermore, deputy district attorneys discovered that there were changes made on the dam by Mulholland and individuals who worked on the project. Unfortunately, these changes were not properly documented, which the district attorney’s found it difficult to understand and complete the construction process. Civil Engineers must strive to be transparent in the design and execution of a project, but Mulholland failed to do so as a chief engineer. District attorneys could not obtain documents that they requested because Mulholland failed to record enough details about the construction process, which shows Mulhollands lack of leadership as an

An investigation into the design flaw of two floating balconies above the atrium of the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Kansas City, Missouri, is discussed in this report. The following investigation includes a closer look at disputes in design between the engineering consultants and the fabrication company, as well as an examination of load capacity. In the design, three walkways were intertwined between the second, third, and fourth floors above the hotel’s atrium (Leyendecker, E., Marshall, R., Pfrang, E., & Woodward, K., 1982). The second floor’s walkway was suspended from the fourth, which was suspended from the roof. The third floor’s walkway was hanging from the roof of the atrium, independent to the other two. When a collapse occurred on July 17, 1981, the fourth floor, which was suspended from the roof, collapsed and landed on top of the second floor. As a result, both floors crashed into the atrium at ground-level (Leyendecker, E., Marshall, R., Pfrang, E., & Woodward, K., 1982). The main causes of the collapse are questionable engineering ethics, negligence, and disputing agencies. These two factors resulted in a poor foundation with lack of consideration of large stress on the structure (Hyatt Regency Walkway Collapse, 2006).

Multiplex argued that Mott MacDonald’s design for the Wembley steel work was not fit for purpose and that the initial designs were not correct, constructible, coordinated and consistent. In other words, although the design looked good, it was very challenging and maybe impossible to replicate to scale.

The two departments that were responsible for producing the drawings do not communicate with each other. The Engineering department does not design for manufacturing. It seems that efficiency and costs are not considered in the design phase.

*This was a build/design project. The idea of making design decisions after construction was underway is an recipe for catastrophe in a project of this magnitude. The city's insistence that this be held to a tight schedule yet allowing multiple design changes was unfortunate. There were too many players, lots of pressure, and the whole project was run by committee with differing agendas. The project administrators had to balance administrative, political, and social imperatives.

According to Luth (2000) there were many opportunities throughout the construction and design phase for the design flaw to be recognized by the engineers and there should have been a better review system in place as the changes that were made were not properly reviewed by a structural engineer. This disaster could have been avoided if someone would have taken the time to make sure all the designs were safe and would work

On the 21st October 1994 saw, what was described as, one of ‘the worst civil engineering disasters in the United Kingdom in the last twenty-five years’. Balfour Beatty, the contractor in charge of a part of the £440 million project to build a part of the tunnel for the Heathrow Express train in the CTA (Central Terminal Area), were five years later charged with a fine of £1.2 million plus, £100,000 worth of prosecution costs for the collapse of a section of the tunnel near Heathrow Airport and seventy-five meters away from a section of the Piccadilly line tunnel. Geoconsult, an expert designer of Balfour Beatty’s for the NATM (New Austrian Tunnelling Method) were also fined by the Old Bailey Criminal Crown Court £500,000 plus £100,000 for prosecution costs.

Question 1 Summarize 1 one page how you would explain Enron’s ethical meltdown: Enron was an energy company founded by Kenneth Lay in 1985 through a merger of vast networks of natural gas lines. Enron specialized in wholesale, natural gas, and electricity, and made its money as a wholesaler between suppliers and customers rather than actually owning any. Enron in fact didn’t own any assets, which made their accounting procedures very unusual. The lack of accounting transparency at Enron allowed the company’s managers to make Enron’s financial performance better than it actually was. The organizational culture at Enron was to blame for it’s ethical meltdown. Enron’s accounting scheme slowly began to erode its ethical practices, which soon led the culture of Enron to become a more aggressive and misleading business practice. Enron reported profits from joint partnerships that were not yet attained in order to keep stock prices up (or make wall street happy). As this was happening employees began to notice the ethics in senior management (leadership) deteriorating, and soon after they to would follow in their footsteps. Senior management thought they were saving their company from financial ruin and though lying was ok if it meant saving the company. Investors would surely sell their stocks if they really knew the situation the

Many times, risks faced by contractors exist at no fault of their own. That is, in some cases the contractor is bound by a design that places specific hazards on the construction site. Designers who are cognizant of and responsive to their effort on construction safety would aid in making jobsites safer for construction workers (Gambatese et al, 1997). Situations such as these led the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health to create a safe design concept, prevention through design. Prevention

A maximum time variance allowance of ±15% on the project is to be allowed. Quality Audits by the Architectural Teams and engineers are to be performed at regular intervals, and all other important information must be communicated to all managers involved in progress meetings. Health and Safety must be given a considerable amount of weighting due to the fact that the process is very labour intensive and involves high powered tools and heavy machinery.