Essay about European Law and the Principle of Conferral

The freedom of speech and of the press, does not protect an individual that may present

Firstly, we will consider the customary character of the introductory phase and sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 1. The customary character of the introductory phase and sub para 1 (a) was never in question, both State practice and opinion juris clearly show that these initiatives had a lege ferenda character. Furthermore, subsequent practice also confirmed the customary character of the provision. However, with regard to the customary character of paragraph 1 (b) and 2 there exist several controversies. It was only introduced at the last moment, as an amendment by the UK and had been adopted by a very narrow margin. Paragraph 1 (b) of Article 56 states that certain treaties by their “nature” contain implied denunciation clauses but it does indicate which those treaties are. As a result, in order to identify these categories of treaties which is the raison d’etre, of subpara. 1(b), one turns to custom. Hence, the existence is customary law of a single category of treaties of this nature would suffice to show the customary character of 1(b). Therefore, Article 56(1) does show customary character of

the freedom of speech, infringing on the freedom of the press, interfering with the right to

La Forest, L’Heureux-Dubé, Gunthier, and Cory J.J. dissented, stating the appeals should be allowed and those questions raised answered. However, ss. 4 (advertisement), 8 (trademark use), and 9 (unattributed health warnings) of the Act cannot be found to coincide with the right of freedom of expression and do not present any limitations on that right. Furthermore, ss.5 (retail displays) and 6 (sponsorships) cannot be successfully removed from relating to ss. 4, 8, and 9, thusly making all of no effect in relation to s.

The first may be either oversight or obligatory licensing by the government in advance of publication and the second is discipline for printed material, particularly that considered by the government to be libel or material that had the intention to defamed a person or the government itself.

European Law is very complex law , within EU law there is various different treaties which are in place. Two most significant treaties which have importance to the legislative process are The Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union.

The Supreme Court has interpreted “speech” and “press” to include not only speaking and writing, but also television, radio, using the Internet, and symbolic expression. Restricting speech because of the content is generally illegal, because a main principle in democracy is that the government should not be allowed to decide what information the people are allowed to hear or read.

(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision was made for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court referred to in article 5;

Supreme Court has long respected the freedom of the press when it came to commentaries made on public figures and matters of public interest. Court stressed that such freedom is not absolute and unrestrained. Exercise of this right and other rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights comes with equal responsibility, thus, the recognition of a right should not roughshod over the rights of

The principle of supremacy of European Union (EU) law has been established over the course of more than five decades. It is a principle that was established by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 1964, and it has continued to have a rich history in the jurisprudence of the ECJ and national constitutional courts. As the ECJ and national courts attempt to define their respective realms of influence, a bright debate has sparked regarding constitutional pluralism. Moreover, the recent codification of primacy in the Constitutional Treaty has led to a new debate on the scope of the supremacy of EU law.

Historically the EEC treaty contained no provision dealing with the concept of supremacy of Community law over the national law of member states. In fact, treaties were generally silent as to the nature of the relationship between EU law and national law except for a general obligation contained in article 4 (3) TEU which states:-

Under Art. 267, only ‘court or tribunal’ of a member state may initiate preliminary reference to the ECJ, however through succeeding case law this has been expanded by allowing entities whose members may not be judges, ‘provided that those entities have the power to adjudicate disputes’12. This concept of a court or tribunal has been interpreted widely as it is a matter of union law13. The Advocate-General in De Coster14 criticised the court’s approach and criteria to the interpretation as he deemed it confusing. The court in this instance accepted the reference, as ‘it was a permanent body established in law, that it gives legal rulings and that the jurisdiction is compulsory’15. The court in further cases has treated tribunals as not only tax appeal like in the case above but also; customs, social security and immigration.

However, others might argue the distortion of this freedom of expression law by explaining that some news reports are not informed accurately. As Brewer-Carías states, “the problem with this law is the definition of the “official” truth and the rejection of any other possible truth” (2010, p.153). Therefore, the view some people might argue in regard to freedom of

However again this higher status can be seen as limited as is only assumed from a written obligation. Therefore to asses if supremacy is not the challenge to member state sovereignty that is appears to be, a close analysis of how the CJEU has dealt with the issue of supremacy of EU law in case law is needed, firstly looking at Van Gend en Loos which stated that the ‘EU was a new legal order permanently limiting the sovereign rights of the Member State’. This customs case helped establish the ‘relationships between the European Union and international law…to grantee that the rules of one system are complied with in another legal order ’ showing in practise that if on a national level EU law is breached CJEU will take supremacy and comply with ‘the integrity of the EU legal order’ . Further evaluation of the limits of the supremacy can be seen in the case of Costa V ENEL where ‘Italy had claimed that the EU treaties…had been transposed into the Italian legal order by national legislation, which could therefore be derogated by subsequent national legislation. The court rejected this presumption of the supremacy of national law by insisting on the supremacy of EU law’ . This case holds significance as it ‘is well-known since Costa V ENEL the court has affirmed the supremacy of Community law over national law’ strongly suggesting the continued existence of EU supremacy is not frequently

The European Union (EU) was established in order to prevent the horrors of modern warfare, experienced by most of Europe during the World Wars of the 20th century, from ever ensuing again, by aiming to create an environment of trust with the countries of Europe cooperating in areas such as commerce, research and trade (Adams, 2001). The EU has evolved into an economic, trade, political and monetary alliance between twenty-eight European Member States. While not all Member States are in monetary union (i.e. share the currency of the euro), those that are form the ‘Euro-zone’ (Dinan, 2006). The EU can pass a number of types of legislation, with a regulation, act, or law, being the most powerful. Its ‘tricameral’ (European Union, 2007)