Evaluating Kuhn´s Theory of Scientific Development Essay

Scientific innovation, a newly introduced idea that everything has to be proven by science in order to be accurate , begun heading into the 20th century. Science led to confusion, uncertainty and unrest

Kuhn noted that his critics claimed that his method is historical, descriptive, and relies on social psychology, whereas their own method is logical and normative. He defended his position by affirming that both of his view and his critics' rely on historical case studies and observations on scientific behaviour. The only difference is that he, contrary to his critics, began as an historian of science to construct a theory of scientific knowledge.

Tits The Scientific Revolution of the fifteen and sixteen hundreds heralded the progression towards a new era of rational and mathematical thinking. Instead of relying on the ideas of the ancient Greeks as Renaissance philosophers did, the contributors of the Scientific Revolution began to look to the world around them for answers. The scientists and philosophers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were surrounded by an amalgam of social, political, and religious factors that would influence the method in which they introduced their theories and findings to the world. These factors often supported and promoted the growth of the Sciences, but only when they adhered to the motives of a higher power. Oftentimes, scientific inquiry was suppressed by powerful forces determined to maintain their grip

Kuhn defines “normal science” as research firmly based upon one or more past scientific achievements achieves that some particular scientific community acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practice.” He later referred to achievements sharing these two characteristics as “paradigms”. Bawazer’s discussion very well could be the dawning of a new scientific paradigm as discussed by Kuhn is his essay. Kuhn goes on to state, “Men whose research is based on shared paradigms are committed to the same rules and standards for scientific practice. That commitment and the apparent consensus it produces are prerequisites for normal science, i.e., for the genesis and continuation of a particular research tradition” (900). Clearly, the research studies Luke Bawazer’s has conducted could definitely qualify as a new scientific paradigm discussed by Kuhn. Other examples that may qualify as new scientific paradigm are highlighted in Bawazer’s Tedtalk video such as the work of Joe Davis and colleagues, who inserted the gene into bacteria to produce a functioning bacteria radio. Another example of this type of technology highlighted in the video by Angela Belcher, shows that viruses can be used to build batteries and solar cells. No doubt, this definitely the dawning of a new scientific

In “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions” Thomas Kuhn argues that normal science inevitably runs into a crisis. Why is it necessarily the case? Is there a way to avoid scientific crises?

According to Kuhn, science has to develop prior assumptions that reevaluate prior facts before it acquires its first universally received paradigm. An example from our “Case History on the Concept of Electrical Charge” is the discoveries of Gilbert and Cabeo. Gilberts experiment lead him to believe that the effluvium emitted by an excited electric acts directly on the body rather than acting indirectly by setting un an air current that moves the body. But after Cabeo looked at Gilberts work he went to conclude a different hypothesis, which was that his observation that objects sometimes rebound or are repelled by rubbed “electrics” is that if there were no air around the electric, it could not attract the objects when rubbed. Cabeo’s hypothesis

However, Kuhn says that it isn’t necessary to have a full parallelism and that we can gain from relaxing the standard. When scientists change their minds about fundamental matters, Kuhn suggests that this is a necessary part of a philosophical paradigm. He also thinks that scientist’s changing their minds is neither a mistake or all wrong. When crisis’s occur, they suggest what some of the new paradigm’s characteristics will be. Crisis’s are unable to be postponed indefinitely which was demonstrated by Newtonian dynamics. Again, Kuhn suggests that the world doesn’t change when a paradigm changes but the scientist tends to in a different world because their viewpoint changes with the paradigm. Normal science is clarified as aiming to refine, extend, and articulate a paradigm. With paradigms, the interpretation of data is crucial to articulating a paradigm. However, data isn’t able to correct a paradigm. Therefore, normal science leads to the acknowledgement of anomalies and then to

Throughout The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas S. Kuhn goes over a common problem that often exists among science, the problem of relativity in conformation with Kuhn’s concept of a paradigm. Many viewed Kuhn’s reply to charges of relativism as mundane, and that his reply may be inadequate. I feel his reply is adequate in the sense that Kuhn accounts for the fact that different people may have different perceptions of reality and that competing viewpoints may both be valid. Kuhn argues that both the skeptic and the relativist are wrong. Potentially, it could be said that Kuhn does not feel that progress in the field of science is a relative concept. However mainly the argument is that Kuhn

The concept of revolutions in science has been debated by historians and philosophers for decades; especially the notion that there was a singular idiosyncratic Scientific Revolution. Despite this, most historians will refer to the Scientific Revolution as spanning approximately the sixteenth century to the end of the eighteenth century. This period displayed a rise in inductive reasoning, and can also be seen as an epistemological revolution, where scientific discoveries were being based on experimental research, as opposed to the traditional philosophy and faith. The importance of the Scientific Revolution can be attributed to the coincidental multidisciplinary breakthroughs made during the Revolution, which fundamentally transformed societal views of the natural world. Finally, philosophers such as Georg Hegel and Thomas Kuhn have been able to use systematic methodology introduced in the Scientific Revolution to validate their models of progress;, more specifically, scientific progress. The Scientific Revolution was the beginning of the Modern Age, as it was the paradigm shift from the traditional, ancient world science, to the empirical and rational modern science.

Popper’s scientific philosophy was solely based on truth, based on the idea that new scientific theories are generated when old scientific theories are proven to be false; he states that in order for a theory to be scientific, it must be falsifiable. On the other hand, Kuhn’s philosophy was based on thought, and how scientist’s collective thoughts and theories change as concepts and practices change with time. These two individuals have directly opposing philosophies- truth versus thought. Finally, Lakatos’ scientific philosophy acts as a happy medium between the two, describing science and scientific revolutions as both truth and thought, although he did emphasize that truth may be a more reliable factor. Whether it be truth, or thought, or both behind the changes in science over time, it does not change the fact that scientific revolutions happen, and that they will continue to happen throughout the course of

Science is characterised by distinctive methods of enquiry and construction of theories (2). Philosophy of science is tasked with analysing the processes employed by scientists and uncovering the assumptions implicit in scientific practice (2, 12). According to Karl Popper a scientific theory ought to be falsifiable; otherwise it is merely pseudo-science (13). Scientists arrive at a set of beliefs by a process of inference (which is more often than not influenced by researcher bias). That is, deductive and inductive patterns of reasoning are used to provide a defensible explanation of the process generating the observed pattern of interest (18-23). Thomas Kuhn suggested that scientific concepts are largely influenced by the paradigms (set of

In this essay I attempt to answer the following two questions: What is Karl Popper’s view of science? Do I feel that Thomas Kuhn makes important points against it? The two articles that I make reference to are "Science: Conjectures and Refutations" by Karl Popper and "Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?" by Thomas Kuhn.

It seems radical and conformist to the point of truism to state that “science” was, historically, a definably romantic endeavour. The heroic, transcendent and improvement focused elements of scientific endeavour have been celebrated, but few sources directly acknowledge the conferred values of the romantic. The interdisciplinary overlap that existed before the lath eighteenth and early nineteenth century definition of scientific application, research, art and academia is rarely discussed in direct examinations of scientific methodology. Similarly, the embrace of the subjective, the social and the highly experimental amongst earlier natural philosophers sits uneasily within a thoroughly structural examination of science. It is subsequently difficult to reconcile enlightenment grounded assertions that the primary focus of science has always been the discovery of natural “rules” and their applications, through pure logic and reason.

Popper and Kuhn held differing views on the nature of scientific progress. As seen in Popper’s falsification theory, he held that theories can never be proved only disproved or falsified. Once a theory is proved false we move on to the next. Kuhn, on the other, hand argued a new paradigm may solve puzzles better than the old one but you cannot describe the old science as false. Both seem to share the Kantian idea that the really real, independently existing world is completely unknowable. Kuhn further asserts that the empirical world, which is knowable, is partly constructed by our categories and concepts. The fundamental difference in their views are best stated in Kuhn’s own words, “A very different approach to this whole network of problems has been developed by Karl R. Popper who denies the existence of any verification procedures at all. Instead he emphasizes the importance of falsification, i.e., of the test that, because its outcome is negative, necessitates the rejection of an established theory. Clearly, the role thus attributed to falsification is much like the one this essay assigns to anomalous experiences, i.e., to experiences that, by evoking crisis, prepare the way for a new theory. Nevertheless, anomalous experiences may not be identified with falsifying ones.”(Kuhn, 145) As seen by this passage, the fundamental difference between Popper and Kuhn is that Popper disregards “verification” and Kuhn asserts that “falsification” only takes place once a

The world of science, as we know it today, is a difficult subject to grasp. So many new ideas are present and these new ideas are not interchangeable. Some parts do work together although as a whole they don’t fully coincide with each other. The three basic ideas that science is now based upon come from Newton, Einstein, and Hawking. I call these ideas/theories “new” based on what I classify the state of the scientific community of today. After looking at what is going on in science, it is clear to me that the scientific world is in a crisis state. According to Kuhn, a crisis state is when science is in the middle of choosing a particular paradigm to work under. For scientists, there is a general theme