Evolution Of Us Policy Towards Arms Control

When President Truman authorized the use of two nuclear weapons in 1945 against the Japanese in the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to end World War II, the nature of international security was changed irreversibly. At that time, the United States had what was said to have a monopoly of atomic bombs. Soon thereafter, the Soviet Union began working on atomic weaponry. In 1949, it had already detonated it first atomic bomb and tensions began to heat up between the two countries. With the information that the Soviets had tested their first bomb, the United States began work on more powerful weapons1, and a fight for nuclear superiority had begun.

The cold war in conjunction with the nuclear arms race raised a countless number of dangers that were new to Americans. One of the most obvious risks raised by the nuclear arms race was the blast of the bomb itself. The bombs that were emerging were only getting colossal, and the effects were reaching potential world destruction. For example, the atomic bombs used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were minuscule compared to the Hydrogen bomb, which the U.S built to stay ahead of the Soviet Union. But as history has shown itself, the Soviet Union came kept up with the competition and created a Hydrogen bomb as well. Now both countries possessed bombs that could decimate out entire countries.

In the aftermath of World War II, tensions heightened between the two dominant powers: America and the USSR. The differences between the ideologies of the communist USSR and the capitalist United States led to a rapid deterioration in relations. The era between 1945, which marked the end of World War II, to 1991, when the Soviet Union dissolved, became known as the Cold War due to the fact that despite the lack of large scale conflict, both sides still feared a nuclear holocaust. Both the United States and the Soviet Union followed the military strategy of mutually assured destruction (MAD), meaning that neither side was willing to risk first attack lest the other nation retaliate massively . The fundamental tenet behind MAD that enabled it to serve as an effective deterrent was the idea of secondary strike capability. In essence, it was the ability of a nation to launch a counterattack and thereby ensure mutual destruction. Submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) fulfilled this criteria admirably due to their ability to stay submerged for extended periods of time, the difficulty involved with locating a submarine, and their invulnerability to nuclear missile attacks when submerged. As a result, the United States attempted to corner this leg of the nuclear triad.

Since the invention of nuclear weapons, they have presented the world with a significant danger, one that was shown in reality during the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. However, nuclear weapons have not only served in combat, but they have also played a role in keeping the world peaceful by the concept of deterrence. The usage of nuclear weapons would lead to mutual destruction and during the Cold War, nuclear weapons were necessary to maintain international security, as a means of deterrence. However, by the end of the Cold War, reliance on nuclear weapons for maintaining peace became increasingly difficult and less effective (Shultz, et. al, 2007). The development of technology has also provided increasing opportunities for states

During the cold war, both nations built up massive stockpiles of nuclear weapons to achieve nuclear supremacy over the other. Both the soviets and the US hoped to use nuclear weapons as leverage against each other by assuring Mutually Assured Destruction, or MAD.

The decision to drop the atomic bomb, made by President Truman, was largely influenced by political factors rather than military factors. Traditionalist historians argue from the military perspective that the bomb was used to end the war as quickly as possible and with as minimal causalities as possible. Revisionist historians, on the other hand, argue the political perspective where they believe that the bomb was dropped as a diplomatic tool to intimidate the rising superpower that was the Soviet Union. In 1945, there was little reason to doubt the traditionalist perspective; however, in retrospect, with the evidence now gathered and available, it was very likely there were other strategic reasons that played a larger role in the decision Truman had made. By observing the historical timeline, the Cold War began shortly after World War II. Truman was aware of the rising power of the USSR and the threat of the spread of communism into Europe and Asia. The fear of this threat was what likely influenced him and Congress to use the bomb more so than the desire to end the war more efficiently.

The physical weapons used in the Cold War were nuclear weapons. Though the Cold War never resulted in these weapons being used, the US and the Soviet Union both strived to develop better, more destructive bombs before the other. In one graph, it is shown that, from 1960 to 1977, the amount of nuclear warheads on ICBMs increases exponentially for both countries(Document 5). The graph also shows the

The USSR “perceived this as a serious threat” (Brezhkov), in comparison, Stalin's actions were viewed as threats to the West. With increased tensions between the two nations, the Cold War was soon to break out. Moving forward, in the year of 1952, the United States had successfully exploded a new hydrogen bomb “The detonation destroyed the island and sent up a three-mile-wide mushroom cloud” (Glider-Lehrman). Seeing the successful testing of a new bomb, that was supposedly stronger than an atomic one, would put any nation in a defensive state. Amidst the Cold War, the hydrogen bomb test of 1952 would result in the Soviets being constantly aware of the major threat the US has now imposed for many years to come.

After the Second World War, the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as superpowers and subsequently a period of tension and hostility arose, known as the Cold War. During this time, a new possibility of complete nuclear destruction that would claim the lives of many emerged, therefore “the easing or relaxing of tensions” on both sides was needed, this period would be known as detente. Both countries had been guaranteed mutually assured destruction as they had both managed to stay ahead in the development of nuclear arsenals. By the late 1960s the Soviets had surpassed the United States in intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) by 1,300 to 1,054. Although the U.S was still ahead

In November, 1969, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) begun. This was because of the economic impact brought by the nuclear testing and production. In May, 1972 the SALT I Treaty was signed. SALT I limited the size of the nuclear arsenals though SALT I did not limit the amount of nuclear warheads that could be placed on one missile. These were the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) the ABM treaty limited country’s to two Anti-Ballistic Missile sites, while the Interim Agreement halted each country's number of submarine-launched ballistic missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles. This treaty lowered significantly the cost brought by the production of nuclear arms and also lowered the risk of nuclear war. A new technology, known as multiple-independently targetable re-entry vehicle allowed single missiles to launch multiple nuclear missiles at deferent targets while in mid-air. In the next 10 years, the Soviet Union and United States added 12,000 more nuclear warheads to their already built

As the Korean War came to an end, superpowers America and the Soviet Union continued to test atomic bombs, more powerful and effective. However, after tests on an atomic bomb that had been fused, also known as the hydrogen bomb, the leaders and scientists of both countries were shocked by the results (technological advances are not always the best for the future). The immense destruction caused by this bomb would annihilate the entire human population if set in a war (which is why war is dangerous). At the same time, leaders came and went, each with their different ideas and opinions, as some believed that the bomb could only be used in total war, while others thought that the bomb could only be used as a way to threaten other countries into

The event of the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 was the closest the world has ever come to nuclear war. Fifteen years into the cold war, the two superpowers continued the fierce competition to increase their military strength. In 1962, the Soviet Union was desperately behind the United States in the nuclear arms race. Soviet missiles were only powerful enough to be launched against Europe, whereas the US missiles were capable of striking the entire Soviet Union. In late April 1962, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev conceived the idea of placing intermediate-range missiles in Cuba which would double the Soviet strategic arsenal and provide a real deterrent to a potential U.S. attack against the Soviet Union. The fate of millions

After World War II, a new enemy was in the horizon: technology. In the 1940’s, the United States was the leader of the “Free World” paving a path and setting an example for the rest of the world to follow (Maland 191). Americans believed the misconception that “American society was sound, and that communism was a clear danger to the survival of the United States and its allies” (Maland 191). The U.S. maintained a policy of containment by fighting communism wherever it may be, and in a show of might in 1952, they detonated the first hydrogen bomb (Maland 192). Only a short year later, the mighty Soviet Union announced that they too had the Atom bomb (Maland 192). And, when the Soviet Union launched Sputnik in 1957, the United States became alarmed that they were falling behind in science and technology. Because the Soviets had the same capability to annihilate the world with the bomb as the United States, tensions between the two countries increase daily. But, this new war tactic brought into question man’s ability to make decisions of nuclear proportions with

Today the United States of America still possess approximately 1,300 tactical nuclear weapons, including about 480 bombs deployed on NATO military bases deployed in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey and the United Kingdom. In response Russia is estimated to possess at least 3,000 of these generally smaller, portable, but still devastating weapons. It only takes a fifteen-minute alert and the decision by one human being at the touch of the button in the U.S. to deploy hundreds of nuclear warheads. Surely with still such a large number of nuclear weapons still easily accessible, they cannot be strategically obsolete. Robert McNamara says, “It was luck that prevented nuclear war”. He continues: “At the end we lucked out. It was luck that prevented nuclear war.... Rational individuals came that close to total destruction of their societies. And that danger exists today. The major lesson of the Cuban missile crisis is this: the indefinite combination of human fallibility and nuclear weapons will destroy nations”. In the end maybe it was deterrence theory that won out, but from McNamara’s perspective this was not the case. McNamara mentioned in his Fog of War Interview that if it hadn’t have been for John F

The American doctrine of deterrence stemmed from the development of nuclear weapons. Strategic analysts, using this development as a point of departure, recognized that a nuclear capability established a defense scenario that was, in fact,