This literature reviewed ‘executive compensation’ and shareholder wealth maximisation. Most studies produced mixed outcomes in relations to the matter. In producing a critical analysis on prior literature, the motive has been to converge a succinct view from different authors’ standpoint in relation to an effectiveness of executive compensation as a function of value deliberation. In addition, considered other alternatives, such as board structure in resolving this agent-problem henceforth. In summary, studies such as, Emre (2013) examined the effectives of executive pay and shareholders value. Findings reveals that, though seen as the solution to an agent-problem, pay-performance approach actually exasperates it. Main reason being , most CEOs who have been running the organisation long enough uses their power to make hostage the board to mastermind pay increase at the cost of an organisation. As pay negotiation occurs between CEOs and the board, the terms of agreements may not be submitted for shareholder endorsement. An opposing argument to this claim came from Gong (2011) who found a relationship between pay-performance in the long run. Nevertheless, Gong’s study bared testing limitations and accuracy of which further study is needed to gain a richer appreciation. Candy (2012) also tested for a relationship between ‘executive pay-performance’ and shareholder wealth, with a control variable being GFC, to see if their executive pay is effected in presence of such large
In “The Overpaid CEO” Susan Homberg and Mark Schmitt bring to attention how CEO pay in America is ridiculous in numbers as opposed to other parts of the world. Looking back, in the nineteen hundreds CEO pay was relativity average. As businesses and companies began to expand there was a demand for higher pay. Between 1978-2012 CEO pay increased by 875%! Many rules and regulations were put in to place to limit the pay of a CEO, such as the Securities Exchange Act that I will explain later on, regardless CEO pay kept getting higher and higher as many loopholes were found. Bonuses pay a large part in the salaries of CEOS’, as an effect CEOS’ tend to partake in risky behavior in order to score those big paychecks.
This paper will discuss the reasons why CEOs are not being overpaid. It will apply the utilitarian ethical principle to many a few aspects to CEO compensation and whether or not it is justifiable for such pay. The paper will look at whether or not their performance is justifiable for the pay because they play such a big role in the livelihood of the company along with the principle agency theory and how it is being addressed for the benefit of the shareholders and others involved with the company, the supply and demand of the CEOs, and the paper will describe the comparison of other professions to help link the idea of CEOs being fairly compensated.
The CEO’s compensation should be set on how well the firm performs and should be awarded based on the performance of the stocks in the long run. It is easier to measure performance by the growth rate in the profits that have been reported since intrinsic value cannot be fully
This paper provides an overview of the current debate and the theories that attempt to explain executive remuneration disclosure. Attention is given to underlying accounting theories such as Positive Accounting Theory, Normative Accounting Theory, Stakeholder Theory, Legitimacy Theory, Institutional Theory, Public Interest Theory, Capture Theory and Economic Interest Group Theory.
Federal governance in executive pay is essential to a stable and healthy economy. I offer that the issue of Federal governance in executive pay is bigger than equity in compensation. “Taxpayers and politicians and others disapprove of these levels of compensation precisely because the leaders of these firms, in the words of Treasury Department officials, nearly caused the financial system worldwide to collapse.”
However, there have been many cases where the CEO and executive officers receive outrageous compensation even when the companies suffer. Overall, there is a wide disconnect between the incentive of the executives and the financial performance of their company, which needs to be fixed. By passing regulations and rules such as the Dodd-Frank Act, there is hope of shedding light on the connection between the company’s performance and the executives pay. Although it will provide a clear insight, it will not be able to set a strict regulated compensation or define what an executive should earn. Instead regulations will allow for more transparency for the shareholders regarding corporate governance issues such as executive pay. Along with that, it will force companies to take accountability for their actions. If they do poorly, then the executives should be paid less, and vice versa. Overall, there should be a direct alignment between executive pay and the company’s
Generally, under-performing companies are the prime targets of hostile takeovers, so it makes sense that aligning shareholder and executive goals is a major way to avoid that. One popular way of aligning these goals is through the use of elaborate, structured compensation plans for executives which directly tie an executive’s salary to the performance of the company, usually and specifically its stock price (Megginson & Smart, 2009). These compensation plans have become the norm for American corporations, and their effectiveness in solving the agency problem is debatable. On one hand, it should drive an executive to strive to maximize the shareholder wealth, and it also helps companies to attract and retain the best available managers. On the other hand, it serves to sometimes wildly inflate the compensation paid to these executives, either by corporations trying to stay competitive for the best talent, or through easily achievable goals and uncapped maximums. The structured plans, if done correctly, are an effective way to help insure the goal of wealth maximization, but they are also by definition agency costs. Hence, agency problems are inherent to our American corporate system.
While these citizen protests and legislative actions could be an overreaction to a few isolated cases of executive compensation excess, the data suggests otherwise. According to the AFL-CIO (2013), executive pay has increased dramatically over the past several decades compared to worker compensation. In 1982, the pay ratio between executives and workers was 42:1, but by 2012 it had increased to 354:1. This 8.4-fold differential in compensation suggests that the productivity of executives has also increased 8.4-fold relative to productivity of workers. If executive pay is positively correlated with a firm's bottom line, then higher pay should predict success. Unfortunately, researchers have found the opposite to be true.
Directors have awarded compensation packages that go well beyond what is required to attract and hold on to executives and have rewarded even poorly performing executives. These executive pay excesses come at the expense of shareholders as well as the company and its employees. Furthermore, a poorly designed executive compensation package can reward decisions that are not in the long-term interests of a company. Excessive CEO pay is essentially a corporate governance problem. When CEOs have too much power in the boardroom, they are able to extract what economists' call "economic rents" from shareholders (Economic rent is distinct from economic profit, which is the difference between a firm's revenues and the opportunity cost of its inputs). The board of directors is supposed to protect shareholder interests and minimize these costs. At approximately two-thirds of US companies, the CEO sits as the board's chair. When one single person serves as both chair and CEO, it is impossible to objectively monitor and evaluate his or her own performance.
As Murphy (1998) rightly points out, CEO compensation has become one of the most debated issues in the recent past. A lot of research in this field has been conducted to determine the relationship between CEO pay levels with the corporate performance, firm size, board vigilance, CEO’s human capital, tenure & age. But the results of these researches are not very hopeful and have yielded conflicting results. This review aims at understanding these relationships and also tries to provide an ethical perspective on CEO compensation.
The practice over overpaying company CEOs in contrast to the general employee population is not considered a valid reward distribution system. As reported in the “The State of Working America”, the ratio between CEO salaries and average company wages was approximately 19.2 to 1 in 1965. In 2011, this ratio was nearly 220.2 to 1 (Mishel, Bivens, Gould, and Shierholz, 2012). Per Mishel, Bivens, Gould, and Shierholz (2012), this ratio has experienced a 177.15-point decrease from the year 2000, when the
It was reasonable for a CEO’s compensation to increase as the company expanded and became a larger entity, and the newly-granted shares and increasing stock options further aligned the CEO’s personal interests with those of the company and shareholders. In this sense, the second compensation package was also well-structured and not excessive. Seeing Sunbeam’s revenue rising and stock price climbing steeply upwards, Sunbeam’s shareholders and directors were fully convinced by Dunlap’s leadership, so they might perceive the increase in compensation amount necessary to retain and better motivate Dunlap to enhance the company’s value. Nonetheless, they neglected the fact that the increased portion of the equity-based compensation also further motivated the CEO’s dangerous behaviors pertaining to improper earnings management.
This report explores the issue of the pay that top executives make, and the reasons why they do. It also suggests improvements that can be made to make the system better. High Pay Seems Small When Compared To Company Profits Many companies pull in profits that are extremely high. When an employee of such a companies salary is compared to the amount of profit that the company earns, it starts to seem reasonable. It only makes sense that if the employee is directly responsible for the success of their company, then they deserve to get their payback. It seems ironic, but many salaries even look small once compared with a companies profits. Top Executives Are Under A Lot Of Pressure Being the CEO of a
Given the effect a CEO can have on a company's success, we can understand why their compensation packages
Nevertheless if companies operate in weak markets and fail to create growth and profit the concept of maximization of shareholder wealth is also an opportunity for self-regulation and security against threats for a company. This approach is in particular useful for safeguarding against difficulties arising from wrong or misguided leadership within a corporation. Shareholders of a company have the strongest interest in a company’s success because they often invest a lot of capital in the business and require revenues for their deposit (Moore, 2002). As a matter of fact, they become more