Expeditionary Force 21: Traditional Employment Challenges

After the Vietnam War ended, the Marine Corps’ main focus changed from broad scale operations, to being an Expeditionary Force in Readiness. Although this was no new role for the United States Marine Corps (USMC), there have been many changes in society, technology and tactics that affect how the Corps operates. However, over the last 36 years one thing has remained the same, and that is the role of the Marine Non Commissioned Officer (NCO). With the world changing ever so rapidly, the strong values and responsibilities of the Marine NCO are now, more than ever, necessary to carry out the operations being assigned to United States Marines. The role of the NCO is characterized by their

“After a decade of sending vulnerable, manpower-intensive, fuel-guzzling ground convoys to resupply troops at far-flung combat outposts in Iraq and Afghanistan--and seeing those convoys consistently ambushed, blown up or just delayed--the U.S. Marine Corps

In 2012, General Dempsey states “Mission Command is fundamentally a learned behavior to be imprinted into the DNA of a profession of arms.” The way Mission Command has evolved through the past years is indicative to the US Military adjusting to a new threat. The concept of Mission Command is not new, what is important is how General Dempsey states “Education in the fundamental principles of mission command must begin at the start of service and be progressively more challenging..” The General emphasizes the need for education at the start of the individual’s service. Additionally, this highlights the United States Army’s doctrinal adjustment to the new threat. During the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US faced an enemy whose creativity and adaptability are two of its greatest assets. The fast-paced situation changes in both of those AOs required tactical level leadership maintain the autonomy to “exercise disciplined initiative.” This type of initiative historically leads to mission success, specifically in fast-paced situations where a key to success is forcing the enemy to react.

2. Summary: ADP 6-0 is broken down into three major sections. These sections are; the guiding principles, the Art of Command, and the Mission Command Warfighting Function. This paper will place emphasis on the guiding principles and the Art of Command portions of the manual as they provide the baseline for conceptual implementation. Additionally, as a Group Support Battalion (GSB), the Mission Command Warfighting Function predominantly lies within the responsibility of line Battalion commanders. Within the GSB, our primary mission is to provide augmentees and unique enablers to commander’s to further enable them to meet mission success.

They are the most efficient and effective response option when unexpected threats face America. The United States Marine Corps maintains a constant state of being prepared. "The American people believe that when a crisis emerges, Marines will be present and will invariably turn in a performance that is dramatically and decisively successful—not most of the time, but always. The investment in the Marine Corps continues to be an investment in the character of the young people of our country." (General James F. Amos, 35th Commandant of the Marine Corps)

The threat environment has expanded from a strategic, nuclear, symmetrical threat from bombers, ICBMs, and air-or-sea-launched cruise missiles, to a continuing symmetrical threat in addition to an emergent asymmetric threat, focused across all domains, borders and agencies. Accordingly, our political leaders recognized a need to transform the military for a new ‘home game’. United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) was established to assume responsibility for the defence of the US homeland, and this new Command was tasked to provide military assistance to civil authorities (MACA).

The United States Marine Corps has an illustrious history forged in the trials of combat. Throughout its history, irregular warfare has and will continue to pose challenges for Marines facing new and radical enemy forces. The rapid, opportunistic, and flexible capabilities of maneuver warfare enables Marines to combat ambiguous enemies whose warfighting capability and doctrine is based on irregular warfare principles. Marine Corps units are organized and equipped to facilitate rapid deployment and to maximize the potential of each asset available to the Marine Air Ground Task Force Commanders. As we wage war against our nation’s foes, the elements of the Marine Air Ground Task Force are prepared to provide mutually supporting roles for the

The evening news is filled with stories about war and conflict, that’s happening throughout the world. The U.S Marine Corps is involved in those conflicts and are supporting America’s global interests. My father is a colonel with of 50 years of serve in the Marine Corps. He works every day to ensure the Marine Corps is prepared to carry out the missions that his units are assigned. This paper will discuss and explain Col Garcia’s roles and responsibilities as a Col in our nation’s most reveled military service.

Sun Tzu’s military acumen resonates in the current discussion of the Marine Corps’ preparedness to conduct forcible entry. The Army and Marine Corps saw significant successes utilizing forcible entry and amphibious operations in the Pacific during WWII and the Korean War. The landing at Inchon was “arguably the Corps’ greatest amphibious success” (Cancian, “Preserving Amphibious Capabilities in a Time of Austerity, 2012). Led by General MacArthur, Inchon remains the legacy by which future amphibious operations are compared against. However, it is important to recognize that in the past 60+ years since Inchon, the modern militarization of both state and non-state adversaries has transformed the battlespace to utilize warfare across multiple domains. This transformation requires a forthright Sun Tzu-like comparison of Marine Corps capabilities, and the perspicacity to recognize that our current posture along with a traditional approach to amphibious warfare is no longer effective at countering our enemies. Given the challenges that exist across the domains of military operations, this paper will demonstrate how based on the current concepts and amphibious capabilities, the U.S. Marine Corps is less prepared to conduct forcible entry operations than we were during the landing at Inchon, and subsequent liberation of Seoul.

Following over a decade of irregular war in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military is attempting to reset towards a conventional, regular type of warfare. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review describes a U.S. military shift to the Pacific and the supremacy of capability against near peer nations rather than support irregular of and counterinsurgency operations. As the QDR points out the U.S. military must “be prepared to battle increasingly sophisticated adversaries who could employ advanced warfighting capabilities while simultaneously attempting to deny U.S. forces the advantages they currently enjoy in space and cyberspace.” This is balanced against the reality that “our forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale prolonged

The Navy including the Marines must be able to conduct multiple missions simultaneously to overpower the enemy and thwart their forces through joint, collaborated, and swift operations. The application of amphibious doctrine is a complex unified effort requiring a high level of shared knowledge between the various military forces involved (Spiller, 1992).

The objective of this study is to examine how, with the ultimate goal of joint mission being operational effectiveness, that USSOCOM and USTRANSCOM can 'enable' the mission. Also discussed will be the capabilities and limitations of the available service forces, and considering that these forces were not optimized for the assigned mission, explain which additional forces would be requested and why. Also addressed will be the interdependencies among available and requested forces.

Joint Force 2025 needs to increase the number of Special Operations Forces and foreign military equipment sales in current and potential gray-zone conflict locations. U.S. and NATO

The general capabilities required by the Joint Force in 2025 will be a global surveillance and strike (GSS) network, increased naval and air investments and ensuring cyber technology outpaces adversaries. Based on the current U.S. strategic direction and global security environment these capabilities are necessary. Satellites and cyber technology will be part of the design of the GSS system. The U.S. military will be able to strike quickly and remain engaged for increased periods while additional forces move to the area of concern using the GSS system. Increased Navy and Air investments in submarines, ships, aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV’s) and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV’s) is critical. The Navy and Air Force allows us to project power to areas of the world far from our base of operations. Air power also enables us to provide support for ground forces while providing deterrence and denial of enemy forces. Cyber investments and security are critical because cyber technology will increasingly be the engine that runs our future military and allows us to attack adversary’s cyber networks and infrastructure. The U.S. Army will see a reduction in tactical armor units while the U.S. Marine Corps remains at the current level of equipment and personnel. After each capability are associated Risk.

Clausewitz defines war as an “act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” The nature of war is enduring yet the character of war changes over time. Current US strategic guidance is advancing the point of view that since the character of war has changed to focus on irregular wars then the US military should prepare for a future of irregular wars. This shift in focus forgets that the nature of war is enduring and in order to be successful, we must prepare for all types of conflict. This paper will define the types of conflict and the likelihood of each followed by a discussion of US strategic guidance and ending with an analysis of the training resources and force structure requirements needed to achieve success for all types of