Failed Operational Bastions

The lack of clear and well thought strategy in addition to the lack of knowledge and understanding of the Iraqi people lead to the failure in Iraq, which materialized in the form of ISIS.

inadequate communication; lack of supporting firepower; and in the final hour before the raid, absolute

General Franks and joint planners identified various strengths in the Iraq pre-invasion planning efforts of the Joint Staff. For instance, throughout development of the Iraqi operational approach, planners recognized Saddam Hussain and the City of Bagdad as strategic Centers of Gravity (COG) as a major sources of Iraqi power and strength to the Hussain regime.5 (JP5-0, p. III-22) By comparison, Karl Von Clausewitz referred to the COG as the “the hub of all power and movement, which everything depends or the point at which all our energies should be directed.”6 (JP5-0, p. III-22) In addition, General Frank’s and planners’ operational approach acknowledged the Iraqi Army and the Republican Guard as key operational COGs targeted in pre-invasion

2. The National Defense Strategy (NDS) counterbalances the Defense Departments tendency to focus on winning conventional conflicts rather than irregular wars by empowering those small nations to improve the security of their countries to prevent conflicts from happening. The NDS focuses on the different irregular warfare tactics that can be used by our enemies in the strategic environment. It gives us guidance on what we need to do to prevent the use of these irregular warfare tactics. It was not until the last decade that the U.S. military started fighting the irregular wars; our Special Forces units were the ones that were fighting the unconventional wars. The U.S. military has had a difficult time changing its focus on fighting conventional wars to fighting irregular wars. During the Vietnam War, the U.S. military became very experienced in guerrilla warfare tactics. However, when that war ended the focus shifted back to fighting the conventional wars and that experience was lost. Now, because of the lack of experience, the U.S. military is having a difficult time fighting the unconventional wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The U.S. military made the same mistakes initially in the 2003 Iraq War. The U.S. failed to allocate the proper number of troop strength, failed to adapt to the terrain, and failed to foresee the used of improvised explosive device (IED). The U.S. also lacked control of the civilian population, and the mistakes in Abu Ghraib became the rally cry for the insurgents, which the Iraqis rose to support the insurgency. (Montanus, 2005) However, the lessons learned from the British 200 years ago, the U.S. adapted and formed a concept to win the hearts of mine of the people into their counterinsurgency operation. The U.S. allocated more troops, adapted to the terrain, and employed new method to defeat IEDs. Furthermore, they opened dialogues with the Tribes, resolved conflicts, and addressed issues in order to win their support for the war. The U.S. assisted the Iraqi’s create a democratic government, provided logistic support, training

The function of the military forces for the United States has had no choice but to evolve as wars wax and wane. As the rise of militant terrorist groups became a threat to the United States and its allies, the armed forces of the United States were deployed by the President to countries such as Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq. Instability in these countries threatened bordering allies, and after September 11, 2001, the threat was brought to U.S. soil. Each president from Clinton to Obama has had to shape the policy of how the armed forces fit into civil-military policies abroad and overseas. In a war time environment, such as Iraq, the purpose of how the military should be deployed is easier to clearly state. But in times when there is no imminent threat, it is much more difficult to transition

However, this external trust has been fraying from the edges for many years – clear and realistic political strategy has been lacking from civilian leaders, a well-meaning yet disengaged public, and an insular military class that fails to organically adapt to emerging technologies. A clear and realistic political strategy determined by civilian leaders addresses the first leg of the strategic triad – government. It is said success begins at the top, with a cohesive vision and unified guidance. One doesn’t have to look further than the 2003 invasion of Iraq - then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld claimed it would require no more than 150,000 troops to secure Iraq, despite the insistence of then Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki that it would take 300,000 troops, a number derived from his experience in Bosnia. (Mills, 2013) However, this detail overshadows the deeper implication – that civilian leaders were not planning for stability operations, or had a plan in place after the conventional phase of the war. The lack of guidance and vision from the nation’s strategic leaders make it extremely difficult, if not impossible for the military to effectively prosecute

To understand how some of the soon to be discussed failures arose, all of the key commanders need to be identified. When Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) began General Tommy Franks was the CENTCOM Combatant Commander in Tampa, Florida. Events on 9/11 lead to us having forces in Afghanistan soon after. From the beginning of the war Special Forces (SOF) were the primary assets utilized. As time went on conventional units were joining the forces in theatre. This caused the need for the Command and Control (C2) structure to adapt to the

The failure to establish a Unified Command as a priority during Operation Anaconda, resulted in a loss of mission control, created confusion between support assets and degraded the ground troops

I am going to discuss the issues and concerns that I feel had the biggest impact on the failed mission. A couple of these issues were, military agencies working independently and the fact that the mission was kept a secret from all other organizations that could have assisted to ensure mission success. I feel that these mistakes made before entering Iran were essentially the root cause of why the mission failed. These issues were overall some of the biggest issues our country was facing during that time era. They had the intelligence available but did not use it to their advantage. Instead each of the teams put in place worked on their own and did not share information because they wanted all the glory. The mission was kept a secret from other government agencies that were not originally depicted as mission essential. By doing this they were blind to the capabilities and knowledge those agencies could have provided. I view this as by far the biggest mistake made within this mission given the information I have been able to

The US Central Command’s planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was not the all-inclusive plan that joint operations require. Joint operations are no longer limited to major combat operations, but encompass a wide range of actions. Planning for joint operations requires input from many sources to produce a successful campaign plan to meet the desired end state. Operational design provides a concept and a construction framework that underpins a campaign and its execution. (JP GL13). Evaluating the planning process by using the operational design identifies some of CENTCOM’s shortfalls. US military planners’ lack of understanding of the operational environment led to an inadequately defined problem that resulted in a faulty operational approach. CENTCOM’s approach did not have the right assessment to gauge the effectiveness of the plan such as alerting planners when and if the plan needed modification. Current joint planning policy incorporates several of CENTCOM’s shortfalls in an attempt to provide a better planning process for future joint operations.

This lead to subsequent denial from congress for additional troop deployment and limited options and resources for continuing the

In order to develop effective solutions for complex military problems, the Joint Community within the US Military adopted the methodology of Operational Design in Joint Doctrine. This methodology addresses the concept of complex, ill-structured or “wicked” problems. In fact, Lessons Learned as a result of operations conducted over the last 15 years played an instrumental role in the continued development of this doctrine. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) illustrates a perfect case study for evaluation utilizing this methodology. Therefore, the intent of this paper is to evaluate US Military campaign planning for OIF by using operational design as the framework for this analysis. First, this paper looks at how planners and commanders interpreted pre-invasion civilian policy guidance, their understanding of the current operational environment, and how these commanders defined the problem. Next, it identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the initial approach. After discussing this initial approach, this paper examines how commanders assessed the campaign and refined the approach – to include how the reframing occurred. Lastly, it provides examples of how these lessons learned shaped current joint planning policy and doctrine.

Within days of Iraqi forces invading Kuwait in 1990, President Bush publicly backed the United Nations’ (UN) stance on the incursion with four national strategic objectives and determined that, ‘if invited, US forces would be deployed to deter further Iraqi attacks, defend Saudi Arabia and enforce UN resolutions.’ From the national strategic objectives, the military end-state is deduced. The military end-state is a conceptual element of operational design which describes the conditions that forces must achieve to attain strategic objectives/ hand over main effort responsibilities. The military end-state does not necessarily indicate the end of a military activities to attain national objectives. While one specific national objective would not

As military members we are educated to think very linearly about strategy. For many years we have been trained to have a strategic thought process based on the use of a methodology that espouses three major steps: Ends (Objectives), Ways (Strategic Concepts), and Means (Resources). (Barber 1997)