Famine Affluence And Morality By Peter Singer Summary

In Peter Singer’s 1972 post titled “Famine, Affluence and Morality”, he conveys that wealthy nations, for example the United States, has an ethical duty to contribute much a lot more than we do with regards to worldwide assistance for famine relief and/or other disasters or calamities which may happen. In this document, I will describe Singers objective in his work and give his argument with regards to this problem. I will describe 3 counter-arguments to Singer’s view which he tackles, and after that reveal Singer’s reactions to those counter-arguments. I will explain Singer’s idea of marginal

In a piece by Peter Singer entitled, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Singer argues that Americans should prevent atrocious situations to arise but, we also should not sacrifice something of equal importance while doing so. Moreover, in the piece by John Arthur, “World Hunger and Moral Obligation: The Case Against Singer,” Arthur disagrees with Singer; he believes that we should help the poverty-stricken but, it is not morally imperative to do so.

John Arthur and Peter Singer have different views when it comes to Famine Relief and the “Ideal Moral Code”. Both theories are intuitive; yet clash heads at the idea of an opinion other than their own. They essentially both argue for what is our true duty.

     In “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Peter Singer is trying to argue that “the way people in relatively affluent countries react to a situation… cannot be justified; indeed,… our moral conceptual scheme needs to be altered and with it, the way of life that has come to be taken for granted in our society”(Singer 230). Peter Singer provides striking examples to show the reader how realistic his arguments are. In this paper, I will briefly give a summary of Peter Singer’s argument and the assumptions that follow, adding personal opinions for or against Peter’s statements. I hope that within this paper, I am able to be clearly show you my thoughts in regards to Singer.

In “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Peter Singer claims that “if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it.” Additionally, Singer believes that distance is no excuse for allowing something bad to happen; thus, we ought to help people on the other side of the world the same way we would help a neighbor – even though we may feel further inclined to help our neighbors. Moreover, Singer states that people should help as much as possible, without putting themselves or their dependents at risk of suffering. Peter Singer is correct in stating that people with the capacity to prevent something bad from occurring should do so; however,

Singer’s argument to world famine is giving charity is neither charitable nor generosity, but it’s an obligation to give money out and if you don’t, then it’s morally wrong. He states we as individuals have a duty to help reduce poverty and death because of starvation. Singer argues, suffering and death due to the lack of food, is terrible. Hence we have the power to help those group of people. By that, people can cut down the famine and suffering by giving famine relief and in doing so, we as individuals have to give a certain amount of money from our standard of living. This fails to recognize people’s own intrinsic moral values because Singer says we must always make the morally best decision.

When natural disasters hit an area, the only way to relieve major suffering is with the help of foreign aid. Major suffering from lack of food, shelter, and medical aid in developing countries is an easily avoidable dilemma. I will present you with Peter Singers’ Basic Argument regarding our moral obligation to relieve suffering that he presents in his paper “Famine, Affluence and Mortality”. There are two problems of spatial distance and shared obligations that help to show the universality of Singer’s Prevention-Principle. Then there are three questions Kekes asks Singer in his paper “On the Supposed Obligation to Relieve Famine” regarding the Prevention-Principle. He displays potential problems for the current principle as described by Singer. The revised version of the principle, after considering the problems, does not support Singer’s original conclusion. In Affluent Countries we should drastically change our moral conceptual schemes and give up luxuries to provide aid to those in developing nations.

This paper explores Peter Singer’s argument, in Famine, Affluence, and Morality, that we have morally required obligations to those in need. The explanation of his argument and conclusion, if accepted, would dictate changes to our lifestyle as well as our conceptions of duty and charity, and would be particularly demanding of the affluent. In response to the central case presented by Singer, John Kekes offers his version, which he labels the and points out some objections. Revisions of the principle provide some response to the objections, but raise additional problems. Yet, in the end, the revisions provide support for Singer’s basic argument that, in some way, we ought to help those in need.

Peter Singer’s central idea focuses around how grim death and suffering from lack of food, shelter and medical care really is. He further argues that if we can prevent something this unfortunate from happening, without sacrificing anything morally significant, we ought to do it. In other words, as privileged citizens, we ought to prevent all of the death and suffering that we can from lack of food, shelter and medical care from happening by giving our money and resources to charity (Chao, 2016, in-class discussion). In the terms of this argument, death and suffering from poverty are preventable with the

In his article Rich and Poor, Peter Singer argues that we have a moral obligation to give assistance to people in absolute poverty. He derived this conclusion from three premises. The first states that if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, then we ought to it. The second premise is that absolute poverty is a bad thing. The third premise is that we are able to alleviate some portion of absolute poverty without giving up anything of comparable moral significance. To illustrate the urgency of our duty to assist the poor, he believes that in a case where we happen to walk pass a child drowning in a shallow pond, the vast majority of people would agree that it would be seriously morally wrong to not rescue the child. Connecting this scenario to Singer’s argument, we can say it is seriously morally wrong to not assist the poor because the lives of these people in need are of greater moral importance than the excess income we would otherwise spend on luxury goods. Thus, Singer is correct in saying that we have a moral obligation to assist the poor, and that failing to do so is equally as morally wrong as failing to rescue the drowning child.

Singer in his essay “The Solution to World Poverty” provides a solution for solving the issue of poverty by donating all excess money for the needs of poor people. He urges readers that everyone, who have sufficient household income, is required to give away all their unnecessary money to overseas aid organizations. Moreover, he argues that if people fail to do so, they are living unworthy immoral lives (5). In this paper I will argue that by giving extreme examples and information of aid agencies Singer makes us feel forced in donation of excess money, whereas this action should be voluntary and it should not be considered if we are not willing to give away all excess

Within “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” Peter Singer delves into the topic of famine; specifically, the moral obligations individuals in affluent countries have to those who are suffering. In his example, Singer focuses on the population of East Bengal, and their struggle with famine and extreme poverty. Singer proposes that with enough aid from both individuals and various governments extreme poverty can be eradicated. Therefore, the question he presents is why poor people are dying while affluent people are spending excess money on luxuries? Singer argues that affluent people, living in affluent countries, are not helping developing countries by failing to give enough to alleviate extreme poverty.

Peter Singer is often regarded as one of the most productive and influential philosophers of modern times. He is well-known for his discussions of the acute social, economic, and political issues, including poverty and famines. In his “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”, Singer (1972) discusses the problem of poverty and hunger, as well as the way this problem is treated in the developed world. Singer believes that charity is inseparable from morality, and no distinction can be drawn between charity and duty. The philosopher offers possible objections to his proposition and relevant arguments to justify his viewpoint. The modern world does not support Singer’s view, treating charity as a voluntary activity, an act of generosity that needs

Addressed in his essay “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”, Peter Singer’s full assertion is that, it is morally wrong for people to spend money on morally insignificant things instead of spending money to prevent suffering and dying from preventable diseases and famine. He begins his argument with the first premise: “suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad.”(231) Such premise is direct, simple, accepted by most people in the society. Peter Singer hence take such assumption as accepted by the readers and quickly moves to his next premise.

Peter Singer said; “If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it” (Famine, Affluence, and Morality). As human beings, we have a moral compulsion to help other people, despite the verity that they may be strangers, especially when whatever type of aid we may render can in no approach have a more significant consequence on our own life.