Ferguson V. Case

In 1989, a public hospital in Charleston, South Carolina began implementing a policy to randomly test women for drugs who came for prenatal care or delivery without their informed consent. If the women tested positive, they were arrested and not given the opportunity to seek drug treatment. In 1990, the policy was modified to allow the women to avoid being arrested if they entered into a drug treatment program, attended all their counseling appointments, and passed all their subsequent drug tests. Ten women tested positive for cocaine were arrested and responded by suing the hospital and the state. In 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of the women because the tests were administered without their consent.

The plaintiff, Plessy was criminally liable under the separate but equal statute for using facilities designated for a different race. He was thus found guilty under the fact that the statute reasonably exercised the state police powers with regard to the state’s tradition, usage, and custom. Plessy, thus filed a petition against Justice Ferguson for writs of prohibition and certiorari in the Louisiana Supreme Court on the

Since the 1980’s, debate about how society should deal with the problem of criminalizing pregnant women who abuse drugs or alcohol has become a nationwide issue. Many states argue that the primary concern is making sure women have healthy pregnancies and healthy children. However, policies that threaten women with criminal prosecution and the potential loss of parental rights drive women away from pregnancy-related care. Constitutionally, enacting states to create these laws is unsound and places women in situations of risk. Less than a week ago a bill was sent to the governor of Tennessee after being approved by both the house and the senate, that would allow for women to be prosecuted if she takes an illegal drugs while pregnant. Although this bill is made to seem like it is promoting healthy pregnancies, many groups are urging the governor to veto it.

While legislators believe that this policy will effectively sort out the “worst of the worst” (Gonzales & DuBois, 2014), this reporter doubts the efficiency and utility of the policy. If the aim is to force mothers into treatment, then perhaps sending them to jail is not the most effective method. Those defending the law have sent mixed messages around how it should be carried out, some describing the law as a “velvet hammer” while others employ it as a strong-arm tactic used to bust women who use narcotics (Beyerstein, 2014; Goldensohn & Levy, 2014). This, in addition to the previous legislation protecting mothers, makes it uncertain how a woman will be received when she reveals her substance use. Likewise, the chances of getting arrested

Michael Brown in Ferguson, Eric Garner in Staten Island, Tamir Rice in Cleveland, Walter Scott in North Charleston and, most recently, Freddie Gray in Baltimore have dominated the headlines this entire school year. These men and their stories provide the basis for claims of racially discriminatory treatment of African Americans at the hands of the police. It is true that each of the stories surrounding these men is different, but the one unifying theme is that police around the country are interpreting our Constitutional rights in a way that is insufficient to protect African Americans and the population in general. This paper will explore one Constitutional right— the 4th Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizures--and examine how one Supreme Court decision that narrowed the scope of the 4th Amendment and unintentionally created a mechanism by which the rights of citizens could be unfairly impeded by police.

“The U.S. District Court jury found for the City of Charleston. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the searches were reasonable as a matter of law under our line of cases recognizing that “special needs” may, in certain exceptional circumstances, justify a search policy designed to serve non-law-enforcement ends. On the understanding, ‘that MUSC personnel conducted the urine drug screens for medical purposes wholly independent of an intent to aid law enforcement efforts,’ the majority applied the balancing test, and concluded that the interest in curtailing the pregnancy complications and medical costs associated with maternal cocaine use overweighed what the majority termed an minimal intrusion on the privacy of the parents. We conclude that the judgement should be reversed and the case remanded for a decision on the consent issue” (Samaha,

363). Kennedy (1998) further suggested that Roberts failed to explain why there was a difference between prosecuting women for fetal endangerment and helping women to heave healthy pregnancies. Roberts (1991) noted the debate of this issue has overlooked a critical aspect of government prosecution of drug addicted mothers. Roberts (1991) concludes by advocating a progressive concept of privacy that places an affirmative obligation of the government to guarantee individual rights and recognizes the connection between the rights of privacy and racial

The upshot was reversal of summary judgment as to Wilson, while affirming the judgments in favor of Schwallier, the school nurse, and Romero, the administrative assistant, since they had not acted as independent decision makers. It is noted and recognized that the school setting requires some modification of the level of suspicion of illicit activity needed to justify a search, and held that for searches by school officials. The standard of reasonable suspicion has been declared on the school and the legality of a school administrator's search of a student. Cases that are on probable cause have an implicit bearing on the reliable knowledge element of reasonable suspicion, as we have attempted to flesh out the knowledge component by looking to the degree to which known facts imply prohibited conduct, the specificity of the information received. The lesser standard for school searches could as readily be described as a moderate chance of finding evidence of wrongdoing. In this case, the school's policies strictly prohibit the nonmedical use, possession, or sale of any drug on school grounds, including any prescription or over-the-counter drug, except those for which permission to use in school has been granted pursuant to board policy. The majority finds that subjective and reasonable societal expectations of personal privacy support this type of search, which it labels a strip search, as categorically distinct, requiring distinct elements of justification on the part of school authorities for going beyond a search of outer clothing and belongings., in the majority's view, although the school officials had reasonable suspicion to believe that Redding had the pills on her person, they needed some greater level of particularized suspicion to

FACTS: In Lexington, Kentucky officers were suspicious of a subject who was suspected to be a drug dealer. The officer initiated an observance of the subject’s movements and followed the subject to an apartment where the odor of marijuana was admitting. The officers made their presence known and immediately heard sounds that the believed were indications that the subject was destroying possible evidence. The officers knocked and explained they were making entry into the room. The officers forcefully enter the apartment and observed the primary subject, additional subjects, and drugs including paraphernalia in the open. The subject was brought to The Circuit Court where the court denied the motion of the defense team to remove the evidence from the case based on the entry of the officers being unjust due to not having a proper search warrant. The defense team entered a guilty plea to obtain the authorization to appeal The Circuit Courts ruling. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed this request which prompted The Supreme Court of Kentucky to reverse the decision. This action was based on the courts assumption that additional exigent circumstances did exist however, it did not proved the officers the proper authorization to conduct a

Mr. Graham was later released when the officer establishes that nothing had happened in the store. Graham then sued the police department, claiming his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure was violated. The Supreme Court later ruled that the police officers be held accountable under the Constitution and federal law for using excessive force on Graham. The court also ruled that such liability must base on the standard of objective sensibleness. (Carmen,

However, Weeks v. United States (1914) officially establishes the federal exclusionary rule. By obtaining private materials from the defendant’s home through a warrantless arrest and search it led to weeks’ conviction. However, the Supreme Court ended a long practice of allowing illegally obtained evidence into the court room. Thus, when the evidence was dismissed Weeks’ conviction was dropped. Almost forty years later in the case Rochin v. California (1952), the exclusionary doctrine is more than unreasonable searches and seizure. It is that of which shocks the conscience. Which in this case the defendant was taken to the hospital after ingesting narcotic and then forcibly had them removed from his stomach with a tube (Wilson, 2016).

Policy M-7 brought the threat of law enforcement into women using cocaine in order to help control the amount of pregnant women that were using cocaine. The policy originally set nine different criteria’s that a women could meet, if the women met one of the nine she would have to get a urine drug test completed. All urine samples would be handled by only certain individuals so the tests results could stand in court. If the women tested positive the policy said they would be educated

The question about whether pregnant women are liable for subjecting their unborn children to risk has yet to be properly addressed. One state South Carolina has been on the forefront of this issue. The Supreme Court in South Carolina in 1997 in the case Whitner vs. South Carolina decided that pregnant women who exposed their viable fetuses may be persecuted under the state child abuse laws. This action was specifically targeting women who use illegal drugs during pregnancy. Since this decision, other states like Arizona and Florida are following suit. In South Carolina, the Medical University of South Carolina Hospital routinely tested the urine of pregnant women for

This was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States limited the power of law enforcement to conduct suspicionless searches, with drug-sniffing dogs at road stops. Previous court decisions had given the police power to create road blocks for the purpose of border security and removing drunk drivers off the road. They ruled that the search was “designed to serve special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement.” In this case however, the court refused to “credit the general interest in crime control as justification for a regime of suspicionless stops.” This opinion was given by Justice O’Connor, as well as many other Justices. Many people were wondering if these random stops to find illegal narcotics followed the 4th

The majority reasoned that Fischer’s refusal to submit to a urinalysis is a factor that permits inferences that Fischer knew about the drugs under the passenger’s seat. However, as noted by the dissent, “it is equally fair to presume he did not want to take the test because he had used marijuana or simply wished to invoke his right not to submit to testing.” The majority does not cite to any statutory authority or case law to support their assertion that refusing to submit to a urinalysis is a factor when considering the “knowingly” element under South Dakota Codified Law section 22-42-5 Possession of a Controlled Substance. Refusing to submit to chemical testing is not circumstantial evidence that links him to the tin to infer actual knowledge like circumstantial evidence of fingerprints