First Amendment- Religion Cases Of Religion

Recently, students were instructed to write an essay along with a pictorial representation of the person they considered to be their hero. Since one student chose Jesus as his hero and submitted a drawing of the Last Supper, possible legal complications need to be considered before grading and displaying the assignment. An examination of First Amendment legal issues that arise when a student submits an assignment of religious nature will provide insight into how the First Amendment applies in the classroom.

Decision: In 1985, the principal and superintendent of Westside High School (a secondary school in Omaha, Nebraska) cited the Establishment Clause as a reason for denying the request of Bridget Mergens to form a Christian club that would have the same privileges and meet on the same terms and conditions as other Westside student groups, except that it would have no faculty sponsor. Ms. Mergens took the case to court, and won at first. She lost on appeal at the 8th Circuit Court, and then later won in a 8-1 decision from the Supreme Court

A more recent case which is similar to Everson v. Board of Education, is Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn. The taxpayers of Arizona were challenging the fact that a state law was providing tax credits to those who were donating to school tuition organizations in order for the schools to provide scholarships to those attending private/religious schools. The claim was that this was a violation of the Establishment Clause (Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, 2016.), which is the first of several pronouncements within the First Amendment within the U.S. Constitution, or the first ten amendments within the Bill of Rights, which states “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof…” (Bill of Rights, 2016.). The Supreme Court had ruled 5-4 and argued that the plaintiff did not have enough information and standing to bring to the suit. Justice Kagen, in her dissent, stated that “cash grants and targeted tax breaks are means of accomplishing the same government object; to provide financial support to select individuals or organizations.” (Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, 2016.). Although the ruling was made on “narrow grounds”, according to Peter Wooley, a political science and direction of the PublicMind Poll, the plaintiff in one “guise or another will be back another day” (Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, 2016.).

v. Chicago. In short, state entities ought to be held to the same legal standard in which they were when schools were

Despite adopting this test, the Supreme Court has been quick to disregard the test and lower the wall separating issues of state and faith as long as educational barriers such as the banishment of school prayer remained untouched. This quick change was evident in the 1981 ruling by the court that a law that prohibited the use of public school properties and campuses for religious purposes unconstitutional was deemed itself unconstitutional. This slow reduction of the separating wall was evident in many more cases through the Supreme Court's following history; cases such as deeming acts of the University of Virginia unconstitutional, who violated the free speech of a fundamentalist Christian group by not funding their magazine. Other following cases slowly deemed the funding of Christian organizations and schools more acceptable as Christian books and financial aid to said students, was deemed constitutionally sound if the aid went to the school, not to the students. These establishment issues not only of education but on the use of religious displays and depictions in

Schempp 374 US 203 (1963), 2015). The Schempp family were Unitarians, so they objected to some ideas in the Bible. They had the option to excuse their children from the Bible reading, but then their children would have missed out on some of the morning announcements. (Supreme Court Cases, 2015) So as to not hinder their children?s learning opportunities, the Schempp family brought their issue to the State appeals court. Later, the State appeals court took the side of the Schempp family and stated the Abington School District violated the Establishment Clause, which is a clause in the First Amendment that prohibits the government from establishing a religion. (Supreme Court Cases, 2015) When the issue was brought to the Supreme Court in 1963, the question was simple, did the Pennsylvania law and Abington 's policy violate the religious freedom of their students that is protected by the 1st and 14th Amendments (Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2015)?

Board of Eduation. The issue of concern was whether New Jersey could reimburse transportation costs to the parents of schoolchildren, at both public and nonpublic schools. As a heavy assortment of the nonpublic schools were catholic, an anti-Catholic organization within the state challenged the program, arguing it violated the Establishment clause. In a 5-4 ruling, the court upheld the law, stating that transportation could be considered a child benefit. However, Everson’s legacy goes far beyond the upholding of New Jersey’s reimbursement program because it was the first case of its kind whose opinion dealt directly with the Establishment clause. Furthermore, the author of the majority opinion, Justice Hugo Black, invoked the Jeffersonian metaphor of “a wall of separation,” writing, “In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect a wall of separation between church and state.” Based upon this line of thinking alone, it is difficult to see why the court ruled in favor of the defendant. However, Justice Black also considered the requirements of Free Exercise clause, claiming that for the state to instate “public welfare legislation,” and then hampering citizens from receiving it on grounds of their religious beliefs would be a violation of the free exercise of the religion. Justice Black’s consideration of the Establishment clause in Everson therefore serves as demarcation point in the judicial history of education. Post-Everson, writes Hubert Morken, “many judicial challenges to educational policy have been couched in church/state

In 1962, Engel v. Vitale was an important Supreme Court Case in the United States that required a firm “wall of separation” between church and state. A group of families in New Hyde park, New York did not appreciate the implementation of a state prayer in their children’s schools. They families challenged the court about the constitutionality of this practice. The courts were in favor of the families as Justice Hugo

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances” (U.S. Const. amend. I). The Establishment Clause which derives from “Congress shall pass no law respecting an establishment of religion” was added to secure that state and church would be separate. In the 1971 the landmark case Lemon v. Kurtzman was heard by the Supreme Court and questioned “Do statutes that provide state funding for non-public, non-secular schools violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?”

Justice Hugo L. Black then wrote a majority opinion for the court. Black went straight to the point with the situation. He stated that the facts of the case were “show the use of the tax-supported property for religious instruction and the close cooperation between the school authorities and the religious council in promoting religious education”. The court then denied the ruling for McCollum’s claim which would manifest a governmental hostility for religion or towards religious teaching. The first amendment is used upon both the religion and also the government so they can best work to achieve their lofty which aims to if each can be left free from the other within it respective

Majority Reasoning: There was no incentive to choose one of the secular or religious schools versus the public school, so it was true private choice (and therefore not in violation of the Establishment Clause).

Even though Santa Fe is a city within a state, within the Union, its schools are subject to the federal standard above all city and state judicial findings. The lawsuit was also subject to the Lemon test: Government action violates the Establishment Clause unless it: has a significant secular (i.e., non-religious) purpose, does not have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, and does not foster excessive entanglement between government and religion. The Supreme Court held that the board’s policy violated the first part of the so-called Lemon test (Lemon v. Kurtzman [1971]), which ruled that a statute was invalid if it did not have a secular legislative purpose; in fact, the only purpose the court found for the policy was to endorse student-led prayer. Thus, the court concluded that the football prayer violated the establishment clause of the First

In Walz Ex Rel. Walz v. Egg Harbor Tp. Bd. Of Education (2002), the Supreme Court ruled Walz’s complaint a dismissal because on three separate grade levels involved distribution of proselytizing pencils and evangelical candy with religious messages, but the school board did not allow it to be distributed in class or during school-sponsored or supervised holiday parties; therefore, Walz alleged the

Kurtzman. The concerning question is, “Do statutes that provide state funding for non-public, non-secular schools violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?”, and the court had a 8-1 decision for Lemon. The court removed a pennsylvania law reimbursing religious schools for classroom materials and teacher salaries. The court found the government was too involved with religion in the case, which is a violation of the constitution. According to the Berkeley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs, “The Court applied a three-pronged test based on several prior Court decisions: “First, the statute must have a secular purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion”, meaning the court resulted in the Lemon test. The lemon test is used to evaluate whether a law violates the establishment clause. Facts of the case according to oyez, ”Both Pennsylvania and Rhode Island adopted statutes that provided for the state to pay for aspects of non-secular, non-public education. The Pennsylvania statute was passed in 1968 and provided funding for nonpublic elementary and secondary school teachers’ salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials for secular subjects. Rhode Island’s statute was passed in 1969 and provided state financial support for nonpublic elementary schools in the form of supplementing 15% of

In making determinations as to whether an expenditure “benefits the public generally, as opposed to special interests or persons,” Chief Justice Martin, citing Briggs, instructed that the law does not require the activities in question to be designed in such a way so as to allow for the use and benefit of all citizens. Instead, as long as an expenditure has a “primary public purpose,” mere “incidental private benefit” will not prove dispositive in assessing its constitutionality. The court elaborated further, stating that “the fact that [an] individual obtains a private benefit cannot be considered sufficient ground to defeat the execution of ‘a paramount public purpose.’ ” The court went on to find that the Program met the second factor, asserting that “the promotion of education generally, and educational opportunity in particular, is of paramount public importance to our state.” In making this claim, the court assumed, without truly considering the question, that the Program met the requirements of ‘education’ as set forth in Leandro and subsequent cases. Based on the preceding analysis, the court determined that the Program and its appropriations qualified as a public purpose under Article V, sections 2(1) and