Fodor Mentality Theory Essay

Gertler identifies pain as dissimilar to water in that the sensation is the same in appearance and in reality, but if pain cannot be separated from its location then, at the very least, the concept is not “sufficiently comprehensive.” Pain does not meet Gertler's requirement for a successful thought experiment, and ultimately fails to fit cohesively into her argument and support her conclusion for the possibility of pain without a physical state. If one's concept of pain allows one to separate it from its location and accept the Disembodiment Argument, the physicalists are right to conclude that one's understanding of pain is severely

In David M. Armstrong’s “The Nature of Mind”, Armstrong praises the field of science and seeks to put the concept of mind into terms that agree with science’s definition of minds. His interest is in the physico-chemical, materialist view of man. Armstrong considers science to be the authority over other disciplines because of its reliability and result in consensus over disputed questions.

The idea that mental states are non-reducible properties of brain states is the central tenant of a theory of mind called property dualism. However, before we can assess the theory we must be aware that the question assumes the existence of mental states and as such we cannot answer this question from some perspectives (e.g. eliminative materialism)

In the world of philosophy, there has been an ever growing skepticism of the relationship between the human body and its mental state. The physical state of a person is tangible, meaning that they can be seen by anyone and touched. While the mental state of a person is embedded in their consciencousness, meaning that it can’t be observed by others unless willing expressed by said person. I will be using Leibniz’s law of identity to show that the metal states of an individual are distinct from a physical state. Using the notion of sameness, I can prove a valid argument that the physical and mental states are distinct. While this theory in part can be debated, some identity theorists can provide a rebuttal this claim. I will provide a response to an identity theorist rebuttal.

For example, pain is identical with C-fiber stimulation. Pain can be explained as C-fiber stimulation, just as the brain can explain the mind – it is the same thing. Of the three theories discussed thus far in class, identity theory is the only theory that would deny the plausibility of a computer or robot experiencing qualia, because identity theorists think the mind can be only one thing: a human brain. Identity theorists explicitly state that a mind can only belong to a human. Only one kind of thing can have mental states: the mind. Qualia are mental states. Therefore, only humans can experience

Putnam claims that what makes up a psychological state can vary between different species (Putnam, 1975). He then attempted to undermine the validity of identity theory with the examples of octopi and aliens. Octopi and aliens have brains that are made up of totally different material, yet they can still function the same. Hence he came to the conclusion that we shouldn’t look at what our mental states are made up of, but rather their function, which is that they cause particular behaviours. By saying mental states are functional states, and not brain states, you are accepting the possibility of brainless systems having mental states (Block, 1978). One type of

The brain has been determined to be the control centre for all nervous messages in humans. The complexity of the brain allows us to interpret these nervous messages into thoughts which in turn allow us to respond to them. To be able to have a sense of consciousness the brain must receive some form of stimulus. Type physicalism/identity theory which was first developed by Place (1956), which describes how different mental states are triggered due to the firing of the corresponding fibres. Philosophers like Place (1956), Smart (1959), Feigl (1972), and Armstrong

Biological psychology is the study of how biology affects a number of psychological processes i.e. how the mind affects the body (Schacter, Gilbert, Wegner & Hood 2015). The study of the mind has had many influential figures throughout history that often use each other’s ideas as a stepping stone to further advance psychology, some of the first being Plato and Aristotle. Plato believed in nativism and theorised some skills and characteristics are innate and a person is born with them (Schacter et al, 2015). Aristotle, however, was in favour of philosophical empiricism i.e. that all knowledge is acquired through experience, yet current scientists do not consider that nativism and empiricism are entirely accurate (Schacter et al, 2015). Aristotle also believed that the brain existed to cool the blood, as during that time people were sceptical that an organ could be responsible for behaviour (Kolb, Whishaw & Teskey 2016). The next major advancement in biological psychology was the introduction of phrenology by Francis Gall, Gall’s theory suggested that all psychological capabilities had a specific place in the brain (Schacter et al, 2015). This theory later turned out to be correct, although was overshadowed by Gall’s insistence that he could state a person’s character dependant on the size of lumps and indentations on a person’s skull, which he thought would represent the size of that brain region beneath (Schacter et al, 2015). Due to this, in spite of a large following, phrenology was quickly discredited. Biologist Pierre Flourens, unhappy with Gall’s research, began removing localized areas of the brain in various animals to observe their behaviour (Schacter et al, 2015). Flourens then found that animal’s movements differed to those with intact brains. This mirrored a situation for surgeon Paul Broca with whom one of his patients had damage to the left side of

In the 1960’s, Hilary Putnam introduced the world of philosophy to the multiple realizability argument against identity theory. Her main point in her argument was that, if identity theory holds to be true, than all living creatures who experience pain, such as humans, mammals, reptiles, etc., must have a commonly shared physical-chemical brain state which directly relates to a certain mental

The International Association for the Study of Pain defined pain as “an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience with actual or potential tissue damage, or described in terms of such damage” (Unk, 2007). Pain being described such as this allows us to see that pain is a perception, not unlike seeing or hearing. Pain is the most common reason that people seek medical attention but pain is very hard to define because it is subjective. Pain perception is the process by which a painful stimulus is relayed from the site of stimulation to the central nervous system (Freudenrich, 2008). In order to determine if pain is a perception of the mind or if it is biological we must first understand how the process of pain works.

The behaviourist perspective is an idea that we can understand any type of behaviour by looking at what the person has learner. This includes personality traits such as shyness, confidence, optimism or pessimism. Behaviourist psychologists explain all human behaviour as resulting from experience. Two key psychologists are Pavlov and Skinner, although these two theorists believed that different processes were involved, they both explained all types of behaviour as being the result of learning. This is everything from shyness to aggression and happiness to depression.

This is the doctrine which the mind-brain identity theory denies and seeks to refute. Its counter-claim is that mind and brain are one and the same entity, in short, that mental states are brain states. Why, then, from this perspective, has the dualist been mistaken? He may have been confused into believing that one thing is two things by the fact that it has two names. For example, while the Morning Star and the Evening Star appear by their different names to denote different things, in fact, astronomical studies reveal them to be the same (in fact, the planet Venus). Water is a different name from H20 but there is no difference at all in the physical substance which both names label. Scientific research has revealed previously hidden identities: that the temperature of a gas is the mean kinetic energy of its molecules; that light is electromagnetic radiation. In a similar way research in neuroscience is expected to show that the sound of a vacuum cleaner, a pang of hunger, the taste of mustard are nothing more or less than the firing of certain neurons.

The mind is a complex myriad of thoughts and psychological systems that even philosophers today cannot entirely grapple. It is composed of the senses, feelings, perceptions, and a whole series of other components. However, the mind is often believed to be similar or even the same as the brain. This gives rise to the mind-brain identity theory, and whether there exists a clear distinction between the physical world and the non-material mind. In this paper, I will delineate the similarities and differences between mind and brain, describe the relevant ideas such as functionalism and materialism, and provide explanations on how these theories crystallized. Further, I will discuss the differing views of this concept from multiple philosophers’ perspectives and highlight the significance of each. Ultimately, I will defend the view that the mind-brain identity theory is false by analyzing its errors and examining the invalid assumptions it makes about consciousness.

Armstrong begins his paper with a question for the reader of what it means to have a mind. It is well understood that man has the ability to perceive, to think, to feel, and so on, but what does it mean to perceive, to think, and to feel? The answer, he believes, lies in science. Seeing that science is constantly and rapidly gaining ground, he asserts that “...we can give a complete account of man in purely physico-chemical terms” (295?) Pointing out the fact that this view has been accepted by various scientists throughout time, he explains it is the most reliable way to approach the mind-body problem.

The development of the Identity Theory of Mind is representative of materialist philosophy’s shift towards questions of human consciousness. Within philosophical and scientific circles, discussions of the mind and body have supplanted discussions of what constitutes the world around us. Staggering technological innovation, alongside the establishment of superior of scientific research methodologies, has given rise to this philosophical trend – Identity Theory is, indeed, the culmination of this trend. Throughout the course of this essay I will both define and defend Identity Theory against what I consider to be two superficially convincing counter-arguments; namely, the invocation of the ‘Leibniz Law’ (otherwise referred to as The Identity of Indiscernibles) and ‘The Problem of Other Minds’. Though seemingly persuasive, the invocation of the Leibniz Law, at its core, consists of a semantic trick. As a general ontological principle the Leibniz Law may possess some validity; in its specific application to Identity Theory however, it remains destitute of substance. On the other hand, The Problem of Other Minds relies on a radical scepticism irreconcilable with current understandings of the brain. Based on the degree of scientific knowledge available regarding the composition of the brain, Identity Theory, at this time, provides a logical and coherent account of the relationship between mind and body.