Force 2025 And Beyond Essay

Like any other unified team, how does the United States Army gain leverage against our enemies who look to seize the free world? Well like many teams they have offensive operations, which are to seek opportunities to gain leverage against their foes or even gain a win in the end and then they have defensive operations. Defensive operations are the opposite of offensive operations where instead of trying to take advantage of the enemy the Army’s forces are trying to take a stance and push the enemy back. Thus allowing a chance to defend the territory where the soldiers stand and hopefully allow the soldiers to regain their forces. So like many other military forces we have used these tactics for many of years to defend our great nation, but of course over the years are tactics have had to change in order to adapt to different wars. So in this paper you will learn the most current tactics that our Army

The increase in technology and intelligence will play a crucial role in the development of the Army. Gen. Milley hit on some important notes in regards to unit effectiveness with these changes. The most difficult question discussed revolves around the how to ease armed conflict. The delivery methods of conflict are evolving and have the potential to completely transform warfare. Also discussed within the same context was the standards of national interest. Furthermore, the implementation of robotics creates a potential for warfare to completely be redefined.

While a commander’s staff conducts planning at any level, whether it is strategic, operational, or tactical, the importance of identifying both theirs and the adversary’s center of gravity (COG) is a critical part of the planning process. Three factors should be carefully analyzed in order to gain a full understanding of the COG; they are critical capabilities, critical requirements and critical vulnerabilities (U.S. Office of the CJCS 11 August 2011, III-24). Although a COG can be attacked directly, the indirect approach which seeks to destroy or neutralize the COG by attacking an adversary’s critical vulnerabilities can be a more efficient use of available resources. The United States Marine Corps’ Warfighting publication MCDP 1 draws a direct correlation between a COG and its critical vulnerability by stating, “we should focus our efforts against a critical vulnerability, a vulnerability that, if exploited, will do the most significant damage to the enemy 's ability to resist us” (United States Marine Corps 1997, 47). The Marine Corps favors the indirect approach to defeating an adversary’s COG because the functions assigned to them by the Department of Defense (DoD) require expeditionary operations and expeditionary forces typically are limited in size, assets, and resources driving them to target an adversary’s critical vulnerabilities.

In General Odierno’s 2014 AUSA Winter Symposium speech, he discussed several changes the U.S. Army will face in the future. He informed his audience the reduction within the Army’s force structure, which will continue until FY 2017. Determine organizational authorizations of the force development process best illustrates what General Odierno deliberated in his speech.

The Department of Defense (DOD) must decide how to rebalance the armed forces general force structure to meet future challenges and opportunities in an austere fiscal environment. The general force structure and capabilities of Joint Force 2020 necessary to adjust the force based on current strategic direction and fiscal constraints is a smaller, efficient, adaptable and integrated joint force. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) emphasizes US military forces will evolve and remain modern, capable, and ready while accepting some increased risk through force reductions. Rebalancing will require innovative approaches and solutions to protect the homeland, build global security, project power, and win decisively with a leaner force.

The Armed Forces of the United States stand at an inflection point. Fourteen years of sustained combat forged a seasoned force capable of success across the range of military operations from military engagement to joint and multinational major combat operations. Today, this seasoned force is tasked to reset from a decade plus of counterinsurgency operations and evolve capability and capacity to defend the Nation from an increasingly complex security environment. Furthermore, this transformation must be completed in the face of a stark fiscal federal budget.

After reviewing The AOC, TP 525-3-1, which describes how the United States Army will employ forces and capabilities in complex

Since the beginning of our nation and the development and expansion of the services that defend it, we have faced a myriad of complex issues: shrinking force structures, global security concerns, and fiscal constraints to name a few. From George Washington’s Continental Army, which evolved into the current Joint Force operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, we are faced with increasing complexity of the operating environment. This heightened complexity and ever shrinking available assets to satisfy these requirements, are the very reason that all commanders at all levels need to find innovative ways to increase operational efficiency in addition to lowering fiscal and asset demands. This new operating environment has also driven the Army Reserve to transform from a traditional strategic force to an operational force.

Force management, or what is really otherwise known as planned comprehensive change, is in reality a complex and interwoven process. Though it was designed within the confines of a systemic approach referred to as the DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership & Education, Personnel and Facilities), in reality it is meant to enable both dutiful and well-thought out change as well as faster, more urgent adjustments in accordance with the evolving nature of war and information gathering tactics. The Army, as one branch involved in this initiative, focuses most of its attention in this regard on the organizational sector because of the way it facilitates an adequate and democratic step-by-step system of review (Student Reader, F102:2). But the fact is that even this initiative remains multi-faceted and appears to be rather bureaucratic in nature (it has five phases, which seems antithetical to an urgent change process), which might not be surprising since implementing the type of changes that are demanded can have major implications of all sorts. Still, it does appear that this concentration is being well received and that it will eventually serve its goal even if it does not appear that way when detailed on a point by point basis.

The transformation in military thought towards employment of forces across multi-domain operations battlespace is based on the current threats

The Army has already established the need for maintaining an operational reserve, through former and current TAAs, capable of breaching AC capability gaps to meet joint force requirements. However, the analysis lacks resources to accomplish this guidance effectively. The demand for RC forces requires generating more operational unit readiness to fully complement the rotational force pool to meet the deployment demand at the same standard as the AC. After conducting a Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) analysis, both overarching recommendations address an identified capability requirement and associated capability gap that could be mitigated with a non-materiel solution with changes or existing capabilities in five, organization, training, personnel, facilities, and policy, of the eight functions.

The Army completed two vitally important publications in 2014. The first was the much-anticipated U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World 2020-2040. This work, with a foreword from the Chief of Staff of the Army, “provides the intellectual foundation and framework for learning and for applying what we learn to future force development under Force 2025 and Beyond.” The TRADOC Commanding General’s foreword emphasizes that the Army Operating Concept’s “vision of the future must drive change to ensure that Army forces and prepared to prevent conflict, shape the security environment, and win wars.” The Army Operating Concept includes an acknowledgment of the “continuities in the nature of war as well as an appreciation for changes in the character of armed conflict” and references Thucydides and Clausewitz. A number of themes emerge from the Army Operating Concept’s vision of the future. These include complexity, ambiguity, multiplicity, adaptation,

The National Defense University’s, Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War, provides a critical analysis from a strategic perspective on the wars in Iraq in Afghanistan. The study concluded that, “Neither national-level leaders nor field commanders fully understood the operational environment.” Indeed, Secretary Robert Gates stated, “our prospects in both countries were grimmer than perceived; our initial objectives were unrealistic… [and] our knowledge and our intelligence were woefully inadequate. We entered both countries oblivious to how little we knew.” Worse, the study identified that after fifteen years of war senior leaders remained unable to identify what or who the enemy is. Recognizing this deficiency as well as the trends in the operating environment, the United States Army and Marine Corps began a multi-year effort in 2005 to develop methods for commanders and staffs to understand complex problems and visualize solutions to solving them. The result was the Army Design Methodology (ADM), which prepares the military for future wars in a complex environment by bridging art and science in an iterative process that facilitates learning, anticipation, and adaptation. The discussion begins with a brief over view of the operating environment before turning to ADM’s utility in preparing for future wars and addressing two of its criticisms.

- Implications for defense posture and force structure: The NDS highly sticks on “compete, deter, and win,” with and to the major adversaries of the U.S., and gives emphasis on modernization and readiness as helping the U.S. military regain its advantage over China and Russia. Also, the NDS is able to a global operating model to help centrally manage posture and make it more “lethal, agile, and resilient,” all in line with facilitating the emphasis on deterring, fighting and winning conflicts with China or Russia. A strategy that emphasizes competing with China and Russia, modernizing the future force, and regaining readiness should be reflected in the department’s investments. Likewise, the NDS outlines

Collectively, the strategic documents serve to align purpose and effort to ensure optimized use of people and resources in pursuit of national objectives. Echoes of these documents are evident in the operational level of military planning. Therefore, to best frame the context in which CA will operate in the future through execution of its core tasks, it is necessary to highlight specific elements within a selection of USG strategic documents that are relevant to CA. Analysis