Ford Pinto- Marketing Ethics

On August 10, 1978 three young girls died in a 1973 Ford Pinto after being stuck from the rear by a driver in a van. The Ford Pinto was completely engulfed in flames and the accident resulted in the death of the three young girls. Today, the debate continues regarding whether or not The Ford Motor Company was responsible for this case and many other cases involving the Pinto bursting into flames resulting in disfigurement or death.

The Grand Jury initiated a case against Ford after a tragic accident occurred on 10th August 1978 along U.S. Highway 33 near Goshen, involving a 1973 Ford Pinto car that was struck from the rear by a van. On board of the 1973 Ford Pinto there were two sisters (Judy and Lynn Ulrich) and their cousin Donna Ulrich who succumbed to burnt injuries after Pinto’s gas tank ruptured and got into flames in the process.

The customers (drivers of Ford) are the number one stakeholders that lost the most. They might not have lost much money or reputations, but they lost the one thing that you can never get back, their life.

In 1972 a Ford Pinto, purchased six months prior, unexpectedly stalled on the freeway in California. The Pinto was hit from behind by a Ford Galaxy, erupting into flames instantly. The driver of the car, Lilly Gray, suffered from fatal burns and died a few days later in the hospital. The passenger, a 13-year old boy named Richard Grimshaw, was also severely injured from burns, which caused his face and body to be permanently disfigured.

Ford executives were under a great deal of pressure to produce a smaller, more gas efficient automobile. Japanese and German automobile sales were rapidly increasing. These competitive forces drove Ford’s executive team to respond by rushing the design process of the Ford Pinto. By 1973, the Pinto was well into production when engineers discovered a flaw in the gas tank, which was located just under the rear bumper. They discovered that if the vehicle suffered a rear-end collision over 20 mph, the gas tank could break and spill gasoline into the passenger compartment, potentially resulting in a fire. The remedy for the flaw was a part that cost $11.00 per vehicle. Executives at Ford knew the company had followed all safety standards and regulations. At that time, automobile safety standards only needed gas tanks to withstand a collision under 20 mph. An internal cost-benefit analysis revealed the costs would be substantially higher to fix the design flaw that the costs associated with any potential damages due to collisions and loss of life. The public remained unaware until Mother Jones journalist, Mark Dowie broke the story in 1977. Fueled by the media, what followed was a frenzy of public outcry and court trials.

In May 1972, Lily Gray was traveling with thirteen year old Richard Grimshaw in a 1972 Pinto when their car was struck by another car traveling approximately thirty miles per hour.  The impact ignited a fire in the Pinto which killed Lily Gray and left Richard Grimshaw with devastating injuries.  A judgment

There are many different cases where people have been critically injured or have died from burn-related injuries from the ruptured the Pino gas tank. This case study specifically discusses the 1978 untimely deaths of Lynn Marie Ulrich, Dana Ulrich, and Judy Ann. Between 1971 and 1978, the Pinto was responsible for a number of fire-related deaths. It was the death of these teenagers that lead brought the controversy of the Ford Pinto’s faulty gas tank placement to a climax resulting in criminal homicide charges for the automaker. Ford’s CEO Henry Ford II and Ford’s new president Lee Iacocca were responsible for the launch of the Ford Pinto. To stay ahead of the growing competition, The Pinto was not to weigh over 2,000 pounds and not costs not to exceed $2,000. Ford officials knew that the Pinto represented a serious fire issue when struck from the rear, but were desperate to expedite the vehicle’s release, the Pintos timing was set just under 25 months. Tooling has already been kicked off, so when crash tests revealed a serious defect in the gas tank, it was too late for any design modifications. The tooling was well underway. Therefore, Ford’s president decided it would be too costly to make changes in the Pinto’s gas tank location pushing ahead with the original design which went unchanged for six years. Any changes to the low-cost Ford Pinto would result in an increased price, thus possibly making it less desirable by small car buyers. Iacocca understood that people shopping for compact cars were watching every dollar, One Ford engineer explained, “the process of elasticity on these subcompacts is extremely tight. You can price yourself right out of the market by adding $25 to the production cost of the model”.

Ford’s current mission statement is "We are a global family with a proud heritage passionately committed to providing personal mobility for people around the world." This is close to what it was in the 1960s; however with Japan closing the once thought insurmountable gap in sales American auto makers had to change. Japan had discovered a way to build smaller more fuel efficient and low-cost cars. American car manufacturers were still stuck on bigger and better as the American standard. As stated before Ford’s response to Japanese autos was the Pinto, a fantastic idea plan poorly executed. Ford knew the

There was strong competition for Ford in the American small-car market from Volkswagen and several Japanese companies in the 1960’s. To fight the competition, Ford rushed its newest car the Pinto into production in much less time than is usually required to develop a car. The regular time to produce an automobile is 43 months but Ford took 25 months only (Satchi, L., 2005). Although Ford had access to a new design which would decrease the possibility of the Ford Pinto from exploding, the company chose not to implement the design, which would have cost $11 per car, even though it had done an analysis showing that the new design would result in 180 less deaths. The company defended itself on the grounds that

I believe that when just starting Gioia thought he was making a difference not just for Ford financially, but for society as a whole. The case of the Ford Pinto would change his ideology forever. Gioia’s position in Ford was to be the Recall Coordinator. He was not designing or engineering any of the cars that Ford was offering. I found it astonishing that only as a recall coordinator, he was “contemplating the fact that [his] job literally involved life-and-death matters”(Gioia 382). He felt that if he did not choose the right recall this could lead to many deaths on his behalf. Yet, he had a financial obligation to Ford. What was going to make them the most money? When the reports of Pintos catching fire started to come in, it was obvious that a recall was in need. Ford made the call that it was not worth putting any effort into fixing this problem due

In the mid to late 1960’s American automobile manufacturing was being dominated by Japanese imports. These imports, smaller in size than the domestic vehicles at the time, offered an economical and dependable alternative to what American automobiles offered. In order to remain competitive with these Japanese imports Ford chief executive officer Lee Iacoca instructed the Ford manufacturing company to come up with a vehicle for the 1971 sales year to compete with these Japanese imports. The normal time for design and production for a new vehicle line is 43 months but Iacoca ordered the process to be reduced to 25 months in order to compete. The timeline was met but a rear-end impact study was not conducted until after the car was already on sales lots. Drawn to the relatively inexpensive price for a vehicle at the time, Lily Gray purchased a 1972 Ford Pinto. This is where the production flaw of the Pinto was first revealed. Gray was traveling with 13 year old Richard Grimshaw on the highway when she had to slow to avoid a broke down vehicle. Also trying to avoid the broke down vehicle a Ford Galaxy traveling at approximately 50 miles per hour rear ended the Pinto. Almost immediately the Pinto burst into flames, both passengers had severe burns on their bodies, and later Lily Gray would pass away as a result of the burns from the crash.

This case study analyzes the experiences of Courtland Kelley at General Motors (GM). Courtland Kelley a third generation GM worker put his job on the line by pushing the GM managers and executives to fully respond to the safety issues found while working as a safety inspector at the company. Kelley along with his supervisor Bill McAleer first discovered the issues while auditing GM cars at rail yards across the country, a spot check of vehicles before the cars were cleared to be delivered to the dealers. McAleer was taken off the audit as a result, who subsequently sued the company seeking whistle-blower protection. The case was eventually dismissed by a judge in favor of GM. The judgement only increased Kelley’s

The American automobile and the foreign car manufacturers were battling in 1960-70s attempting to create a more efficient car at bargain prices. Another problem that was haunting the industry was the gas consumption, which, in the period of the Arab oil embargo in 1970s, became a really critical issue. The survival for the American automobile industry was in designing and building of subcompact cars, which would be affordable for masses, consuming as less gas as possible. Such car for the Ford Motor Company became Ford Pinto that was presented to public in September of 1970.

fires that were killing the occupants of vehicles involved in low-impact rear-end collisions. In his information and overloaded recall coordinator role, Gioia saw thousands of accident reports, and he followed a cognitive “script” that helped him decide which

Volkswagen is under investigation following reports from the EPA that they had installed software into their engines that deceived emissions testers. Furthermore, engineers updated this software in 2014, claiming that they were improving the vehicles. James Liang, a senior engineer who had worked for Volkswagen for 30 years, admitted to investigators in September of 2016 that he had designed the software in question. Further investigation has revealed that this conspiracy may have involved executives of the company. It is unknown to the public whether Liang was acting under orders when he designed the software or he decided to create it on his own to meet requirements his superiors gave him. Both rule utilitarianism and Kantian duty ethics