Foreign Military Intervention

In Paul Johnson’s “American Idealism and Realpolitik Critique” about American involvement in political battles in foreign countries, he brings forth the idea that the American government plays a vital role when it comes to mediating and facilitating conflict. Their importance can often be overshadowed by some opinions that the government, specifically the army, has over stepped its boundaries by intruding on countries and excessively becoming involved in hostility. Johnson notes that without American intervention, there would be cause for a considerable diminish in aid and possibly a rise in disputes. Johnson compares to America’s duties to Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan in which the lack of control over the discord between countries results in an anarchy that would leave the world’s population to “‘continual fear and danger of violent death, and the life of man solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.” (Johnson 387) Although he does put a stress on the significance of the American government, he does not ignore the obvious moral flaws that sometimes tarnish this reputation. When adding up the pros and cons of the United States authority, Johnson’s writing favours the positive aspects but also has hints of neutrality; this attitude is quite fitting considering America’s actions.

Unfortunately indicative of the politics and policies in today’s terms, foreign policy increasingly occurs 150 characters at a time through Twitter, and the unhinged behavior often displayed by our executive leadership damages our national image and ability to effectively manage foreign policy. This fosters a political climate bent on retribution, vilifying dissent, and clear lacks of self-control does not convey an image of national strength and admiration. Unfortunately, this reinforces the stereotypical worldview of American’s and our politics as “the gun toting cowboy” that shoots first and asks questions later. While “the gun toting cowboy” is part of our culture as a nation, an “environment of threat inflation, frenzied overreaction, confusion, complexity, and uncertainty requires cool judgment” (LeVien 16), but cool judgement and detailed planning are not the hallmarks of a shoot-from-the-hip approach. Fulbright spoke to this in The Arrogance of Power in comparing two Americas when he clearly portrayed “the gun toting cowboy” as self righteous, narrowly egotistical, and arrogant in the use of power (Fulbright 245). This only reinforces Fulbright and Bacevich’s

Since World War II, America has often been considered and called upon to serve as the world’s policeman. But is it a role we have performed effectively – and perhaps more importantly, is it one that we should continue to play? With opinion polls showing the American people’s overwhelming reluctance to serve a military role in foreign countries, it is time to consider whether the title of “world’s policeman” is one we should keep. Studying American interventions in the world since WWII offer some lessons and insights into both America’s desire – and ability – to police the world, and leads to the unavoidable conclusion that we are the only nation capable of preventing the all-too common atrocities, genocides and acts of aggression that destabilize continents and create untold human suffering.

Over time, history has shown that Americas involvement in conflicts, proved to be futile efforts in practicing policies of attraction and developing relationships with other cultures. Some leaders successfully established levels of control over indigenous persons, but not without promoting an agenda, or following orders that were not their own. Leaders, left to their own devices, promoted the political agenda via a military mindset that did not allow for diverse ways of thinking, nor enable military forces to approach resistance from a diplomatic perspective. The military forces design could not maintain a sound framework of government. Therefore, only organizations fluent in the practices of

Although the government’s intentions to provide security and protection to the Vietnamese was positive, ultimately, it behaved as a disadvantage. Not only did the refugees have to assimilate into a new culture, but they faced challenges from citizens who held discontent for them. Yet, the refugees still prospered even with the odds against them. Since then, however, a new crisis that appears to be similar has occurred. America yet again has found itself caught between joining a war with Syria or abandoning the war to focus on issues afflicting its citizens. Though the President has already sent attacked Syria, he has yet to announce officially that America waged war against the President of Syria. While Americans argue against going to war

Ever since its rise to global power in the early 20th century, the United States has been involved in countless foreign affairs. Said involvement has really influenced how the United States should look at foreign affairs today. In essence, being the lone Superpower of the modern world, the United States acts like the World’s Policeman. While on paper, this idea of having a World Policeman may seem like a great idea, since there will always be that one nation standing by with the intent of protecting shared ideals around the globe. However, actually putting this idea into practice says otherwise. Taking a look back at the outcomes of recent military interventions, specifically the Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq wars, the

The U.S. military response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 signifies the most extensive use of force by any state since the Persian Gulf War more than two decades ago. Following these operations, many commentators have suggested that there has been a notable transformation in international law regarding state responsibility for terrorist acts. This essay aims to argue that such change has been significant and it has satisfactorily countenanced states’ response to terrorism by presenting evidence of new state practice plus opinio juris in this area. To do so, this essay will first discuss the controversial concept of terrorism and its relevance to the legal framework for the use of armed force in international law. From here, it will move to explicate the principles of and grounds for state responsibility as well as to debate that the act of providing a safe haven for terrorist non-state actors should be considered as a revolutionary factor to the concept of attribution. Lastly, this essay will examine the recent changes occurred in customary law on state responsibility in the light of the application and interpretation of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter after the events of September 11. All these aspects will demonstrate that not only has the law on state responsibility had noticeably developed and consequently provided states with adequate legality to react to the challenges posed by contemporary terrorism, but it has also begun to inaugurate binding

Carl Von Clausewitz was a Prussian Military Theorist in the early eighteen hundred`s who focused on the moral implications of war. He once said “War is the mere continuation of politics by other means”, a statement that has become all too relevant in the twenty-first century. This paper will serve to analyze why the US invaded Iraq in 2003, discussing the underlying agenda of the Bush administration at the time compared to what information was given to the public. First, evaluating how the Bush administration used propaganda to vilify the Iraqi regime as terrorists and convince the US public that invading Iraq was clearly for pre-emptive self-defense. This section shows how the US government at the time framed the Iraq war as

President Obama stated that, “[ISIS is] not an existential threat to us. They are vicious killers and murderers who perverted one of the world’s great religions” (Obama, 2016). ISIS resembles a typical state instead of a terrorist organization, through holding territory and region-specific revenue sources (Crawford, 2003). The president’s decision to start a ground offensive against ISIS illustrates the greatest show of force in modern history. While the reasons for going to war are just, the mission 's low chance of success makes the war morally unjust. The ground invasion has too many moral obstacles and would further risk destabilizing the region. The United States could not peacefully end the mission due to regional religious and cultural problems. The United States stands as a legitimate authority and has a just cause for initiating war. Yet, the inability to install a friendly regime in the region and the lack of coalition forces invalidates moral reasoning for the war. The plan for American military intervention against ISIS cannot be morally justified and would forever hurt America’s standing as a legitimate authority. The Just War Theory dates back to the 5th century and defines the guidelines for justly conducting war. Just War consists of three parts: jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum (Moser and McDonald, 2016a). The ground invasion against ISIS violates principles from all three components.

Generations of Americans have watched our military engage in conflicts abroad. For mine, it’s Afghanistan and Iraq. Whether or not all of these crusades were born of integrity and the pursuit of democracy is questionable. In 2011, we watched as the United States and allied forces entered yet another conflict, in Libya, to aid protesters in their ousting of Muammar Gaddafi. This conflict was supposed to go uphill from Gaddafi’s death. However, we know that Libya today is a place connected to chaos and division. President Obama even describes the handling of the Libyan intervention as his “worst mistake” (Tierney “The Legacy of Obama’s ‘Worst Mistake’”). Why? “[W]e [and] our European partners underestimated the need to come in full force if you’re going to do this…the day after Gaddafi is gone…at that moment, there has to be a much more aggressive effort to rebuild societies that didn’t have any civic traditions.” (Tierney “The Legacy of Obama’s ‘Worst Mistake’”) Many agree that our conflicts in the Middle East, recently in Afghanistan and Iraq, have shown us intervening operations are complicated

In the article “ the decision to go to war with Iraq” Pfiffner explains how the United States of America made its decision against the regime of Saddam Hussein. With much media coverage focusing on the complexities and victims of the war, we may think that we have the specifics and details of this war; however, many of the details of this war were hidden and not shared with the public. Furthermore, disagreements in the international community and within the American public about the wisdom of war with Iraq were mirrored in divisions within the U.S.

The articles that made up the reading for this week deal with the causes of war in Afghanistan today, and shifts in US strategy. They provide different explanations on why the US has maintained a military presence in the country, ranging from terrorism and security to economic and human rights concerns. All of the authors, however, agree that US intervention has largely been a failure, as the US remains no closer to peace than in 2001.

The white house has overseen the vast foreign policy establishment for the purpose of synthesizing all the messages arising out of the bureaucracy and helping the president makes his own foreign policy. The constitution gives congress the power to declare war; congress has exercised this power on only five occasions. The treaty power was and is a significant entrée of the senate into foreign policy making. Numerous members of congress have left the legislature to develop into key foreign affairs cabinet. Although the president, the bureaucracy, and congress are the true makers of foreign policy, the foreign policy institution is a much larger arena, counting what can properly be called the shapers of foreign policy: a host of unofficial, informal players who posses varying degrees of influence depending on their prestige, reputation, socioeconomic, and most important, the party and ideology that are leading at a given moment. Even though foreign policy make in noncrisis situations may closely resemble the pluralistic politics of domestic foreign policy which is still a narrower arena with fewer

The USA has a lengthy history of foreign intervention when it is convenient for them rather than for the benefit of the country being converged upon. Regimes and dictatorships breed with practiced ease in developing—or even recovering—countries, and foreign policy is a highly disputed topic for the world’s most powerful nations. Specifically, in the US foreign intervention should not be implemented as of late, for they have proven their incapability to actually be beneficial to a nation without benefiting form it. Often armed with selfish notions, America intervenes in foreign affairs—to garner some sort of profit—before withdrawing from the country entirely. By reading political declarations and historical recounts of these dictatorships it

After successfully campaigning against the domestic and foreign policy direction of the Bush administration, the newly inaugurated President Obama immediately and abruptly faced one of the principal challenges to his promise of change, reanalyzing and redefining the purpose of the United States’ long-term troop commitments in the Middle East. President Obama faced a public weary from the ongoing war in Iraq and disillusioned with the perpetually increasing list of US casualties, but also needed to ensure the security of US interests in the Middle East and deter future terrorist attacks against the US homeland. And while President Obama ultimately decided to commit 30,000 troops to combat terrorist cells in Afghanistan, some questions remain over whether the president’s eventual decision met all the criteria of rationality as defined through the Rational Actor Model. Such questions hold the utmost importance in an ongoing analysis of Obama’s presidency, as the American people expect any successful and enduring president to rationally chart the course best able to further the interests of the American people and maintain the United States’ global supremacy.