she could have done otherwise. This is the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP). For any person and any action, that person is morally responsible for performing or failing to perform that action if and only if she had a genuine alternate possibility open to her at the time. An alternate possibility is simply another option that an agent has at the time that he or she acts. This principle may hold in part because of the Ought Implies Can principle, which states that a subject ought to do something
In this essay I will argue that moral responsibility for something we do does require that we have alternate possibilities in some sense. I will explore the criticisms of this from Frankfurt, with the suggestion that Frankfurt cases are not as damaging as they seem. Finally, I will attempt to show that it is philosophically safer to adopt Otsuka’s slight revision of alternate possibilities. It has long been taken for granted that for an agent to have moral responsibility for an action, they must
determinism is true or false. Harry Frankfurt thinks even though the requirement of alternative possibilities in order to be held morally responsible for our actions seems intuitively plausible, it is a questionable premise in the argument provided by incompatibilists. Frankfurt calls the premise that “a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise” the principle of alternative possibilities or PAP (Frankfurt, 829). He argues that PAP is false and a person can be
in his essay “Of Liberty and Necessity” that free will and determinism are compatible ideas, and that they can both be accepted at the same time without being logically incorrect. Alike Hume, 20th century author Harry G. Frankfurt concludes in his essay “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility” that the two major concepts are compatible. These two authors are among the most famous of Compatibilists (hence the fact that they believe free will and determinism are compatible ideas) in philosophical
I will begin, as Frankfurt does, by defining what he means by PAP (principle of alternate possibilities): “a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise” (167). In this paper, I will argue that Frankfurt, despite appearances, does not employ a counterexample in his refutation of PAP. To illustrate how he fails to do so, I will first review how counterexamples operate. Next, I will explore the basis of Frankfurt’s argument in the context of the Jones4
Harry Frankfurt debates the issue concerning moral responsibility without the presence of free will. However, his hypothetical demonstration cannot exist, therefore his account does not adequately address the problem with free will. The metaphysical issue is in
Frankfurt distinguishes between acting freely and having a free will. Are both of these compatible with determinism? How does our freedom relate to causation? In this essay, I will initially address an incompatibilist approach towards free will and decipher why it is illogical and contradictory. In turn, I will address why Frankfurt’s definitions regarding freedom of action and free will is more appropriate and evaluate why they are both synonymously compatible with determinism. Following on from
PROJECT MANAGEMENT CASE STUDIES, SECOND EDITION - PROJECT MANAGEMENT CASE STUDIES, SECOND EDITION HAROLD KERZNER, Ph.D. Division of Business Administration Baldwin-Wallace College Berea, Ohio John Wiley & Sons, Inc. This book is printed on acid-free paper. @ Copyright O 2006 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. All rights reserved. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken, New Jersey Published simultaneously in Canada No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in