(8) leadership.
MG Fredendall rarely left the Command Post and was removed from the front lines, being hidden in underground bunkers. His verbal orders were vague and he continually bypassed the 1st Armored Division commander, MG Ward, so as to deal directly with the combat commanders. His orders were based solely (Nidorest) on directive and not from the information on hand. He regularly ignored the advice of his subordinates.
d. State the mission and describe initial disposition of the opposing forces.
As per the Corps commander, the 1st Armored Division was to defend the passes and provide support to the French XIX Corps’ flanks. The primary purpose was to hold the lines until reinforcements and logistical elements could catch back
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It was a complete disaster for the Allied Forces and large victory for the Axis powers. It set a tone for further engagements along the western front of the Tunisian invasion. Only the lack of clear unity of command between the Italians and Germany allowed the offensive to stall.
4. ASSESS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ACTION:
a. Relate causes to effects.
The US doctrine relating to the use of tanks and tank destroyers was flawed, furthermore unit commanders failed to both properly exercise the doctrine and adapt to the realities of war. This lead to a total failure in our ability to properly engage and defeat the German forces.
A lack of good intelligence and the inability to properly utilize the intelligence we had made it impossible to properly position our forces prior to the battle starting. Furthermore it greatly reduced our ability to reinforce our front lines and counter the German attacks.
b. Establish military “lessons learned.”
Doctrine should be fluid, it must be allowed to adapt and change as the situation dictates. You cannot allow yourself to get stuck in a singular mindset about how war is fought. Our enemy’s technology and tactics are always evolving and we must always strive to evolve both to adapt to and overcome these
The notion of an American way of war informs how scholars, policymakers, and strategists understand how Americans fight. A way of war—defined as a society’s cultural preferences for waging war—is not static. Change can occur as a result of important cultural events, often in the form of traumatic experiences or major social transformations. A way of war is therefore the malleable product of culturally significant past experiences. Reflecting several underlying cultural ideals, the current American way of war consists of three primary tenets—the desire for moral clarity, the primacy of technology, and the centrality of scientific management systems—which combine to create a preference for decisive, large-scale conventional wars with clear objectives and an aversion to morally ambiguous low-intensity conflicts that is relevant to planners because it helps them address American strategic vulnerabilities.
Imagine being on a boat headed to Normandy, France with 160,000 other American, British and Canadian forces. There are planes flying overhead and there’s a tank on your boat and all the other boats have tanks. Then you hear your platoon leader saying “Men, we’re on our way to a heavily fortified beach head to take control of the beachhead. Securing the beachhead will help us stop Hitler’s plan to conquer the world for himself.” When they were at the beach they had to keep their heads low until the door opens and let the tank get through first so they could take cover behind it. “And men, good luck out there.”
Germany’s poor execution in the Battle of Britain can be blamed on many factors, including the weakness of the German Luftwaffe after their attack on France and Norway, and the German’s lack of a plan for battle. Germany was unprepared for the Battle of Britain and leaped into airstrikes despite having little knowledge of the British Royal Air Force strategy and vulnerabilities, leading to their ultimate failure in the battle. On top of this, the British Royal Air Force had top rated pilots and updated plane technology, allowing the British to excel in precision and avoid fatal errors in a more efficient manner than the German
The Germans suffered from confusion and the absence of commander Rommel, who was on leave. At first, Hitler thought the invasion was a distraction from a coming attack north of the Seine River. He refused to call nearby divisions to the counterattack. He also didn’t want to send armored divisions to help defend. Furthermore, the Germans were hampered by Allied air and naval support, taking out bridges and protecting Allied troops.
Despite having more than 9,000 soldiers either injured or dead, the Allies’ pushed through and won the Battle of Normandy. Many people were happy with the outcome of the battle and even celebrated the victory. With Hitler’s misstep and his suicide, it was inevitable for Germany to surrender. The Allied forces showed the world they should not be
Germans used ingenuity to thwart allied forces sustainment efforts by using aerial, communications, and biological attacks to name a few. The Germans did not achieve enough success with their strategic operations to win the war, but the lack of major success did not deter the efforts. The Allied forces were superior on the battlefield because of the vast amount of resources it could receive. The Germans felt the fingers tighten on their throats because of the lack of supplies to sustain their forces. Since this was a problem for the German forces they wanted to ensure that the allied forces had the same issue. Many of the attack by German forces attacks of supplies it did not stop supplies from reaching the allied forces.
This essay will be discussing and analyzing the Battle of Normandy following a chronological order. First, we will see how the battle of Normandy was the result of a great preparation and collaborative effort where all the protagonists had key roles in the execution. We will then underline the importance of the weather and terrain and show how these factors did contribute and mold the different key phases of the battle which determined the outcome of this major Historical moment.
It was a total humiliation to the Germans and to the man in the army
Fredendall was known as a brassy, outspoken, imprecise in speech corps commander, who had a firm opinion on every subject. He personally disliked Anderson and apparently had little understanding of that British procedures for emplacement of forces. Furthermore, Fredendall had no confidence in and little patience with the French. He was outspoken in his opinions of allied forces and was inclined to be critical of superiors and subordinates alike. But, of all his characteristics, perhaps the most fatal to the 1st Armored Division was his air of finality. His perceptibly excessive emphasis on security and safety of his command post, which he located far to the rear and seldom left to visit the front; and his open dislike for and reluctance to allow the 1st Armored Division Commander the opportunity to
A major factor in Germany's inability to win the battle was that they failed to destroy the English fighter command installations and didn’t realize that the British were using radar extensively along with an army of observers that thoroughly communicated German coordinates.
The Allies could crew and aircraft losses but the Germans could not. This resulted in the collapsation the German resistance because no protection from the blows launched by the Allied air forces. Once the Allies targeted the German oil industry that started to become hopeless for the Germans. The Americans turned the oil industry the focus of their air campaign. The Germans faced continuous defeat, resulting in Nazi leaders rethinking their leadership strategies.The insecure leadership lead the to make two serious military mistakes. The first mistake was that the Germans used flak batteries to fight off the bombers and the second was the terror attacks instructed
(7) Command and Control: During the Battle of Kasserine Pass, Allied and Axis commands both had relationship problems. The Axis command initially gave Gen. Ziegler two panzer divisions. Made a decision to give one of those two commands to Gen. Rommel. Those two commands did not communicate with each other. MG Fredendall’s orders were unclear and somewhat incorrect. He also skipped around chain of command and made direct coordination with combat commanders. MG Fredenall did not get along with other Allied
With Hitler’s delay in the operation start time it allowed the Russians too much time to prepare and build up forces. The Germans lost many tanks and assault guns simply to mine fields. Those tanks could have been used in a better way and could have allow the Germans to make a better breakthrough. The Germans also went in to the operation severely outnumbered which would not have been a bad thing since they had the armor and firepower to offset this numbers but if they attack when they originally wanted to the Germans would not have to face as many as they did. The Germans could have easily beaten the force that was arrayed in front of them in month of May. Not only did this delay allow the Soviets to build up their forces in Kursk the Germans were now pressed for time with the impending allied invasion of the west. Also the German intelligence dropped the ball due the breach of Intel the Russians were able to do which allowed the foreknowledge of the attack and locations of the German assembly areas in the north part of the battlefield. The Battle of Kursk shows that with plenty of preparation an army of number can beat an army of unstoppable force. This battle will go down in history as the largest armor conflict in the world and would doom the Germans on the eastern front in World War
The first battle was very important in keeping the French in the war. And setting up a standstill for around 4 years. Without this battle I don’t think the Allied powers would have won the war. France most likely would have fallen if they wouldn’t have held strong at the Marne. If France would’ve fallen many historians believe that the end of the war would’ve been different with the Central powers on top.
The German commanders decided to not attack from France’s rear but rather from the Franco-German border, which was probably one of their biggest mistakes because the French were lined and heavily protecting themselves and their line. This plan was flipped due to Germany’s inability to predict what was happening in other countries. These miscalculations over the role of Belgian resistance, speed of Russia moving in Eastern Prussian territory and Britain’s immediate entry into the land war at the Battle of Mons led to Germany’s military plans being weakened. After a few weeks of battle, it was clear this plan had failed. The plan itself effected the war but in a way, it also had nothing to do with the outcome of the war. If the plan had worked the way it was originally planned, that would have meant no other countries made a move to protect themselves or fight back. Since the plan did not go as it was supposed to, it was clear Germany was behind in what was happening in other countries, were under-prepared, and had no way of predicting exactly what would happen when they did