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Free Will And The Door For Free Action

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This paper contends that Sider is wrong. With a revised interpretation of free will and internalization of weight bestowal, indeterminacy might open the door for free action. We will discuss what this paper means by free action and indeterminacy, explore why Sider thinks indeterminacy is incompatible with free action, object Sider’s arguments using Nozick’s proposal of self-subsuming weight bestowal, and investigate possible counter arguments to Nozick’s proposition.

The libertarian view requires a free action to be non-random, uncaused and ‘could have been done otherwise’. However, indeterminacy suggests that a prior event provides a clue of a range of probable future events. Thus the indeterministic version of event is not uncaused. To explore the possibility of indeterminacy to be compatible with free action, we have to tolerate this shortcoming. Therefore in this essay, we will regard a person who acts freely as someone who could have non-randomly chosen other than the chosen non-random event. Whether the event is caused or uncaused is driven out of the equation.

Sider argues that an indeterministic world governed by the law of probability inherently entails decision to be made by chance. Suppose Amir has 75%, 20%, and 5% probabilities of choosing a sandwich, a burger, and an orange for his lunch respectively. Imagine one hundred parallel worlds exist. In 75 worlds, Amir would choose a sandwich; in 25 worlds, Amir would choose a burger; in 5 worlds, Amir would choose

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