This paper contends that Sider is wrong. With a revised interpretation of free will and internalization of weight bestowal, indeterminacy might open the door for free action. We will discuss what this paper means by free action and indeterminacy, explore why Sider thinks indeterminacy is incompatible with free action, object Sider’s arguments using Nozick’s proposal of self-subsuming weight bestowal, and investigate possible counter arguments to Nozick’s proposition.
The libertarian view requires a free action to be non-random, uncaused and ‘could have been done otherwise’. However, indeterminacy suggests that a prior event provides a clue of a range of probable future events. Thus the indeterministic version of event is not uncaused. To explore the possibility of indeterminacy to be compatible with free action, we have to tolerate this shortcoming. Therefore in this essay, we will regard a person who acts freely as someone who could have non-randomly chosen other than the chosen non-random event. Whether the event is caused or uncaused is driven out of the equation.
Sider argues that an indeterministic world governed by the law of probability inherently entails decision to be made by chance. Suppose Amir has 75%, 20%, and 5% probabilities of choosing a sandwich, a burger, and an orange for his lunch respectively. Imagine one hundred parallel worlds exist. In 75 worlds, Amir would choose a sandwich; in 25 worlds, Amir would choose a burger; in 5 worlds, Amir would choose
Determinism is a doctrine suggesting that for every event there exist conditions that could cause no alternative event. Free will is a philosophical term describing a particular sort of capacity of rational agents to choose a course of action from among various alternatives. Understandably, the dichotomy between these two concepts is a topic philosophers have debated over for many years. As a result of these debates, a number of alternative philosophical perspectives arguing for the existence of free will, namely libertarianism and compatibilism, have emerged, existing in stark contrast to determinism. In order to ascertain the extent to which free will is compatible with determinism, one must first consider these different approaches to
In the following paper I will talk about A.J. Ayer’s “Freedom and Necessity,” and I will explain the dilemma of determinism and Ayer’s compatibilist solution to it. I will explain some of the examples Ayer uses to explain the difference between cause and being constrained, and how both affect one’s free will. I will also discuss on why Ayer’s compatibilism solution to the dilemma is the best solution so far.
In respect to the arguments of Ayer and Holbach, the dilemma of determinism and its compatibility with that of free will are found to be in question. Holbach makes a strong case for hard determinism in his System of Nature, in which he defines determinism to be a doctrine that everything and most importantly human actions are caused, and it follows that we are not free and therefore haven’t any moral responsibility in regard to our actions. For Ayer, a compatibilist believing that free will is compatible with determinism, it is the reconciliation and dissolution of the problem of determinism and moral responsibility with free willing that is argued. Ayer believes that
But, since intuition depends on who we are and what we are made of, things that we do not control, free will is not present and with that neither is moral responsibility (Strawson, page 17). Everything we do is based off of what we are made of in terms of our mind and rationale, and what we are made of is a product of external things that we do not control, so it must be true that everything we are, and everything we do, is not determined by our own free will. In order for us to truly have free will, it would require us to be our own creators, products of our own thoughts, which in itself is impossible due to our understanding of human procreation. By no means does this suggest that humans cannot be punished for evil actions, or that humans are being forced to do what they do, but rather that we do not have as much control over what we do in our lives like supporters of free will would believe. Free will is not present, so moral responsibility isn’t, either, for determinism proves to be the argument more worthy belief after comparison to free will. I did not make a free willed decision to title this paper, I did not even make the choice to take this class, for what I have been convinced is humorous, clever or for my own best interests in life as a whole is completely out of my control, and with that so are my
The subject of freewill and determinism has been a matter of intense debate in the philosophical community for ages with the topic of compatibilism and incompatibilism. This essay will be reviewing and critiquing the work of a very well-known philosopher Peter Van Inwagen and his article “An Argument For Incompatibilism” and what does he mean by freewill and determinism.
The aim of this essay is to prove the reliability of and why Libertarianism is the most coherent of the three Free Will and Determinism views. It refers to the idea of human free will being true, that one is not determined, and therefore, they are morally responsible. In response to the quote on the essay, I am disagreeing with Wolf. This essay will be further strengthened with the help of such authors as C.A. Campell, R. Taylor and R.M. Chisholm. They present similar arguments, which essentially demonstrate that one could have done otherwise and one is the sole author of the volition. I will present the three most common arguments in support of Libertarianism, present an objection against Libertarianism and attempt to rebut it as well as
Many times I find myself sitting and wondering whether I am fully free or not. I wake up every single morning and do the same routine, which is eat breakfast, go to class or work, do homework, go to the gym, shower, and then go to bed. Does this truly mean I am free? There are a lot of questions that you can ask yourself while following a routine. Is this really the path I should have taken? Were my choices determined by external factors? Determinism is the thesis that an any instant there is only one physically possible future. Robert Blatchford and Walter Terence Stace, two philosophers, both agree that determinism is true, although they have two different views on whether this means that people are free or not. Blatchford believes that everything is predestined. Stace on the other hand, believes that a person chooses what they do because of free will. In this essay I am going to discuss both of the philosophers’ views more in depth and why I favor Stace’s view over Blatchford’s.
To establish determinism, we can admit by denoting that some events in our lives happen because of prior reasons without yet losing our sense of freedom. It is actually evident that the events and actions that an individual undertakes action have different effects upon him even though they may be past or present events. Though we might not be sure whether our past event result to our present status in life, it is pertinent to note that freedom in decision making is an open forum for each individual and impacts on later activities. We can admit that some events, for example, a next domino fall, are bound to happen because of a prior event. It is possible that if we have no power to act other than us, in fact, to act, then we have no free will. This argument for hard determinism is persuasive. It is certainly valid, and none of the premises appears to be clearly false. Although we have discovered a plausible argument in defense of hard determinism, most people find this argument to be impossible to accept. In our lives, we hold each other in account of our deeds that we had made wrong choices.
a. Attention Gatherer: Nothing is completely random, and everything is determined, as the determinist would say, but as humans, there is such a thing as self determinism. Each action has a cause, it is not random, and it is rational, but it is also a choice. Each individual can choose to do a multitude of things, and thus the actions are free, and they are not wholly predictable, but they are not wholly unpredictable either.
In “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”, Harry Frankfurt illustrates the concepts of freedom of will and freedom of action, but more importantly, Frankfurt has refined the compatibilism theory. Compatibilism allows the freedom of will to exist in the deterministic world. According to determinism theory, the future state of worlds is determined by some events in the distant past (E) and the laws of nature (L). More specifically, E refers to the history, such as experiences or states whereas L refers to scientific or physical law like gravity. For example, an alcoholic’s action is determined that he will not stop drinking. Here E is that he had been drinking in the past, and L is the physiological addiction effect caused by
Whether we have free will is widely controversial. The absence of a universal definition poses a primary problem to this question. In this essay, I shall base my argument on a set of three conditions for free will: 1) that the actor is unconstraint in his action, 2) the actor could have acted otherwise and 3) the actor must be ‘ultimately responsible’ (Kane, 2005: 121) for his action. After I have explained them, I shall apply these conditions to three scenarios that cover most, if not any, circumstances that occur when taking choices. The purpose of this essay is to show that if my conditions are true, none of the scenarios is based on free will and thus we do not have free will.
William Rowe defines gratuitous evil as an instance of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.(Rowe 335) In a world with so much evil it raises the questions If God is all powerful, all knowing and all good, how can he allow bad things to happen to good people? Can God even exist in a world with so such gratuitous evil? These are questions that has afflicted humanity for a very long time and has been the question to engross theologians for centuries. The existence of evil has been the most influential and powerful reason to disprove the existence of God. It is believed among many theist that God is the creator and caretaker
The chance and uncertainty of randomness is an explanation of freedom. Given this act it would break the causal chain and abolish determinisms freedom. (Doyle 1,2) For human beings to have free will they are required to have some sort of randomness. If their actions are a direct consequence of a random event they are not responsible for their actions. Interdeterminism requires certainty to establish the knowledge and the laws of nature. Strawson and Sartre have very different views regarding free will. Throughout the paper, the idea of responsibility based on our actions and the issues of human beings not having free will is discussed. I believe human beings are able to have free will based on the
In this essay I will explain why I think the strongest position of the free will debate is that of the hard determinists and clarify the objection that moral responsibility goes out the door if we don’t have free will by addressing the two big misconceptions that are associated with determinists: first that determinism is an ethical system, and secondly that contrary to common belief determinists do believe in the concept of cause and effect. I will also begin by explaining my position and why I believe that the position of the indeterminist does not hold water as an argument and the third
For ages, Philosophers have struggled with the dispute of whether human actions are performed “at liberty” or not. “It is “the most contentious question, of metaphysics, the most contentious science” (Hume 528). In Section VIII of An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, David Hume turns his attention in regards to necessary connection towards the topics “Of Liberty and Necessity.” Although the two subjects may be one of the most arguable questions in philosophy, Hume suggests that the difficulties and controversies surrounding liberty (i.e. free will) and necessity (i.e. causal determinism) are simply a matter of the disputants not having properly defined their terms. He asserts that all people, “both learned and