Freedom Of Expression Contained Within The European Convention Of Human Rights

Another important Supreme Court case that examined the reasonable limits on freedom of expression is R v. Whatcott. The Whatcott ruling also challenged the jurisdictional issues of free speech. William Whatcott, a Christian activist who advocated strongly against homosexuality and same sex marriage. Whatcott distributed several flyers in Saskatchewan that discussed political, social and moral issues. Many of these flyers heavily denouncing homosexuality using strong offensive language denouncing homosexuality. The public distribution of these anti homosexual flyers put Whatcott under a great amount of scrutiny by the Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission. The Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission found that Whatcott violated section 14 of the human rights code which states no one shall publish or distribute material that promotes hatred of any group of people. Whatcott’s activities were ruled as hate speech against homosexuals and was ordered to pay compensation to his complainants. After this case was appealed several times it was eventually heard by the Supreme Court. The question and arguments of the R v. Whatcott decision was whether human rights tribunals should be allowed restrict freedom of expression under Charter framework. (Schutten and Haigh:3-5) However, there was a golden opportunity that was missed to define the jurisdiction between political expression and hate speech. The Supreme Court could have looked at past precedent cases and Supreme Court doctrines, but

Articles 8 and 10 of the European convention of human rights and section 6 of the human rights act 1998 relate directly to both of the key issues throughout this problem question. These problems regard towards the publication of photographs containing Brad Pitts family and Dylan Davies attendance to a gamblers anonymous meeting.

Freedom of speech is a fundamental human right. Whether or not on a college campus, people (especially college students) should have the right to speak freely. Everyone does have the right to speak freely, because it is one of the twenty-seven amendments. Colleges all around the United States are now home to many restrictions on free speech. For example, the idea and use of “free speech zones” has made its way to colleges everywhere. A “free speech zone” is a sidewalk sized place where students are allowed to speak their minds freely on college campuses. I know what you’re thinking. This sounds ridiculous. Why are there specific places for people to speak their minds? Aren’t colleges suppose to be a place where students speak their minds and learn new things? Universities should not be able to put any restrictions on free speech.

These extreme cases of judicial misconduct are rare; but when they happen they force us to think critically about our judicial system and the important role it plays in our society. When it comes to preventing abuses

The right to freedom of speech as one of the fundamental human rights is enshrined in The Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It is consisted of the freedom to speak, think and express oneself without censorship. Freedom of speech constitutes the essential foundations of a democratic society and the basic conditions for its progress and for the development. One of most important functions of the right to freedom of speech is that decision-making at all levels is preceded by discussion and consideration of a representative range of views. It enables the public to participate in making decisions based on the free flow of information and ideas. A decision made after adequate consultation is likely to be a better one which less imperfectly reflects

It has also been suggested that judges could use video conferencing facilities from a different location in order to deal with a civil dispute rather than be physically present. This is not without its’ own set of challenges . It is implied that a party in a trial has the right to see a judge “struggling conscientiously with the detail of a case ” which is a “feature of the court system that cannot be discarded ”. In trying to minimise the physical aspect of the judge’s role in court seems to undermine the basic fundamental human rights mentioned in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which states that parties in a trial are entitled to a “fair and public hearing...” . This is because it seeks to reinforce the aspect of the courts moving towards a more ‘impersonal ’ and ‘nonhuman ’ approach to dealing with civil disputes.

On observing the District Court a number of distinctions from the Local Courts were immediately made apparent. Without going in to detail about the actual structure of the courts, they seemed to fit more closely with the traditional schema of a typical courtroom. In particular the larger courtrooms with more facilities combined with the barristers and magistrates wearing their wig and robes seemed to instantly uphold the ideology of justice. It is interesting to note how appearances can automatically provide an impression that justice will be upheld. The

Competing voices purporting to speak for the judiciary undermine the institutional independence of the courts and leave other parts of government (and the public) free to choose the messages they prefer in relation to court policy and administration. This is potentially very damaging both to the actual welfare of court systems and ultimately to the level of respect and attention afforded them.

Robinson (2001, p.261), clarifies that, “in cases where the public interest in the administration of justice conflicts with the public interest in freedom of speech, Australian courts have traditionally favoured the former.” However, rulings such as these risk journalists’ not publishing legally legitimate information, as they are unsure if it will be viewed as contempt, and are unwilling to take the risk, thus inadvertently, and unjustifiably, impinging upon free speech (Bowley 2005) (Aniano 2005). This is a significant and contentious point, highlighting the conundrum. Bowley (2006, p.15), illustrates this, discussing the balance between free speech and an unprejudiced trial, “Striking a balance between these two interests is a difficult task, which in Australia, has been addressed by the common law over time. While a number of decisions have considered how the balance should be maintained, no authoritative guidance has yet been developed in Australia, with considerable uncertainty still surrounding the questions of when a publication will offend the sub judice rule.” Bowley (2006, p.15) expands, believing that elucidation of sub judice contempt would benefit all major stakeholders, and ultimately “avoid costly and time-consuming litigation, and at the same time, allow the media to publish and broadcast with greater confidence and without fear of being found to be in contempt of court.” Lorne and Valerie (2013, p.537), strongly emphasise this point, believing, “not only that we lack a clear understanding of this [sub judice] rule, but also that because of this, it is used selectively, incoherently, and instrumentally. As a result, the accountability of government, the integrity of adjudicative processes, and the effectiveness of the media all may be jeopardised.” Clearly, balancing free speech and the right to a fair trial is a difficult

Contempt law is now largely governed by the Contempt of Court Act 1981. The Act was passed as a result of several UK defeats before the European Court of Human Rights and its aim was to make the law clearer and more liberal. The Act was also designed in

Therefore, this essay will firstly critically evaluate how court reporting restrictions in the family court, under the anonymity provisions of the Children Act 1989 and the contempt at court provisions in section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960 along with other court reporting restrictions in the family courts, are problematic for family proceedings when compared to being protective. Furthermore, this essay will then analyse how the protective scope of court reporting restrictions in the family court system has been reduced as a result of the continued problems that court reporting restrictions cause, but in a need to make the court more transparent has made the court reporting restrictions even more

Freedom of Speech and Expression: Article 112 of the criminal code, the so-called lese majeste law, makes it a crime--punishable by a maximum of 15 years’ imprisonment for each offense--to criticize, insult, or threaten the king, queen, royal heir apparent, or regent. The law also allows citizens to file lese majeste complaints against each other, which they did on several occasions. The government may and regularly does conduct trials in secret and prohibits public disclosure of the content of the alleged offenses.

Contempt of court is ‘any words spoken or written, or any conduct which might impede the working of the court, or which could create a disregard of the authority of our justice system.’ (Samson, 2014). The two most common types of contempt of court are sub judice rule and the failure to obey a court order. Most of the law of contempt in New Zealand is common law, however, parts of it that deal with the conduct in court and specific offenses that relate to the administration such as perjury, are considered as statutes.

Contempt of court concerning journalistic matters was dealt by the common law until 1981. Newspapers were almost always held for contempt of court because of what they wrote. The decisions were quite strict due to the fact that they were made by judges. After the Contempt of Court Act of 1981, matters concerning contempt of court were dealt by acts of Parliament. With this act a person can be found liable for contempt of court in two cases:

It is important to set the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights in context by examining the development of rights within the European Union. The embryo organisation that commenced the EU (The Coal and Steel Community 1951) was introduced in the wake of World War II to rebuild Europe by economically tying previously warring nations together. The consensus amongst the "heavy weights" of the EU was, if member states were economically invested in each other to ensure financial stability within their own state, future conflicts would be avoided. The EU had taken the role of a purely economic organisation which explains why it was not focused on social issues such as human rights, leaving such matters to individual member states to determine. Then came the political advancement of the 1990s, as evidenced by Weiler; ‘[The Maastricht Treaty] appropriates the deepest symbols of statehood: European citizenship, defence and foreign policy’. Naturally, the issue of human rights became prominent within the EU, and after much debate and a Convention the Charter was passed and given legally binding status under the Lisbon Treaty of 2009. The Charter has proved to be a controversial issue within European politics, with doubts being voiced about the functionality of the European Union’s own “Bill of Rights”. To effectively assess the question at hand, this essay will evaluate the extent to which the Charter is a necessary and desirable development, before reaching an overall