Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person by Harry Frankfurt

There is much debate over the issue of whether we have complete freedom of the will or if our will caused by something other than our own choosing. There are three positions adopted by philosophers regarding this dispute: determinism, libertarianism, and compatibilism. Determinists believe that freedom of the will does not exist. Since actions are events that have some predetermined cause, no actions can be chosen and thus there is no will to choose. The compatibilist argues that you can have both freedom of the will and determinism. If the causes which led to our actions were different, then we could have acted in another way which is compatible with freedom of the will. Libertarians believe that freedom of the will does exist.

In the following paper I will talk about A.J. Ayer’s “Freedom and Necessity,” and I will explain the dilemma of determinism and Ayer’s compatibilist solution to it. I will explain some of the examples Ayer uses to explain the difference between cause and being constrained, and how both affect one’s free will. I will also discuss on why Ayer’s compatibilism solution to the dilemma is the best solution so far.

In respect to the arguments of Ayer and Holbach, the dilemma of determinism and its compatibility with that of free will are found to be in question. Holbach makes a strong case for hard determinism in his System of Nature, in which he defines determinism to be a doctrine that everything and most importantly human actions are caused, and it follows that we are not free and therefore haven’t any moral responsibility in regard to our actions. For Ayer, a compatibilist believing that free will is compatible with determinism, it is the reconciliation and dissolution of the problem of determinism and moral responsibility with free willing that is argued. Ayer believes that

When discussing the topic of compatibilism, several aspects of the concept must be considered, such as free will and determinism: those who are skeptical and criticize this philosophical position and or stance, are typically weary or concerned with the reality of both free will and determinism flowing freely together.

There are 3 basic views that can be taken on the view of determinism, (1) deny its reality, either because of the existence of free will or on independent grounds; (2) accept its reality but argue for its compatibility with free will; or (3) accept its reality and deny its compatibility with free will.In this paper I am going to be defending the view compatibilism, specifically W. T. Stace’s view of compatibilism.

The aim of this essay is to prove the reliability of and why Libertarianism is the most coherent of the three Free Will and Determinism views. It refers to the idea of human free will being true, that one is not determined, and therefore, they are morally responsible. In response to the quote on the essay, I am disagreeing with Wolf. This essay will be further strengthened with the help of such authors as C.A. Campell, R. Taylor and R.M. Chisholm. They present similar arguments, which essentially demonstrate that one could have done otherwise and one is the sole author of the volition. I will present the three most common arguments in support of Libertarianism, present an objection against Libertarianism and attempt to rebut it as well as

Compatibilism, also known as soft determinism, is the position or view that causal determinism is true, but we still act as free, morally responsible agents. In the absence of external constraints, our actions are caused by our desires. W.T Stace, wanted to prove that the hard determinist definition of “free” was incorrect. He posed that free does not mean random, but that our acts are casually determined in a particular fashion. There must be a deterministic or causal connection between our will and our actions. This allows us to take responsibility for our actions, including credit for the good and blame for the bad.

Many times I find myself sitting and wondering whether I am fully free or not. I wake up every single morning and do the same routine, which is eat breakfast, go to class or work, do homework, go to the gym, shower, and then go to bed. Does this truly mean I am free? There are a lot of questions that you can ask yourself while following a routine. Is this really the path I should have taken? Were my choices determined by external factors? Determinism is the thesis that an any instant there is only one physically possible future. Robert Blatchford and Walter Terence Stace, two philosophers, both agree that determinism is true, although they have two different views on whether this means that people are free or not. Blatchford believes that everything is predestined. Stace on the other hand, believes that a person chooses what they do because of free will. In this essay I am going to discuss both of the philosophers’ views more in depth and why I favor Stace’s view over Blatchford’s.

In “Human Freedom and the Self,” Roderick M. Chisholm takes the libertarian stance, arguing that freedom is incompatible with determinism, that determinism is in fact false, and that humans do posses the kind of freedom required for moral responsibility. Chisholm argues that a deterministic universe, where all events, including human actions, proceed from prior events without the possibility that they would proceed differently than they do prevent the possibility that humans are responsible for their actions. To validate his libertarian beliefs, Chisholm sets out to prove that humans are responsible for their actions and also the thoughts that lead to those actions. In order to answer this problem, Chisholm believes we must make some assumptions about the man who preforms the act.

Stace, Frankfurt, and Wolf are all compatibilists. They hold that free will and determinism are compatible. In this paper, first I will define and explain key terms determinism, free will, and compatibilism. Next, I will discuss the individual views of each compatibilist and how they object to parts of determinism; then compare and contrast their views. They all believe in parts of determinism and parts of free will, even though determinism holds we are not morally responsible and free will holds we are morally responsible; thus, they are technically incompatible. This concept will be explained in this paper.

Holbach argues that choice, in the simple sense, does not produce freedom. A man "tormented with a violent thirst ... perceives a fountain" would naturally and beyond his control desire the water. But, "if... it is announced that the water he so ardently desires is poisoned, he will, notwithstanding his vehement thirst, abstain from drinking it." He has therefore apparently acted own his on free will by making a choice. But, as Holbach accurately points out, one motive has merely become stronger than the other, or, on another level, the motive is still the same - self conservation. The person might still choose to drink the water, but this is merely because he believes that he "shall derive a greater good by drinking the poisoned water than by enduring the torment." (Feinberg 419)

Frankfurt defines "freedom of will" as an ability to bring one 's will into correspondence with one 's

My second notion of free will requires that an actor is able to decide between different possibilities of actions that lead towards different futures. Robert Kane calls this concept ‘a garden of forking paths’; every action leads to other actions that again allow for alternatives of action (Kane, 2005: 7). If an actor could not have done otherwise, he would not have had free choice. Even if he did not choose to do otherwise, he could not have done so. Free will seems to require the power to do otherwise, or our actions would

Harry Frankfurt essay “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person” is centered around two major ideas. First is a person’s will is a set of effective first-order desires, and the second is that a person is a creature that has second-order volitions. Frankfurt offes the concept of a person vested with first-order desires and second-order desires which play the major role in decision making process.

The argument about free will continues with the principle of alternate possibilities. It states that you’re only morally responsible for something if you could have chosen otherwise. This is the common justification for free will and moral responsibility and is even the basis of criminal law. Harry Frankfurt did not agree with this argument, however. He criticized the principle of alternate possibilities and challenged the idea that moral responsibility requires free will. He proposes the following example: there are two men, Jones and Black, and Jones has the option of choosing A or B. Black wants Jones to choose A and Jones is unaware that Black exists. If Jones chooses A, Black will not interfere in any way. However, if Jones tries to choose