Fritz Todt's Economic Report

Superficially, Hitler's economic policies were extremely successful. He appeared to have virtually eradicated unemployment, something no democratic Western power was able to achieve in the 1930s and within three years of gaining office. Yet beneath the "economic miracle", as Ian Kershaw points out, Hitler was pursuing economic policies in those early years which could only lead to war or a loss of power. The reality was that Hitler understood little about economics and seemed to care even less. His aims were to create full employment without inflation, to make Germany self-sufficient and to create Wehrwirtschaft, a defence economy, but in pursuing these policies he created

Washington D.C. in the summertime is constantly perspiring, a rather miserable place to be. And, although the summer of 1949 was equally as dredged, Paul Nitze, an expert economist who lacked status in the United States government, was about to receive the opportunity of a lifetime. George Kennan, longtime diplomat and Russian studies expert, was looking to retire to his quiet farm in Pennsylvania, but he needed to leave a successor for the Policy Planning Staff. He decided on Paul Nitze. However, just months later after Russia succeeded in building and testing an atomic bomb and Nitze’s appeal for an assessment of U.S. Foreign Policy, Kennan on September 30 wrote, “I face the work of these remaining months with neither enthusiasm nor hope for achievement.” Obviously, the Cold War would be a large undertaking for any Russian expert in the State Department, however, it is more than likely that he was referring to working closely with colleague whose foreign policy tactics evidently began to differ greatly from his own as time would show.

They sent 409,500 vehicles, 43% of all soviet tyres, 56% of rails and 1900 locomotives and 58% of high octane fuel and 200 fighter planes, 4 million pairs of boots as well as large quantities of rubber, tin and cloth, respectively. This supports the scheme was a ‘sacrifice’ as some of the supplies sent to the USSR negatively impacted Britain’s supplies. Some including Stalin and the USSR criticised the level of assistance given. Overy argues against criticisms of the supplies by showing that the post-war soviet viewpoint that assistance ‘could have no decisive influence’ and concludes that without the aid, the Russian economy would have been ‘severely hampered’. This seems to dismiss claims that the West had neglected Russia’s needs. He argues that even though western aid accounted for only ‘4% of soviet weapons’ the impact was far greater as ‘food, raw materials, machinery and industrial equipment’ were donated. Both Gilbert and Overy are British historians who would have been biased in favour of the wests position and may have been sceptical of Russia’s claims as both historians were raised during the cold war. But when looking at the views in the official ‘soviet history’ of World War Two, the publication’s context should be considered: the Russians had a vested interest in misrepresenting events due to their post-war situation. After the Second World War the Cold War arose and the USSR were keen to distance

The United States entered World War Two in late 1941, and right away they were thrown into a conflict that involved making important decisions that would affect generations of people, in the United States and elsewhere, for years to come. A most notable decision by the Allies, namely the United States and Great Britain, was the combining of the American and British military chiefs of staff. This joint collaboration was appropriately titled the “Combined Chiefs of Staff”. They worked together as one body, and made war planning decisions and strategized together. This type of alliance was an innovation in war planning for the time, and the decisions made collaboratively by the two powers contributed greatly to the Allied victory in 1945. The relationships involved and the disputes that came up are worth noting, specifically the question of the Allies opening up a second front in the west, particularly titled “Operation Sledgehammer”. The relationship between President Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, as well as General George Marshall of the United States and General Sir Alan Brooke of Great Britain were the main actors involved in this undertaking, and they will be the main individuals discussed and analyzed for the purposes of this paper. Ultimately Operation Sledgehammer was delayed and no action was taken upon it. Even though it caused rifts between the USSR, for reasons that will be explained, and the Allies far into the future, in retrospect they may have been

Captain Dennis W. Dingle’s dissertation, presented before the faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in 1977, concerns the significance of the Soviet Union’s decisive victory at Stalingrad and its impact on the outcome of the Second World War. While much of this information is irrelevant for the purpose of answering the thesis question I have proposed, it does contain indispensable statistics showcasing the economic and military might of the two most pertinent combatant nations in the Second World War in the timeframe of December of 1941 and July of 1943.

On March 1948 General Lucius D. Clay, the Military Governor of the American zone of occupation in Germany, sent a telegram to the Chief of Staff of the US Army in Washington, depicting the beginnings of the Soviet Union’s imposed restrictions,

Upon appointment as Minister after Fritz Todt’s suspicious death, Speer proved immensely successful, in which his organisational skills were proven, increasing the efficiency and production of the German war machine despite the constant British bombings of factories and communications. Between 1942 and 1943, arms production grew by 30%, with labour productivity increasing by 160%. (Wagenführ, R, 1954). Historian Alan Bullock admires Speers improvements to the war effort, claiming that “Without Speer, Hitler would have lacked the power to stage his fight to the finish.” (A.Bullock, 1962). Contradicting Speers success as Armaments Minister however is Dutch historian Dan Van Der Vat, who questions Speers claims, “As if he did not have enough to do, Speer somehow managed … at the end of January 1945 to draw up a Rechenschaftsbericht … this enormous report ran to 10 000 words.” (Dan Van Der Vat, 1997). Van Der Vat therefore raises the important issue of how much one can trust a source written by one on their own success in power, with little to no contradicting evidence. Consideration however must be given to Van Der Vat’s argument, as he did grow up under Nazi occupied Holland, and thus an obvious bias is pited against any leader of the Nazi Party. Nevertheless, there was an actual increase in production under the guidance of Speer, in which his organisational genius was proven and the war was extended by a further two years, thus having a positive effect upon the Nazi Regime in regards to the war

However, it has been argued that containment should not be seen as the underlying factor behind the Marshall Plan, due to the fact that Britain was a recipient of this aid. This is because Britain did not fall within the sphere of communist influence, yet received the most amount of aid. For example, in the 1945 General Election, the British Communist Party only won two out of six-hundred and fifty seats, receiving less than one hundred thousand votes overall; thus, highlighting the lack of communist support in postwar Britain. Furthermore, the Marshall Plan was even offered to the Soviet Union by the American administration. Despite being an empty gesture, if there was a genuine fear of communism and an overwhelming agenda to contain it, why would they offer aid, in the first place, to the principal communist state? Joyce and Gabriel Kolko go further and ascertain that the US “cynically manipulated a Russian threat in an effort to fasten economic control over the entire world.” The Kolkos argue that “Truman and his advisers deliberately exaggerated and misrepresented external reality, provoked and invented crises, and spurned genuine Russian offers to negotiate a détente,” in order to achieve greater world hegemony.

Was World War II the people’s war, or the manufacturer's? That’s the question Zinn bases this chapter on. Bringing in facts about the U.S entering multiple countries and intervening before the U.S declared war, he challenges the motivation behind U.S involvement in the war. One of these intervening being Vladivostok, Russia, with seven thousand troops, “offsetting the effects of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia” as told by the U.S state department. Zinn conveys it as we didn’t enter the war as a concern for the people fighting it or being hurt by the Nazi party, any more than how we didn’t enter the Civil War off the number of enslaved blacks. Rather, we entered because of the Japanese bombing and Roosevelt lied about it being the right cause. Challenging the reader, Zinn makes him or her ask themselves if we really are such a self-centered country and leaves it to them to find the answer that

Stalin, in a toast to his brief allies, made it “to American production, without which this war would have been lost”, while Churchill, in his book recalling the war, claimed, “Through the materials and weapons [the U.S.] gave us we were actually able to wage war as if we were a nation of fifty-eight millions instead of forty-eight”.

The Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe lead by Stalin from 1945 was aggressive and self-serving. This was characterized by rapid control of Eastern Europe and exploitation of Soviet satellite states for the social and economic improvement of Russia. During World War Two Russia endured the loss of countless troops, economic turbulence and great land loss. Although they experienced such loss as a consequence of World War Two their decisions after were motivated by greed and were justified by an impending war with the West.

In Germany, Hitler’s demand for oil put many men to work. Several expressways, known as autobahns, were built for the finest automobiles. In fact, Hitler was intrigued by such automobiles and developed his vision of war using the new, efficient modern technology of automobiles. However, Hitler’s hope of “Germany on wheels” was not a promise. Germany did not really possess any of its own oil to power Germany’s showy automobiles or its necessary war machines. Because of their indigent amount of natural resources, German chemists, “the best in the world”, according to Germany and IG scientists, about two thousand barrels of artificial fuel were made daily. Like racecars, Hitler was in a “race” to get everything ready for war. Unfortunately, still in desperate need, Germany’s dependence on coal or the later replacement octane gasoline to keep things running was a costly process that

As the World War II ends whole Soviets were scared and exhausted by the experience of the war. Soviet Union people never tolerated another war after experiencing World War I and World War II. WWII had left Soviet Union with 26 million human loss and an enormous economic loss. The Soviet Union looked for access to the oil and other sphere of influence in the Middle East and far east also their cruel behavior in the Eastern Europe was intolerable. Therefore, these all brought Russia into conflict with United States and Britain. Meanwhile, Russia held elites and rulers who believed in the supremacy of Russia’s position and influence in the international world, who believed in forming a socialist imperial that would ensure Russia’s security. After a huge victory on Nazis Russian rulers hoped to turn the world into a socialist world. The socialist Soviet Union could be only secured with the socialist world. They believed that expansion of communism will increase the influence of Soviet Union accordingly. They knew that war is inevitable since the capitalism existed and that the war will be engine for revolution, and they were concerned about the after revolution. Some factors overtime call to question their assumption, it makes it less and lesser valid over the time which caused them to rethink their positions in spreading their ideology. Thereby, the events and experiences after the World War II

Examining the literature focused on the Cold War Period, it seems that some scholars argue that the Cold War came to an end and that the Soviet Union collapsed, as a result of the American effectiveness in the war against communism (Gaddis 1992). Many claim that the United States won this more than 40 year period of conflicts against the USSR because its ideology was simply superior, and add to such statements that American policies at the time were highly successful on containing and defeating the communist superpower on the economic battle, the arms and technological race, and on the degree of their political influence on other areas of the world. (Newcombe 1997, 32-34). At simple sight, there appears to be a tendency to present external factors as the key elements for the disintegration of the USSR and the end of the Cold War.

The term ‘Cold War’ had been used to describe periods of extreme tensions between states, which never culminate to actual, direct warfare. However, for the purpose of this essay, we will define the Cold War as being the period of hostility that existed between two blocs shortly after World War II and divided the world into two parts: the Soviet bloc and the Western bloc. More than just a conflict, the Cold War was, as the historian John Mason pointed out, ‘a fundamental clash of ideologies and interests’ between Soviet-sponsored communism and capitalism promoted by the United States. This essay will argue that the announcement of the Marshall Plan at Harvard on the 5th of June 1947 - a European Recovery Program initiated by the US Secretary