Functionalism And Non-Reductive Physicalism: Wynton Marsalis

Functionalism was developed as a combination of the Behaviorist theory and the Identity theory. Behaviorism believes being in a mental state is the same as a physical state, which is a noticeable behavioral characteristic. For instance, if one claims they are unhappy, there physical state could include a frowning display or inappropriate posture. On the other hand, the Identity Theory suggests when one

The mind is a complex myriad of thoughts and psychological systems that even philosophers today cannot entirely grapple. It is composed of the senses, feelings, perceptions, and a whole series of other components. However, the mind is often believed to be similar or even the same as the brain. This gives rise to the mind-brain identity theory, and whether there exists a clear distinction between the physical world and the non-material mind. In this paper, I will delineate the similarities and differences between mind and brain, describe the relevant ideas such as functionalism and materialism, and provide explanations on how these theories crystallized. Further, I will discuss the differing views of this concept from multiple philosophers’ perspectives and highlight the significance of each. Ultimately, I will defend the view that the mind-brain identity theory is false by analyzing its errors and examining the invalid assumptions it makes about consciousness.

In this essay, I am going to write a response to the objection raised by the functionalists towards identity theory. Identity theory is a form of physicalism; it states that a particular mental state is identical to a particular physical state of body and brain, for instance mental sensation such as pain is simply just the firing of C-fibres (Smart, 1959). This is a reductionist view as it reduces our psychological state to a materialistic and physical form. A prominent objection against identity theory is Functionalism, in which the main advocate Hilary Putnam stated that identity theory is too narrow as it ignores multiple realisability. In the next paragraph, I will write a little more about functionalism, and in the end, I will ultimately conclude that functionalism is a better theory than identity theory.

The idea that mental states are non-reducible properties of brain states is the central tenant of a theory of mind called property dualism. However, before we can assess the theory we must be aware that the question assumes the existence of mental states and as such we cannot answer this question from some perspectives (e.g. eliminative materialism)

(P1) In this paper I will be explaining the Knowledge Argument against Physicalism. I will be stating each of the premises and giving an explanation on why they are plausible. Then, I will choose the strongest reply to the Knowledge Argument--the Ability Reply. I will be explaining and justifying the objection to the Ability Reply.

Thesis: The mind-body problem arises because of the lack of evidence when looking for a specific explanation of the interaction of mental and physical states, and the origin and even existence of them.

The understanding on the knowledge of other minds has provided a puzzle known as the inverted spectrum. This possibility has emerged as an important challenge to functionalist accounts of qualia. Functionalism is committed to defining mental states in terms of their cause and effects . By identifying sensory events with casual roles, however, functionalism appears to be missing qualitative aspects all together. The topic of spectrum inversion has often been raised as a contradiction to functionalism, as well as other materialist theories about consciousness. These negates to functionalism show that even when all the relevant physical facts are held constant, the facts about qualia can still vary, hence that the phenomenal must be over

In the 1960’s, Hilary Putnam introduced the world of philosophy to the multiple realizability argument against identity theory. Her main point in her argument was that, if identity theory holds to be true, than all living creatures who experience pain, such as humans, mammals, reptiles, etc., must have a commonly shared physical-chemical brain state which directly relates to a certain mental

In the world of philosophy, there has been an ever growing skepticism of the relationship between the human body and its mental state. The physical state of a person is tangible, meaning that they can be seen by anyone and touched. While the mental state of a person is embedded in their consciencousness, meaning that it can’t be observed by others unless willing expressed by said person. I will be using Leibniz’s law of identity to show that the metal states of an individual are distinct from a physical state. Using the notion of sameness, I can prove a valid argument that the physical and mental states are distinct. While this theory in part can be debated, some identity theorists can provide a rebuttal this claim. I will provide a response to an identity theorist rebuttal.

Functionalism is the belief that a mental state, such as pain, “is to have an internal state which does a certain job” (Ravenscroft, 2005, p. 50). For example, the pain that a human being feels and the pain that an octopus feels may have different physical processes within the brain, but the pain is still being felt; in other words, “to be in (or have) mental state M is to have an internal state which does the ‘M-job’ (Ravenscroft, 2005, p. 51). Any mental state M is defined in terms of inputs, outputs and internal connections, and for example, the pain role’s input may be stepping on a Lego piece, the output may be cursing and finally a possible internal connection, which is the causal link

Functionalism is a theory about the character of mental states. According with functionalism, mental states are diagnosed with the aid of what they do instead of through what they're product of. This could be understood by considering artefacts like mousetraps and keys. Specially, the original motivation for functionalism comes from the useful evaluation of minds with computer systems. However that is only an analogy. The primary arguments for functionalism rely on showing that its miles advanced to its number one competitors: identification concept and behaviourism. Contrasted with behaviourism, functionalism retains the conventional idea that intellectual states are internal states of questioning creatures, contrasted with identity principle;

Suppose it is a nice sunny day, and you decide to linger in the sun; after a few minutes you may feel thirsty and you look for some refreshment. It can be said that this situation triggers two ‘situations’; on the one hand there is a physical process: the body’s reaction to heat, and on the other hand, there is a ‘mental effect’: the experience of heat like being thirsty. The relationship between the two situations has been the source of many debates within

Functionalism developed out of the positivist observation that 'all positive speculations owe their first origin to the occupations of practical life' (Comte, 1865, pg 11) and the boundaries of scientific knowledge can not go further than empirically observable truths and views societies as holistic systems where 'the whole is greater than the sum of its parts' (Taylor et el, 1997, pg 662). Functionalist analysis draws on three assumptions essentially seeking to transform society into a theoretical system of reality. The first assumption is that there are zero independent parts operating within

Physicalism is the notion of the entire world being physical. Through physicalism, even human experiences are interpreted as physical. The world is physical in nature and anything included in the world is physical, including thoughts and emotions. Every action and state is reduced to a physical occurrence. For example, a thought is composed of a neurons being in a certain state, creating the way the person thinks. Animals and their actions are physical due to their senses understanding the environment around them and their brain acting accordingly. The physicalist understanding of the mind and body problem is that both are not separate entities. The mind is just a part of the body: a physical entity.

Regarding his study in the philosophy of mind, in 1950, JJC Smart was one of the fathers of the Mind-Brain Identity Theory, whose central claim was that particular states of the mind are similar to particular states of the brain. He believes that there are mental states which are the same as brain processes. Smart’s ‘Sensations and Brain Processes’ is historically significant as it inaugurates a new way of looking at things in the world.