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Gagon V. American Provision Summary

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Gagan v. American Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 959 (7th Cir. 1996).
Tello's appeal fails to recognize this distinction. His argument, focused [**20] as it is on the difference between the predicate acts referenced in the indictment and those identified in his plea agreement, presumes that proof of at least two specific predicate
[*793] acts of racketeering that he committed (or agreed to commit) was a prerequisite to his conviction for racketeering conspiracy under section 1962(d). This is the very presumption that the Supreme Court in Salinas described as "wrong." 522
U.S. at 63, 118 S. Ct. at 476. HN4 In order to convict a defendant under section
1962(d), the government need only prove that he agreed that some member(s) of the conspiracy would commit two or more predicate acts, not that the defendant himself …show more content…

United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753,
776 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Salinas, 522 U.S. at 65-66; 118 S. Ct. at 478), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1051, 181 L. Ed. 2d 772, 132 S. Ct. 1054, 181 L. Ed. 2d 774, 132
S. Ct. 1612, 182 L. Ed. 2d 217, 132 S. Ct. 1986, 182 L. Ed. 2d 831 (2012); United
States v. Campione, 942 F.2d 429, 437 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Glecier, 923 F.2d at 500 ("Neither overt acts nor specific predicate acts that the defendant agreed personally to commit need be alleged or proved for a section 1962(d) offense.")
(citations omitted); United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 498 (7th Cir. 1986)
[**21] ("[S]ection 1962(d) [is] broad enough to encompass those persons who, while intimately involved in the conspiracy, neither agreed to personally commit nor actually participated in the commission of the predicate crimes."), abrogation on other grounds recognized by United States v. Rogers, 89 F.3d 1326, 1336-37 (7th
Cir. 1996); DeGuelle v. Camilli, 664 F.3d 192, 204 (7th Cir. 2011); Goren, 156 F.3d
at

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