Gen Odierno Developing Organizational Model

The situation in today 's Army is clearly much different from what existed years ago. Many changes have occurred, moving the Army 's EO program from a strictly educational and training initiative to a multifaceted management program with clear goals and objectives. These goals and objectives are also an integral part of human relations and are nurtured and developed through a professional military education system.

So as we look to the Army of 2020, as a part of Joint Force 2020, how do we want to shape it? Today, we are an Army that is globally engaged in 150 countries on six of seven continents. We have over 95,000 Soldiers deployed in support of operations; another 96,000 Soldiers forward stationed. Our strategic posture is a testament to our flexibility and adaptability as well as our unmatched credibility as the best trained, best equipped, and best led land force in the world.

In support of my capstone project, I assessed and will submit a redesigned proposal with developmental recommendations for reformation of a solid POI for the SPCC that takes place at the Army Logistics University. In this, I have identified the foremost purpose for this redesign as the following: The investment in the education and training of rising leadership is vital to the long-term success of our sustainment support staff and the services provided. With this course providing training in modular force operations for newly selected command designees that enables them to function effectively throughout their command tour it is very important to make sure that the training is substantive. Therefore the main focus is to assure that training is current and emerging sustainment doctrine and leadership topics for commanders on the National Guard, Reservist and Active Duty levels is most essential.

In General Odierno’s 2014 AUSA Winter Symposium speech, he discussed several changes the U.S. Army will face in the future. He informed his audience the reduction within the Army’s force structure, which will continue until FY 2017. Determine organizational authorizations of the force development process best illustrates what General Odierno deliberated in his speech.

The subsequent sections will propose how smaller and better-combined joint forces maintain lethality, mobility, and survivability. In spite of some associated risks, force adjustment is an opportunity to form an aggregate joint force. Nevertheless, these contractions will not mirror equally among the services. The result will be a lean joint force that maintains the ability to defeat conventional and asymmetric threats in all domains. Discussed in this order, Air Force, Army, United States Marine Corps (USMC), and Navy general structure will revolve around the integration of skills and capabilities. Next, discussion of the four categories of risk involved in the transition to Joint Force 2020 include operational risk, force management

Despite the complexity of this environment and fiscal austerity, the JF25 must “protect our Nation and win our wars.” It must deter and defeat state adversaries, disrupt and defeat terrorist organizations, and strengthen the global network of allies and partners.” The prioritized capabilities required for Joint Force 2025 are linked to the imperatives of securing the homeland and maintaining strategic agility. This essay discusses general attributes of the JF, specific capability requirements by service, and the risk associated with focusing the rebalance on these two imperatives.

General Dempsey’s NMS underscored strategic challenges to the Joint Staff in rebalancing the JF of 2025 to meet the national security directives in an austere fiscal environment. General Dempsey highlighted strategic imperatives to protect and advance U.S national interests, apply contrasting approaches to state threats (China, Russia) verses non-state threats (ISIL), and adjusting to prolonged campaigns in an unpredictable strategic environment with limited resources.4 The CCJO emphasized enduring proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), rise of competitor states, violent extremism, regional instabilities, transnational crime and competition for resources.5 Furthermore, advancements in mobile technology and social media allow middleweight

After reviewing The AOC, TP 525-3-1, which describes how the United States Army will employ forces and capabilities in complex

Phase 3: Develop Organizational Models. Phase 3 of the Army Force Development Model transitions organizational development responsibilities from the TRADO

The primary challenge for leaders in the Army is taking a group of individuals and molding them into a team. The framework that is employed to the

The primary issue facing the United States Army in 2025 and beyond is its ability to operate in a fiscally constrained environment. According to the Army Capabilities Integration Center’s (ARCIC) primary initiative, Force 2025 and beyond, it “Is the Army 's strategy to ensure the future joint force can win in a complex world.” Furthermore, ARCIC’s initiatives will “consists of activities along three primary lines of effort: force employment; science and technology and human performance optimization; and force design.” Proponents of a lighter and more rapidly deployable force continue to argue for a dramatic downsizing of mechanized and armored forces.

Force management, or what is really otherwise known as planned comprehensive change, is in reality a complex and interwoven process. Though it was designed within the confines of a systemic approach referred to as the DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership & Education, Personnel and Facilities), in reality it is meant to enable both dutiful and well-thought out change as well as faster, more urgent adjustments in accordance with the evolving nature of war and information gathering tactics. The Army, as one branch involved in this initiative, focuses most of its attention in this regard on the organizational sector because of the way it facilitates an adequate and democratic step-by-step system of review (Student Reader, F102:2). But the fact is that even this initiative remains multi-faceted and appears to be rather bureaucratic in nature (it has five phases, which seems antithetical to an urgent change process), which might not be surprising since implementing the type of changes that are demanded can have major implications of all sorts. Still, it does appear that this concentration is being well received and that it will eventually serve its goal even if it does not appear that way when detailed on a point by point basis.

The Army has already established the need for maintaining an operational reserve, through former and current TAAs, capable of breaching AC capability gaps to meet joint force requirements. However, the analysis lacks resources to accomplish this guidance effectively. The demand for RC forces requires generating more operational unit readiness to fully complement the rotational force pool to meet the deployment demand at the same standard as the AC. After conducting a Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) analysis, both overarching recommendations address an identified capability requirement and associated capability gap that could be mitigated with a non-materiel solution with changes or existing capabilities in five, organization, training, personnel, facilities, and policy, of the eight functions.

While the United States Army is dedicated to promoting peace, stability and security throughout the world, there are challenges that are necessary to address. Russia, North Korea, China, Iran, the rising of non state actors in the Middle East, and future strategic campaigns all present issues that face the Army. Coupled with budget sequestration, these challenges are amplified.

The Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2014 and the Army Posture Statement to Congress provides the concept concerning the adaptive Army leaders’ development. The United States Army Training and Doctrine Command Analysis Center (TRAC) and the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) could support the leaders’ development through the analysis of the current leadership issues within the operations and prediction for the upcoming needs as