General Dempsey Case Summary

The United States from the Cold War and into the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) continues to face challenges in translating military might into political desires due to its obsession with raising an army, electing politicians and assembling a diplomatic corp that continue to gravitate towards State-to-State engagements that if not rectified could lead to substantial delays in fighting terrorism and non-terrorist adversaries or worse total failure of the United States Military’s ability to properly carry out it’s politicians objectives due to being blindsided.

In a 2015 article, “Is U.S. military becoming outdated?” written by Stuart Bradin, Keenan Yoho, and Meaghan Keeler-Pettigrew, the authors argued that despite the U.S. military maintaining a position of global dominance “without peer” during conventional operations, it is not the ideal force against current and future threats. The authors claim that there are several negative factors arising due to the past sixteen years of war against several state and non-state elements, inferior cultural differences of government bureaucracy compared to commercial firms, and a misallocation of defense spending that leaves the US military waging war inefficiently while simultaneously losing technological dominance against current and future threats.

The function of the military forces for the United States has had no choice but to evolve as wars wax and wane. As the rise of militant terrorist groups became a threat to the United States and its allies, the armed forces of the United States were deployed by the President to countries such as Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq. Instability in these countries threatened bordering allies, and after September 11, 2001, the threat was brought to U.S. soil. Each president from Clinton to Obama has had to shape the policy of how the armed forces fit into civil-military policies abroad and overseas. In a war time environment, such as Iraq, the purpose of how the military should be deployed is easier to clearly state. But in times when there is no imminent threat, it is much more difficult to transition

However, this external trust has been fraying from the edges for many years – clear and realistic political strategy has been lacking from civilian leaders, a well-meaning yet disengaged public, and an insular military class that fails to organically adapt to emerging technologies. A clear and realistic political strategy determined by civilian leaders addresses the first leg of the strategic triad – government. It is said success begins at the top, with a cohesive vision and unified guidance. One doesn’t have to look further than the 2003 invasion of Iraq - then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld claimed it would require no more than 150,000 troops to secure Iraq, despite the insistence of then Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki that it would take 300,000 troops, a number derived from his experience in Bosnia. (Mills, 2013) However, this detail overshadows the deeper implication – that civilian leaders were not planning for stability operations, or had a plan in place after the conventional phase of the war. The lack of guidance and vision from the nation’s strategic leaders make it extremely difficult, if not impossible for the military to effectively prosecute

With Trump’s election this year, his rhetoric of “Making America Great Again” and therefore revitalizing our military will soon become a reality. Trump has formally requested a reappropriation of funds; around $54 Billion, towards the US military. Part of Trump’s campaign promises had to do with making the military more robust; ensuring America’s title of militarily strongest in the world. In order to achieve this goal. Trump’s federal government has the option of many different aspects of the military to focus on. Of these, funding weapons of mass destruction, cyber security, and further military research and development prove themselves as most relevant in the contemporary military.

The threat environment has expanded from a strategic, nuclear, symmetrical threat from bombers, ICBMs, and air-or-sea-launched cruise missiles, to a continuing symmetrical threat in addition to an emergent asymmetric threat, focused across all domains, borders and agencies. Accordingly, our political leaders recognized a need to transform the military for a new ‘home game’. United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) was established to assume responsibility for the defence of the US homeland, and this new Command was tasked to provide military assistance to civil authorities (MACA).

While a commander’s staff conducts planning at any level, whether it is strategic, operational, or tactical, the importance of identifying both theirs and the adversary’s center of gravity (COG) is a critical part of the planning process. Three factors should be carefully analyzed in order to gain a full understanding of the COG; they are critical capabilities, critical requirements and critical vulnerabilities (U.S. Office of the CJCS 11 August 2011, III-24). Although a COG can be attacked directly, the indirect approach which seeks to destroy or neutralize the COG by attacking an adversary’s critical vulnerabilities can be a more efficient use of available resources. The United States Marine Corps’ Warfighting publication MCDP 1 draws a direct correlation between a COG and its critical vulnerability by stating, “we should focus our efforts against a critical vulnerability, a vulnerability that, if exploited, will do the most significant damage to the enemy 's ability to resist us” (United States Marine Corps 1997, 47). The Marine Corps favors the indirect approach to defeating an adversary’s COG because the functions assigned to them by the Department of Defense (DoD) require expeditionary operations and expeditionary forces typically are limited in size, assets, and resources driving them to target an adversary’s critical vulnerabilities.

The United States military has never been as weak as it is under Barack Obama. In a time where the world is getting more dangerous every day, whether it is the growing threat of ISIS, Russia or North Korea, the current president insists on continuously making cuts to the military. According to an independent panel appointed by the pentagon and congress, “the shrinking U.S. armed forces, which are being downsized to fit that strategy and budget cuts, is a serious strategic misstep on the part of the United States and is inadequate given the future strategic and operational environment.” This essentially means that these cuts are weakening the military so much, that it will be ineffective to deal with global threats.

should adjust its priorities and spending to address the changing nature of threats in the world: What all these potential adversaries—from terrorist cells to rogue nations to rising powers—have in common is that they have learned that it is unwise to confront the United States directly on conventional military terms. The United States cannot take its current dominance for granted and needs to invest in the programs, platforms, and personnel that will ensure that dominance's persistence. But it is also important to keep some perspective. As much as the U.S. Navy has shrunk since the end of the Cold War, for example, in terms of tonnage, its battle fleet is still larger than the next 13 navies combined—and 11 of those 13 navies are U.S. allies or partners." (Staff,

Arnold McClellan and Annabel McClellan were charged by the Securities and Exchange Commission with leaking confidential merger and acquisition information to their family overseas. The SEC claimed it was a multi-million dollar insider trading scheme. Mr. McClelland had worked in advising his clients in mergers and acquisitions for over a decade. Because of his position as the head of one of Deloitte’s regional mergers and acquisitions team, Arnold McClellan had access to highly confidential information.

Mr. Clancy referenced his report on slides 94-110, summarizing the Online Auto Sales and Online Account Manager projects. He spent time on the mobile format stating that new technologies are being used causing us to engage outside consultants. He reported our website traffic is increasing and mobile device usage is at 20-25%. Mr. Clancy summarized the CRM system project reporting the pilot began in March with 40 Agents which has expanded to 90 along with Marketing Associates. Additional functionalities will be rolled out in phases which will likely carry over for the next two years.

While working at the Africa Command (AFRICOM) as one of their staff officers, I have been tasked to justify three of our command’s most important priorities. These priorities need to support AFRICOM’s current mission statement, give support to our commander’s latest statements, inclusion into the new President’s National Security Strategy (NSS), and general enough to align with a national security policy. More importantly, they need to clearly provide support to America’s vital interests.

Patrick Porter’s article, “Sharing Power? Prospects for a U.S. Concert Balance Strategy” discusses the advantages of the U.S. abandoning its current Pax Americana strategy in favor of a Concert-Balance strategy. Porter recommends conceding “strategic space and spheres of influence to other states,” thereby reducing the U.S.’s ongoing financial hardships that are experienced under the current strategy that has ground and naval forces stationed throughout the globe. Porter quotes Admiral Mike Mullen, the former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to further his argument that mounting debt is the largest threat to national security. Porter believes that the adoption of a Concert-Balance strategy would enable the U.S. to maintain its economic

The Defense Strategic Guidance states that in this current fiscal environment the armed forces will no longer be sized to conduct prolonged stability operations. While this document says that the forces will be sized based on the requirements of missions listed therein, which includes countering terrorism and irregular warfare at the top of the list, it further states that versatility across the range of missions will be maintained. In order to keep enough capability and capacity for high intensity regular warfare as well as money to pay for training for this type of warfare, irregular warfare programs and training will necessarily be less funded.

The nature of warfare is ever evolving. Due to various factors such as globalization and technological advances, twenty-first century warfare is different from previous conflicts. The United States participated in two large, protracted conflicts since the start of the century – Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. These wars demonstrated the hybrid nature of warfare where the United States faced both conventional and then irregular forces. Today another type of threat is emerging in the cyber domain. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Martin E. Dempsey, stressed the changing nature of warfare in the forward of the 2015 National Military Strategy, explaining that the United States faced not only