General Gouverneur Warren's 'The Battle Behind Mine Run'

4). So, the plan was for General Longstreet to basically pull the wool over the eyes of the Union by moving away to throw them off as to what their course of action actually was. Once Longstreet finally got into position to start his attack, it was late in the afternoon. The numerous attack points the Confederates have selected, forced the Union forces to keep sending reinforcements to different parts of the line they held. In doing this, the Confederates were able to stretch out the Northern Army’s defense leaving holes in their position. After several hours of battle, the Union was finally able to turn around the last Confederate troops before night fall upon the once peaceful town of Gettysburg.

On January 26, 1863 General Joseph Hooker was appointed the commander of the Army of the Potomac. General Hooker wanted to attack General Lee’s army while a large portion of his troops were engaged at the town of Fredericksburg. He commanded an army that was almost twice the size of Lee’s forces. Hooker then moved the Union forces toward the town of Chancellorsville and had his men set up in defensive positions just outside the town. When General Lee learned of this he moved a portion of his men to assault Hooker and his army. When he arrived, Lee split his men in order to attack from different locations and General Stonewall Jackson commander of the cavalry moved his men to an exposed section of the Union defense and exploited it. On May 3 the fighting was so fierce that it caused General Hooker to withdraw his men and move them to the other side of the river that was nearby. This is when General Lee learned of federal troops gaining the advantage

The battle took place in the tangled woods of what is now Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania National Park about 10 miles west of Fredericksburg, Virginia along Orange Plank Road and Orange Turnpike. The Federals held the land to the east and the confederates to the west. The land was nearly impassable, proving a nightmare for both moving men and logistics. The importance of the location, however, was significant. Railways and roads led to Washington and were logistically important. For two years, fighting for the land surrounding the Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers led to stalemate. Twice previously, Lee had been able to withstand attack from the Federals; attacks led by Joseph Hooker and George Meade. Lee’s plan was, likely, to take Washington, which he believed would decidedly win

and consisted of 16,500 IX Corps Union soldiers and approximately 9,500 Confederate soldiers.1 Ambrose E. Burnside lead the IX Corps soldiers but

General J.E.B Stuart is the cavalry leader assigned by General Lee to recon the movements of the Union army. Stuart rode too far north and was absent for most of the battle. Lee was left with no Intel on the Union army and was fighting in unfamiliar Northern territory. With no information about the movements of the Union army or the surrounding area strategic planning was

On November 26, 1862, the Union army arrived in Falmouth, Virginia and across the Rappahannock River was Fredericksburg where the Confederate forces had fortified the hills behind the city. They would stay in Falmouth until December 11 when they bombarded Fredericksburg on December 13 and moved into the destroyed city, but the Confederates were in the hills. The next day the 44th New York, Orsell’s regiment joined the Third Brigade as they attempted to capture the Confederate’s position. They moved through the hills and ravine trying to avoid sniper and cannon fire, but they had to take cover behind a small rise in the ground and spend the night there in the mud. The next morning, December 14, after thirty hours of being in battle the Third

General Meade sent in his reinforcement troops and took many troops from the Union right in order to stop the 1st corps advance. Meade’s reinforcements took positions to fill up the gaps in the center of the Union line, to defend the Union left flank on Little Round Top and to engage Longstreet’s 1st corps as Sickles’ 3rd corps were

The Confederates at Manassas knew far ahead of this action due to many Southern spies in Washington. The Southern troops spread in lines along eight miles of Bull Run Creek. The heaviest Southern troops were on a ridge around Henry House. After a few skirmishes, the Union Army arrived at Bull Run on July 21, 1861.

The Second Battle of Bull Run was between the Union and Confederate armies in northern Virginia, from August 29 to August 30, 1862. The Union army of Virginia was commanded by John Pope and the the Confederate army was commanded by General Robert E. Lee. Based on President Abraham Lincoln’s orders, McClellan withdrew the Union army from Richmond. The plan was to combine that army with General Pope’s troops. When the northerners pulled back, General Lee planned to demolish General Pope's army before it combined with General McClellan, knowing that it would be difficult to fight an twice their size. General strategically divided his army in two, while half of the army remain in command of Major General James Longstreet and the other half would be led by General Stonewall Jackson.

General Lee had at his disposal two army Corps, the First Corps was commanded by Lieutenant General James Longstreet and the Second Corps was commanded by Lieutenant General Thomas Jackson. Both of these corps comprised of 35,000 men for a total of 70,000 men. After leaving Maryland, Lee decided to divide his army by sending the Second Corps to the Shenandoah Valley towards Winchester Virginia and the other towards Culpeper station Virginia in order to see what the North was going to do. The Confederate cavalry were a little slow in detecting the move of Sumter’s grand division, and it was three days before Lee knew about it and could order Longstreet to intercept the Federals. This allowed the first elements of Northern forces to arrive at Falmouth two days after the

     McDowell had 34,000 troops ready to attack 25,000 Confederate forces spread out over eight miles on the other side of Bull Run. Most of the Confederate forces were clustered on the Confederate right flank, prepared to counterattack. McDowell plan

On November twenty-first, General Hood and his Army of Tennessee left Florence, Alabama to go to Tennessee. Hood did not want to fight in Tennessee unless there were an equal number of men on both sides fighting. He wanted to “recapture Tennessee for confederacy” (“Battle of Franklin and Nashville). The Confederates had 33,000 men (“Franklin”). They also had many corp commanders: Cheatam, Stewart, Lee, and Forest (The Carter House). The Confederates also consisted of seven divisions: “Walthal’s, Loring’s, two brigades of French’s ( Sear’s and Cockrell’s) of Stewart’s corp, Brown’s. Cleboune’s, and Bathes’ of Cheatham’s Corpes” (Banks 49). These divisions were marched from Spring Hill to Franklin. These men were worn out. They were tired and exhausted which probably made them not ready for battle (Banks 49). They were not treated well: they were “ill-fed and ill-clothed” (Lent). Although Hood saw his army being slaughtered, he remembered the rules of warfare: “he was

Although Grant had 115,000 soldiers and Lee had only 65,000 troops, knowledge of the dangerous terrain could become more valuable than the number of troops. The actual battle began the morning of May 5th, 1864. The fighting was wild and chaotic due to the thick undergrowth and many trees making it nearly impossible for one man to move swiftly, forget about an entire army. There were men on both sides who got so lost that they accidentally went into enemy camps and were taken as prisoners. Many of the wounded fell into the thick undergrowth and got stuck, later being burned and killed by fires due to rifle fire.

Johnston originally planned to attack Grant on April 4, but delays postponed it until the 6th. Attacking the Union troops on the morning of the 6th, the Confederates surprised them, routing many. Some Federals made determined stands and by afternoon, they had established a battle line at the sunken road, known as the "Hornets Nest." Repeated Rebel attacks failed to carry the Hornets Nest, but massed artillery helped to turn the tide as Confederates surrounded the Union troops and captured, killed, or wounded most. Johnston had been mortally wounded earlier and his second in command, Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard, took over. The Union troops established another line covering Pittsburgh Landing, anchored with artillery and augmented by Buell’s men who began to arrive and take up positions. Fighting continued until after dark, but the Federals held. By the next morning, the combined Federal forces numbered about 40,000, outnumbering Beauregard’s army of less than 30,000. Beauregard was unaware of the arrival of Buell’s army and launched a counterattack in response to a two-mile advance by William Nelson’s division of Buell’s army at 6:00 am, which was, at first, successful. Union troops stiffened and began forcing the Confederates back. Beauregard ordered a counterattack, which stopped the Union advance but did not break its battle line. At this point, Beauregard realized that he could not win and, having suffered too many

An interesting turn of events would soon favor the Federal Army as General J.E.B. Stuart and his cavalry were north and east of Gettysburg causing a lot of fear in the North but consequently were not performing adequate reconnaissance, the result was that General Lee did not know where General Meade and the Army of the Potomac were or what their strength was (Freeman, 147). When Confederate General Henry Heth moved into