General McClellan was a famous general during the civil war who lead the Army of the Potomac. President Lincoln wanted him to move forward towards Richmond but General McClellan would hold back until he was finally ordered to move. Him being removed can be considered a loss but it also was a victory for the people back in Washington. George McClellan was somewhat of a perfectionist he would not do anything till the time he didn't have it all figured out, also he was never sure and doubted himself. Another thing that caused him issues is that he overestimated the abilities and manpower of his enemies. George McClellan was considered to be a perfectionist and would never take the next step until everything else wasn't all figured out. He wanted more reinforcements but President Lincoln had to explain to him that this would not be a wise move. The amount of time it would take President Lincoln to get him reinforcements would be enough for the “rebels” or the confederates to gain upon him and be able to take him on easily. Even though President Lincoln stayed calm he was still impatient, he ordered McClellan and said he must move. This is because if the orders were not given McClellan would have stayed back and would doubt him self upon when to move. [Document A and B] …show more content…
He can be considered one of the reason to make the union wait longer for its victory. McClellan kept fearing the amount of soldiers that Lee would bring and was slowing down instead of moving towards the Confederate capital in Richmond. He slowed down because he thought that his army was unfit for battle and wanted more reinforcements. President Lincoln even tried to assure him and helped him strategize by telling him that he must think like his enemy and if he continues to do what he is instructed to do he will achieve his goal in no time. [ Documents G and
Through vivid descriptions of George Washington, I learned that he was not the best military leader. There were multiple times in the war where Washington was faced with difficult decisions, and proved to be very indecisive. Also, there were times where action needed to be taken, but he couldn’t decide what to do. Even though I learned Washington wasn’t as great as the history books explain him to be, it makes me respect him more to know that he, just like any other American, flawed.
One of the boldest actions of Maj. Gen. James Ewell Brown Stuart under the leadership of Robert E. Lee was his effort to make "a complete circuit around the Union Army, heading to the north end of the lower peninsula (near the York River) and returning to Richmond along the James." . Allowing Stuart to make this move was one of the first decisions of Robert E. Lee, who had just replaced the more cautious Gen. Joseph E. Johnston as the leader of the Confederates. "In the aftermath of the inconclusive battle," led by Johnson "Lee suspected that the right flank of McClellan's army was 'in the air' not anchored to any natural formation, and thus vulnerable to attack. To be certain, he decided to send Stuart to reconnoiter."
In his book written several years after the war, McClellan’s remarks on Burnside clearly depict his disdain for the subordinate General, “I think that his weak mind was turned; that he was confused in action; and that subsequently he did not know what had occurred, and was talked by his staff into any belief they chose” (McClellan, G. B. 1887). Instead of fostering mutual trust and respect, he provided unclear and biased guidance to his subordinate leaders resulting in confusion, angst, and eventually he lost control of the battle around mid-day.
McClellan’s caution in waging war is evidenced clearly in the Army of the Potomac’s Peninsula Campaign. McClellan was charged with leading the assault on Richmond, delivering what could have been a fatal blow against the Confederacy. During the Army of the Potomac’s movements towards Richmond, McClellan repeatedly delayed, believing he had inferior numbers to his initial adversary, Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston. Johnston knew the caution McClellan was prone to, and slowly drew McClellan closer to Confederate forces defending Richmond. At the Battle of Seven Pines, Johnston reinforced the idea in McClellan’s mind that caution was necessary. (McPherson, 1988, p. 461) The surprise attach by Johnston’s forces, though ultimately defeated by the Army of the Potomac, delayed McClellan’s advance as he called for more reinforcements from Washington. Johnston was wounded in the battle, and replaced by General Robert E. Lee. Lee, whose prowess as a tactician bordered on legendary, led a series of surprise attacks against McClellan’s Army of the Potomac in the Seven Days’ Battle. McClellan’s forces were pushed back, and he was relieved of duty as commander of the Army of the Potomac, until later in 1862. (McPherson, 1988, pp. 462-470)
Although James McPherson presents Lincoln as having numerous qualities that defined him as a brilliant leader, he wastes no time in revealing what he believes to be Lincoln’s greatest strength. In his Introduction, McPherson states regarding Lincoln’s political leadership: “In a civil war whose origins lay in a political conflict over the future of slavery and a political decision by certain states to secede, policy could never be separated from national strategy…. And neither policy nor national strategy could be separated from military strategy” (McPherson, p.6). Lincoln could not approach the war from a purely martial standpoint—instead, he needed to focus on the issues that caused it. For the catalyst of the war was also the tool for its solution; a war started by differing ideologies could only be resolved through the military application of ideology. This non-objective approach to the waging of the war almost resembles the inspired approach McPherson brings to his examination of Lincoln himself.
The South’s dominating strategy in winning the civil war was attrition. They believed they could wear down the political will of the North if they held out long enough to make the Northerners tired and question value of the means to achieve the ends. Military stalemates, guerilla war tactics and inconclusive battles would help the South achieve this goal. “Confederate armies did not have to invade and conquer the North: they needed only to hold out long enough to force the North to the conclusion that the price of conquering the South and annihilating its armies was too high, as Britain had concluded in 1781 and as the United States concluded…” (Why Did the Confederacy Lose?, pg 117)The South really enjoyed McClellan’s performance in the Southern theatre with his tendency to retreat when he could have won. This was another helpful hand the South would need to cause attrition. In response, Lincoln knew he had to do two things to prevent attrition and win the war more quickly. He needed to fire McClellan, and shift the theme of the war in the view of the North so that it would not lose its thunder. He did this by issuing the Emancipation Proclamation and converting the war for unionism into the war for morality. The
After the loss at Manassas, Lincoln looked for another leader to replace McDowell, and some consideration settled on General McClellan. McClellan was at his best when he was organizing armies, not leading them into battle. Lincoln wanted the army to take over eastern Tennessee for political reasons, and McClellan for fairly sound military reasons wanted the same thing. The task was given to General Buell; it did not matter to McClellan that the area was impossible to take from the north, not to mention holding it.
The Battle of Fredericksburg falls in a long list of failures of the Army of the Potomac during the first year of the American Civil War. Following the Battle of Antietam the Northern Army had the opportunity to defeat Lee’s army. However, Northerners, were shocked by Lee’s escape following this battle on 17 September 1862, and were further upset by Major General George B. McClellan’s procrastination in pursuing Lee and allowing General J.E.B. Stuarts daring cavalry raid into Pennsylvania around Gettysburg (10-12 October 1862). McClellan’s failure to pursue Lee’s Army is mainly due to his own lack of confidence, believing that he doesn’t have enough men or material in order to defeat the Army of Virginia. President Lincoln had finally
Nonetheless, Lee saw a glimpse of hope to end the war, as he noticed the stage was set to launch an offensive campaign. Union’s large-scale effort to seize the rebel’s capital, led by McClellan, ended in a great failure. McClellan quickly lost the initiative, as Lee boldly attacked invaders in a series of six main
GEN McClellan may not have been a great war time General but he excelled at training Soldiers, getting his men ready to fight and raising the morale of the Armies he
At the beginning of the war, President Lincoln was very concerned at how the country was actually doing when he finally entered the White House. The fractured government was worse than what he accepted to see. Fort Sumter was captured and the Civil War was declared on April 12, 1861, but the first battle would not take place until July at the First Bull Run. It was said this was when Lincoln know this was going to be a long war. The Union army was not doing or showing any true movement in concluding the war. He was so upset with his General; Gen McClellan that he starts to read about military warfare to get to understand what can be done. He issues a General War Order that calls for his troops to advance by George Washington’s birthday. Out
Sears uses language that most all of us can understand, and clearly it is a very well researched work. He supports his claims in the book with a copious amount of facts and yet still keeps the course of the book moving forward. He draws on a variety of sources including diaries and letters of the participants to produce, arguably, his definitive work. Sears thesis is actually two-fold; one that McClellan missed countless opportunities to defeat Lee and two that McClellan was an incompetent commander who missed several instances to take initiative and win the battle decisively. The young Napoleon, as McClellan was known, often waited an inordinate amount of time before making a movement with his troops. For me, reading the details (with heavy emphasis to the Union story) was captivating. No recon, no communication, egotistical leadership, timidity, and procrastination all combined and helped the Union snatch defeat (or, at the very least, a draw) from the jaws of victory. This battle, like others before and after it, could have really shortened the Civil War.
Grant was unlke other generals because when other generals would have retreated he lept attacking. This caused many military losses but Lincoln respected Grant's military strength and left him at his post. He also realized that he had more recourses than the South and that victory would go to whoever could las tthe longest.
Lincoln, Commander In Chief: Abraham Lincoln was unprepared but did everything he could during the time of the Civil War. His only experince of war was the Black Hawk War that occurred in 1824. He mocked his entire military career during one of his speeches to Congress because he felt he didn’t make enough change. During his time as Commander in Chief, he learned a lesson on how to deal with military forces when he ordered troops into service. Despite the lack of experience with military, he was a self taught lawyer, master of geometry, and did try to work hard with military stategy. By 1862, he was actually considered a master. Many historians consider him better than any other presidents before him, despite the fact that he was bounded by war. His first document was actually war-related. He tried his best even though in the end, he ended up being shot just five days after General Robert. E. Lee surrended at the battle of Appomatox. Lincoln really spent most of his time dealing with war matters than anything. He only left
The reason for writing this book from McPherson’s point of view was because out of all the material out there about President Lincoln the vast majority of it is about other topics besides his role as Commander in Chief. McPherson believes that this is surely unthinkable due to the sheer amount of time and energy Lincoln had to put into being the commander of our army throughout the four long years the Civil War reigned. This book, in the eyes of James McPherson, is a long overdue explanation of Lincoln in his main role as Commander in Chief. He tells of numerous occasions when Lincoln must make important decisions that could make or break the union army. These