General Petraeus Opposition Forces Case Analysis

Over the course of history, the strategic environment has changed rapidly and is now more complex than ever before – it is currently characterized by unpredictability and disorder, and may yet manifest itself in the collapse of nuclear armed nations, destabilizing conflict in geo-politically vital regions, and humanitarian crises. A world of disparate actors – not all nation states – now exists. Unpredictable events will continue to cause strategic surprise. The widespread effects of past conflicts such as World War II, Vietnam and the Iraq war are still being felt and have created significant strategic repercussions. The failures of these conflicts are the result of our military and political leaders’ failure to quickly adapt to wartime conditions. This occurs because of a general refusal to commit to a military culture of learning that encourages serious debate, critical assessments of our military operations, and challenges to our doctrine in the face of emerging change. Additionally, leaders have struggled with the critical responsibility of forecasting and providing for a ready force, one that is well-resourced and prepared to conduct future operations. It is the responsibility of our military and political leaders to send our military to war with a ready force, and a strategy that will ultimately result in victory. But understanding war and warriors is critical if societies and governments are to make sound judgments concerning military policy.

General Franks and joint planners identified various strengths in the Iraq pre-invasion planning efforts of the Joint Staff. For instance, throughout development of the Iraqi operational approach, planners recognized Saddam Hussain and the City of Bagdad as strategic Centers of Gravity (COG) as a major sources of Iraqi power and strength to the Hussain regime.5 (JP5-0, p. III-22) By comparison, Karl Von Clausewitz referred to the COG as the “the hub of all power and movement, which everything depends or the point at which all our energies should be directed.”6 (JP5-0, p. III-22) In addition, General Frank’s and planners’ operational approach acknowledged the Iraqi Army and the Republican Guard as key operational COGs targeted in pre-invasion

The disbanding of the Iraqi army and “debathification” or dismantling of the government in place only served to increase the casualties of American troops and Iraqi civilians as the radical Sunni insurgency expanded. This point of cause and effect, clash of two distinct political and cultural worlds, defined this war for the generation serving, at home and the future generations. The threat of increasing terrorism after the attack of September 11, 2001 was one of the driving force of invasion of Iraq. However, in one analysis the increase of global terrorism today is told to be well contributed by the conflicts that were fueled by the western presence in Iraq and the surrounding

The U.S. military made the same mistakes initially in the 2003 Iraq War. The U.S. failed to allocate the proper number of troop strength, failed to adapt to the terrain, and failed to foresee the used of improvised explosive device (IED). The U.S. also lacked control of the civilian population, and the mistakes in Abu Ghraib became the rally cry for the insurgents, which the Iraqis rose to support the insurgency. (Montanus, 2005) However, the lessons learned from the British 200 years ago, the U.S. adapted and formed a concept to win the hearts of mine of the people into their counterinsurgency operation. The U.S. allocated more troops, adapted to the terrain, and employed new method to defeat IEDs. Furthermore, they opened dialogues with the Tribes, resolved conflicts, and addressed issues in order to win their support for the war. The U.S. assisted the Iraqi’s create a democratic government, provided logistic support, training

Since the war on Iraq began on March 20, 2003, at least 1,402 coalition troops have died and 9,326 U.S. troops have been wounded in action. This is no small number and the count grows daily. One would hope, then, that these men and women were sent to war with just cause and as a last resort. However, as the cloud of apprehension and rhetoric surrounding the war has begun to settle, it has become clear that the Bush administration relied on deeply flawed analyses to make its case for war to the United Nations and to the American people, rushing this country, and its soldiers, into war. This is not to say that this war was waged against a blameless regime or that our soldiers have died

While under Major General David Petraeus, the 101st Airborne Division initially deployed, ready to engage insurgent forces. However, after arriving in Mosul, Iraq the division became heavily involved in a vital reconstruction effort. General Petraeus understood through his previous experiences that in war, reconstruction efforts are inevitable. His critical thinking and problem solving led to a three-pronged strategy to provide a secure environment, to restore basic life services and to facilitate a return to normalcy for the citizens of Mosul. In this paper, I will summarize how General Petraeus used critical thinking, problem solving and the “Screaming Eagles” to earn the hearts and minds of throughout Iraq.

Throughout history, the United States Government and Armed Forces have learned from devastating mistakes and decisive victories making the US Armed Forces superior to most, if not all, other militaries; however, the Battle of Mogadishu in Somalia throughout Operation Restore Hope, Operation Provide Relief, and the Joint Special Operations Task Force missed the mark on such “lessons learned”. The inadequate intelligence; the ignorance of tactics, techniques, and procedures; and absence of reinforcements cost needless loss of US troops, and crippling a sophisticated, well-equipped military at the hands of an under-equipped militia using irregular warfare tactics. Even 24 years later, the impact resonating still weighs heavily on minds of key leaders in the government along with all echelons of military commanders.

Earlier this week we were privileged to watch the PBS Frontline film titled, “Losing Iraq”. In the beginning of this film, General Keane believed that the United States shouldn’t invade Iraq. Keane noticed that the war plans didn’t include adequate plans for securing the country. At the same time, General Franks announced that by September 2003, 110,000 troops would be prepared to leave and that a division of 30,000 would stay and handle Iraq. At this point of time, this was huge news for the United States, they truly believed that the major combat phase of the war in Iraq was over. United States next step was to send Jerry Bremer to Iraq to attempt to fix 20 years of dysfunctional government. Jerry Bremer was a very interesting candidate

US Central Command’s (CENTCOM) lack of understanding the operational environment led to a poor definition of the problem. The key to understanding the operational environment is the ability to describe the current and desired operational environment. (JPiii8). CENTCOM’s planning did reflect a good understanding of the current operational environment. CENTCOM understood the influences Iraq’s current political structure

In order to develop effective solutions for complex military problems, the Joint Community within the US Military adopted the methodology of Operational Design in Joint Doctrine. This methodology addresses the concept of complex, ill-structured or “wicked” problems. In fact, Lessons Learned as a result of operations conducted over the last 15 years played an instrumental role in the continued development of this doctrine. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) illustrates a perfect case study for evaluation utilizing this methodology. Therefore, the intent of this paper is to evaluate US Military campaign planning for OIF by using operational design as the framework for this analysis. First, this paper looks at how planners and commanders interpreted pre-invasion civilian policy guidance, their understanding of the current operational environment, and how these commanders defined the problem. Next, it identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the initial approach. After discussing this initial approach, this paper examines how commanders assessed the campaign and refined the approach – to include how the reframing occurred. Lastly, it provides examples of how these lessons learned shaped current joint planning policy and doctrine.

Today, Iraq still remains a very bloody, dangerous and unstable place where a normal and peaceful way of life is hard to see. The role of HUMINT officers in relation to this conflict is enormous. Silverstein (2007) wrote a very damning article suggesting failures throughout the intelligence community. The impact was summed up as follows: "the Curveball case explains the forces at play that led to worst intelligence failure in American history and it also explains how we went down a rabbit hole in Iraq. It's not the only reason we went into Iraq but when you deconstruct the intelligence, obviously with benefit of hindsight, it's clear that a

This paper provides an evaluation of the command and control and integration of joint functions associated with the invasion of Sicily, known as Operation HUSKY. The Allies achieved a positive outcome despite the fact that key leaders demonstrated ineffective command and control capabilities and poor integration. The paper will first evaluate the joint function of command and control, using the three attributes of mission command from joint doctrine: commander’s intent, mutual trust, and understanding. An evaluation of the integration of intelligence and fires joint functions at the Operational level will follow.

The brand new mission that involved the 1-502nd Infantry regiment was not only a hostile, but a confusing one in the least. In 2005, the 502nd Infantry Regiment was flung out to the 330-square mile region in Southern Baghdad known as the “Triangle of Death,” homing one of the most dangerous insurgency in the country. This area was the focal battleground between the Sunnis and Shi’ites as well as the central grounds for terrorists to ferry men, weapons, and money into the capital (Frederickson 113). The 502nd Regiment was assigned to the task of root out insurgent strongholds, promote social and municipal revival, and to train the local Iraqi Army battalions into a competent fighting force,

The first battle in Fallujah during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) is known as Operation Vigilant Resolve. This battle is regarded as one of the biggest single defeats that the United States Military has suffered throughout all its campaigns during OIF. The United States and international media outlets exploited this defeat, which in turn, bolstered Al Qaeda recruiting in Fallujah. This offensive failure and retreat was backed by a huge public outcry for troop withdrawal and successful exploitation of recruiting propaganda by the insurgents.

As seen through today’s prism of operational art and design, the U.S. military’s campaign planning for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) was not successful. This failure resulted from flaws in the planning process itself, and the conclusions that flowed from that process. The lack of adequate advance planning for Phase IV stability or transition operations proved especially problematic. This contributed directly to rising levels of violence in Iraq, and indirectly to increased public scrutiny of the war at home. Throughout 2006, the U.S. public, pundits and military planners debated the way forward in Iraq. The plan that emerged from this period, known as the surge, successfully overcame the deficiencies in the initial planning and execution