General Stanley Mcchrystal 's Military Design

Operational leaders down to the platoon and squad level have recently faced increasingly complex missions in uncertain operational environments. Accordingly, Army doctrine has shifted to officially recognize mission command, which enables leaders at the lowest level feasible to “exercise disciplined initiative” in the accomplishment of a larger mission. The operational process consists of six tenants: understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess. During the battle of Fallujah, LtGen Natonski understood the intent two levels up, visualizing courses of action for both allies and the enemy, and leading his organization into combat while directing his officers and soldiers to meet his intent. He visualized that Marines alone could not accomplish the mission. He understood that without the support of Iraqi police and a task force from the Army with

Balancing the role of the Professional Leader has been an ongoing issue for the Army since the latter decades of the 19th century when the U.S. Army was professionalized. The Army has struggled with the matter of balancing a force as massive as the Army. When out of balance the Army does not have the capability to send Soldiers where they are needed. During the Second War in Iraq it was obvious that the Army was not upholding this balance, junior leaders in the Army were fighting against a counterinsurgency campaign that they were ill prepared to handle due to a lack of necessary experience and equipment.

Successful leadership on a battlefield can be measured in different ways. It is possible for a good, successful leader to lose a battle. Conversely, it is possible for an ineffective leader to win a battle, given the right circumstances. What distinguishes a successful leader from an unsuccessful one is his/her ability to oversee an operation using effective mission command. In ADP 6-0, mission command as a philosophy is defined as “as the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations” (ADP, 1).

Transitioning to command from any other leadership challenge in the military requires that an officer experiences a mental shift in his/her approach to exercising the newly granted authority, responsibility and accountability for the unit. Army doctrine suggests that authority, responsibility, and accountability are inherent attributes of command. These attributes of command coupled with the expectations of the commander, demand a new and holistic approach to commandership, which is defined as exercising the art of command through leadership, management, and command.

What might have been the setback we previously faced in making decisive, clear or sound effective decisions? Was it a defect in how Commanders and Leaders led units or troops, or perhaps the philosophy in which we chose to command and control every aspect of the battlefield? What does it mean to recognize or comprehend the art of Command and the science of Control? The six principles of mission command are key in developing a cohesive team that will support all aspects of the mission. Asking “why” is now encouraged when it pertains to certain situations or missions. Understanding the purpose of why a course of action or desired outcome is necessary, leads to mission success and a cohesive unit with thinking leaders. Thinking clearly usually isn’t an issue for most leaders, but position an individual in a situation of extreme stress or complexity, then there might be a reason to be concerned. Through

The 1986 revision of the US Army, FM 100-5 “AirLand Battle” doctrine introduced the Clausewitzian concept of culmination point as a “key concept of operational doctrine.” Moreover, the new manual adopted the traditional German notion of Auftragstaktik, a decentralized command system with the commander devising a mission and then leaving the methods and means of achieving it to his subordinate

Commanders at all levels face increasingly challenging scenarios as the operational environment changes. Some instinctively motivate and empower their subordinates to think and act independently, thereby influencing actions during combat. However, those who understand the commanders' activities of mission command will influence not only subordinates, but the outcome of the battle as well. Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders.1 Commanders who understood the importance of mission command was Major General Horatio Gates. General Gates at the Battle of Saratoga successfully

Command and Control is often thought of as a distinct and specialized function like logistics, intelligence, electronic warfare, or administration. However command and control encompasses all military functions and operations giving them meaning and harmonizing them into a meaningful whole. None of the functions listed above would have any purpose unless there was command and control. Command and control is the means by which a commander recognizes what needs to be done and sees to it that the appropriate actions are taken. This action can take many forms; sometimes it’s a conscious commander decision similar to deciding on a concept of operations, sometimes it is a preconditioned reaction like an immediate action drill, sometimes it is a rules-based procedure similar to a guiding an aircraft on final approach. Some types of command and control must occur so quickly and precisely that they can only be accomplished by computers like guiding a missile onto target. Sometimes command and control occurs concurrently with the action being undertaken in the form of real-time guidance or direction in response to a changing situation. Sometimes it occurs beforehand and even after. Planning, whether rapid time-sensitive or deliberate, which determines aims and objectives, develops concepts of operations, allocates resources, and provides for necessary coordination, is an important element of command and control. Since war

Maj. Gen. “Fighting Joe” Hooker demonstrated an excellent example of failed mission command during the Battle of Chancellorsville in April 1863. He had thought he would defeat General Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia by maneuver beginning in Chancellorsville as he pushed Lee toward Richmond. His commitment toward his own plan for Lee’s response would overshadow his operational planning and ultimately lead to a mission command failure at Chancellorsville despite outnumbering Lee’s troops 128,000 to 60,000. Through decentralized execution, Hooker could have empowered agile and adaptive leadership to operate under uncertainty, exploit opportunities, and achieve unity of effort. Instead, he failed in exercising at least four principles of mission command. He did not provide a clear commander’s intent, create shared understanding, exercise disciplined initiative, or accept prudent risk.

At the close of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the US military ended with varied to questionable results. This is because US policymakers and military leaders did not adjust to the emergence of new conditions due to their dependence on medium structure problem framing. The Army Design Methodology (ADM) is a tool military organizations should use in adaptive environments to develop solutions for complex problems. To understand why the ADM is a critical tool for military organizations, military professionals need to understand the impacts of ill-structured problems on planning and execution and the potential influence the ADM will have on their organization. Once military professionals understand the influence the ADM has on ill-structured problems, they can begin to consider how to integrate the ADM into planning.

Summary: In this article the authors are addressing future leaders, and they immediately inform the reader that because there is more complexity considerably more complex issues and technologies than a century ago in the operational military environment, there is a great need for military leaders to achieve autonomy in terms of adapting to and learning about the evolving environment. In short, leaders must be smarter and better prepared for a changing world.

In order to develop effective solutions for complex military problems, the Joint Community within the US Military adopted the methodology of Operational Design in Joint Doctrine. This methodology addresses the concept of complex, ill-structured or “wicked” problems. In fact, Lessons Learned as a result of operations conducted over the last 15 years played an instrumental role in the continued development of this doctrine. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) illustrates a perfect case study for evaluation utilizing this methodology. Therefore, the intent of this paper is to evaluate US Military campaign planning for OIF by using operational design as the framework for this analysis. First, this paper looks at how planners and commanders interpreted pre-invasion civilian policy guidance, their understanding of the current operational environment, and how these commanders defined the problem. Next, it identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the initial approach. After discussing this initial approach, this paper examines how commanders assessed the campaign and refined the approach – to include how the reframing occurred. Lastly, it provides examples of how these lessons learned shaped current joint planning policy and doctrine.

Technology and the American Way of War Since 1945 covers in detail a wide range of weapons systems, technologies, and other equipment developed by the United States Military. Naturally, a significant amount of Mahnken’s book places a heavy emphasis on technologies and systems developed during the Cold War. The book could almost be examined as a complete history of the development of military technology during that period, however, the author has a much more significant purpose for his work than to just educate the reader on military history. Mahnken says, “This book is about the interaction of technology and culture in the context of the strategic environment. It argues that technology both shaped and was shaped by the culture of the U.S.

of the U.S. military have been evolving to include a more emotionally intelligent leadership strategy.

“World War I demonstrated that if speed were the major consideration, the radio provided the method of transmitting orders and information that no other means could duplicate. “ Radar could now identify objects beneath the seas and in the air. Effective communications now could be accomplished between a tank and aircraft this would prove to be a significant advantage to the Germans Blitzkrieg. We can trace back to one of the first computers that allowed us to quickly decode the German Enigma code. Today, we see countless advances in communication that have changed the way we conduct mission command through information systems that give us unit locations down to the Soldier level. Information and data are now at a staffs finger tips to process and analysis to make even quicker and timely decisions on the