Graduate Level Sustainment Case Study

When Halstead was given this mission in Iraq, she never anticipated the challenge she would soon face. She had one year to plan her operation, train and certify her units for deployments and after months of painstaking preparation and training, Halstead was confident her soldiers and unit were ready to be certified for deployment. However, certification had to be issued by her superior, a three-star general recently back from Iraq—and the most challenging boss Halstead had ever encountered in all of her years of services.

Training objectives must support the mission profile and meet the commanders desired end state. Prior to the 56TH train up at the National Training Center (NTC) the deployment location changed from Iraq to Afghanistan (case study). Changes to mission essential tasks were not identified prior to NTC, resulting in the BCT training on collective tasks and validated during MRE based on the Iraq mission profile. However, the shift to the Afghanistan mission profile created gaps in training not identified until units arrived at Bagram Air Field (BAF). i.e. the BCT had to establish an MRAP drivers training program at BAF extending the RSOI process. Training gaps were not limited to company level shortfalls as battalion and brigade staffs were not able to anticipate potential threats and capitalize on opportunities. (case study 2)

Operation Anaconda was a subordinate joint combat operation, during Operation Enduring Freedom, (Lyle 2012) to be carried out in the Shahi Kot Valley located in southeastern Afghanistan. Operations planning took place in February of 2002 and was executed from 2-16 March. The operational purpose was to capture or kill, what was reported to be, “The largest concentration of al Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan”. Operation Anaconda Case Study (2003) In order to undertake a mission of this magnitude and scope, unity of command would prove critical. The task organization of Operation Anaconda involved both joint and multinational assets. Operation Anaconda lacked unity

Operation Anaconda was the first major joint combat operation against the war on terror that the US was committed to winning. This operation would test our military’s readiness for joint operations against a hardened and willing adversary. The primary mission was to kill/capture Taliban/Al Qaeda forces occupying towns and villages in the vicinity of Shahi Khot in order to gain control of the valley.1 The US needed the towns, villages, mountains, and more importantly, the intricate and hard to access caves cleared of enemy fighters. Units participating in the operation included elements of the 101st Airborne Division, 10th Mountain Division, Special Operations Forces (SOF), and Coalition forces from seven nations

Many elite forces from around the world came together for operation Anaconda. The focal point of the operation was the Lower Shahikot Valley, which housed and protected a large number of foreign fighters – “Afghan Arabs” from al-Qaeda, Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Chechens from the Islamic Movements of Uzbekistan (IMU) 5. Takur Ghar was the highest point overlooking the Shahikot Valley and was a key terrain to capture for the mission. A noted Afghanistan specialist, Lester Grau, believes there were initially 600 estimated enemy fighters in the valley, which tallied with other credible sources6. The valley was protected by multilayered defenses. At the entrances to the valley, the insurgents maintained checkpoints, which allowed an early warning system of attempted ground attack7. The valley was “classic guerilla terrain – easily defendable, controlled access, numerous routes of escape, and near a sympathetic border”8.

The United States Air Force controls and operates numerous satellites for global positioning, missile warning, communication and meteorological purposes along with reconnaissance aircraft. Through a combination of satellite imagery and reconnaissance aircraft, identifying and collecting intelligence on guerilla military targets and movements would be the first objective in the conflict. Once targets are identified, bombing campaigns could commence from regional Air force bases in the Area of Operations (AO), softening up guerilla forces in advance of the next stage of the military engagement, the ground campaign. Air force tankers such as the HC-130, KC-135 and KC-10 would need to be deployed to offer in flight air refueling for the F-15, F-16, F-22 and A-10’s departing from regional Air force bases. The Air Force also

In early January 2002, American intelligence received evidence of a large volume of enemy forces assembling in the Shahi Kot Valley in Eastern Afghanistan. Central Command (CENTCOM), led by General Tommy R. Franks, was directing combat operations in Afghanistan through the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). As the interest in assaulting the Shahi Kot Valley amplified, General Franks reached a conclusion that a U.S. tactical commander was a need in Afghanistan. The decision was to assign the 10th Mountain Division Commander, Major General (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck, as the tactical commander. In an effort to strengthen MG Hagenbeck’s command authority, CENTCOM named his headquarters Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain and gave it command and control authority over Operation Anaconda. By having command and control authority, MG Hagenbeck would encounter challenges with the command structure. The challenges of command structure were due to CJTF Mountain not having tactical control (TACON) of multiple Special Operation Forces, the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC), and friendly Afghanistan forces. These misunderstandings were resolved during the execution phase, but rectifying the command relationships prior would have avoided lost time and resources needed on enemy forces and positions. In this paper, I will identify the challenges of command structure during Operation Anaconda.

Progress has also been made in repairing and improving the infrastructure of corrections and training facilities” {Security- Canada’s Mentoring Role}. The Canadian forces provide Afghanistan with decisive and influential training to most, if not all Afghanistan National Army (ANA) personnel for them to become more capable and self sufficient when managing its populace. This concept shall assist the Afghanistan economy because if the Afghan Army were finally trained to proficiently secure its people and the nation as a whole, it will cultivate the government to become more effective hitherto, “turn and pave the way for economic development and reconstruction” {Security- Canada’s Mentoring Role}. In addition to the ongoing efforts by the Canadian Forces to mentor and equip the Afghan National Army, “Canada is also providing up to $99 million over three years towards: training, mentoring and equipping the ANA and the ANP; building capacity in administration and logistical support; and complementary initiatives in the justice and correctional systems to support activities of the ANP” {Canada’s Engagement in Afghanistan}. In order for the Canadian military to be able to maneuver themselves in the struggling nation of Afghanistan, it is obligatory that these armed forces be provided with the necessary weaponry and arsenal to cope through with their

On March 12th, 2014 I stepped off the plane in Afghanistan. I nervously glanced at all my surroundings and first noticed how enormous the airfield is. There’s miles of runways, plane hangars, and helipads directly in the middle of the base. Fifteen foot concrete barriers surrounded every single road, compound, and building on the base. It amazed me how a base resembling a small-scale city

1-4 ADA carried out combat operations in 160-square kilometer area across from the airfield. By May 2003, 1-4 ADA relieved 1st Battalion, 3rd Air Defense Artillery, 3rd Infantry Division (Armstrong et al., 2003). 1-3 ADA consolidated as a battalion on the airport and constructed the first successful entry control point (ECPs) and observation posts (OPs) around the parameter of the airfield (Armstrong et al., 2003). Consequential to 1-3 ADA’s accomplishments with the local leaders they laid the foundation for 1-4 ADA’s successful combat and humanitarian operations in theatre (Armstrong et al., 2003).

The strategy of the 176th Wing is unique primarily based on our location and our

Afghanistan was a challenging deployment for the 4th ABCT. From the beginning the issues with manning and equipment caused a strain on the daily operations within the Brigade. Though not an impossible issue it caused tension between the echelons of command. These minor challenges were magnified by the death of the BDE CDR, BDE CSM, and a BN CDR. This impacted the organization greatly as it should but COL Cutler, COL Timmon’s replacement, rarely displayed decisive leadership and did not take ownership of the Brigade. As a result, the trust that was built prior to and during the deployment began to degrade and continues to do so. Numerous indicators exist on this lack of trust and they there is no indication that these actions will cease under the current leadership. The central leadership problem that exists in the 4th ABCT is a lack of trust. This trust has eroded as a result of 3 primary factors which are the misalignment of ethics, leader imposed stress, and a lack of leadership.

In this book, Schroen gives his straightforward perspective on his role leading the Northern Afghanistan Liaison Team (NALT) from mid-September to the end of October 2001. Schroen gives a detailed account of the CIA’s infiltration into northeast Afghanistan to support the Northern Alliance (NA) campaign against the Taliban and foreign Arab forces around Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif. Having worked with Afghan rebels during the Soviet occupation, Schroen was well familiar with the terrain and geography, and also with several of the NA functionaries with whom he would work.

The Counter Insurgency operations in Vietnam have taught the U.S. a lot that can be applied to Afghanistan. According to Phillips (2015) “Although our understanding and steadfast support can make a significant difference, ultimate success depends on

The utilization of Navy ships to deliver the cargo to the SPOD and then a C-5M to fly direct to the AOR for delivery (Figure 5). Plus, the C-5M outperformed normal Mission Capable rate of the C-5B fleet that historically hovered around "55 percent-well below the required 75 percent required during wartime.” Col Chuck Nesemeier, 436th Maintenance Group commander at Dover AFB stated during the Rota Multimodal Operation the C-5M Mission Capable rate was at “90.5 percent, a rate that has never been reached before. We haven’t seen an overall performance like this yet in the history of the C-5 weapon system.” Furthermore, supporting that the C-5M is improving Mission Capable rating as a new weapon system and is reducing the requirement of aerial