Greek Military Speech

The Greek victory against Persia was largely due to efforts of mainly Athens but also Sparta as well. Athens was responsible for the major turning points of the Persian invasions, while Sparta was responsible for the deciding battle. Miltiades, with his skilful battle strategies, defeated the Persians during their second invasion at Marathon, which gave Athens a confidence boost on their military. During the third invasion, when the Athenians were evacuated to Salamis, Themistocles had devised a plan to trick the Persians which had resulted in Persian army without a supply line. Sparta?s importance had revealed during their sacrifice at Thermopylae and at Plataea, where they provided the most effective part of the army.

The great Athenian general Miltiades came up with a shrewd battle plan. He decided to thin out the ranks in the center of the phalanx to strengthen the wings. During the battle, the Greek wings crushed the Persian wings and forced them to retreat. At the same time, the Persians in the middle managed to break through the weakened center of the phalanx. Instead of pursuing the retreating Persian wings, the Greek wings moved backward to attack the Persians that had broken through the Greek defenses. The Greek center then turned around so that they had the Persians surrounded. The Persians were slaughtered (5). According to the Greek historian Herodotus, the Persians lost 6400 men while te Greeks lost only 192 (4).

The Battle of Thermopylae, which Herodotus recorded in his writing The Histories, was one of the most arduous and notable battles of western history. Herodotus was an extremely significant historian who lived during the 5th century B.C. In this primary source writing, he portrays how Xerxes was superstitious and tyrannical, how the battle informs you about the Spartan culture, how the values of Greek promoted society, and he displayed how significant the Persian invasion was on Greek development, for example, their political and intellectual expansion. The Persian King Xerxes

The Persian Wars were a series of destructive and malevolent battles which occurred in the time frame of 490B.C and 480 – 479B.C. The Greek victory over the Persians in the Persian Wars cannot be attributed to only one factor, more it was a commixture of factors. Such factors include unity, leadership, strategy, tactics and the pre-eminence of the Greek soldier. Each contributing factor was to play a distinctive and pivotal role in the various battles to come, which ultimately would lead to the subsequent demise of the Persians.

Xerxes was a man of power. The Great King of Persia, his empire encompassed the majority of the known world. On his invasion of Greece in the spring of 480BCE, he reportedly commanded a horde of over two million men. Even the Greek oracle at Delphi encouraged prudence in face of such an overwhelming force (7.140). Thus the question arises of why such an army failed to compel Greece into submission. I will explore this with focus on the key battles and the important factors, most notably the timing of the attack, the quality of his expeditionary force and Xerxes’ personal faults.

King Leonidas, a superior tactician, accurately assessed the Persian army’s motivations and capabilities and decided to use the natural terrain to his advantage. Assuming that the Persians would challenge the Greek forces from their staging point, derived from pervious knowledge during the Battle of Marathon and the Persians encampment location, King Leonidas had chosen to eventually maneuver his forces into the Pass of Thermopylae, also known as Hellespont; saddled between a mountain range and the Gulf of Maliakos (Frye, 2006). Hellespont would provide the Spartans some significant tactical advantages, where within the pass, at its narrowest portion which was only 50 feet wide; countering the Persian greatest strength of archery and mounted horsemen (Frye, 2006).

It is 490 B.C. and the powerful Persian army is about to invade my polis of Athens and all of mainland Greece. The Persians have just caused the fall of Eritrea and now were next. We are outnumbered easily and even the Spartans have denied us their help. The Greeks have sent Philippides, a professional messenger to Sparta asking for their assistance in the battle. The Spartans decided to help but unfortunately there was a law that they are reluctant to break. They would not fight until the moon was full. I Kristo II may confront the Persians and just give in to protect my family. Then at least I would be able to keep our belongings, we would still be alive. If I give king Darius III some info on my fellow Athenians I might even be able to live

The book written by Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, contains two controversial debates between distinguished speakers of Athens. The two corresponding sides produce convincing arguments which can be taken as if produced as an honest opinion or out of self-interest. The two debates must be analyzed separately in order to conclude which one and which side was speaking out of honest opinion or self-interest, as well as which speakers are similar to each other in their approach to the situation.

The Peloponnesian War was the turning point in Athenian hegemony in Ancient Greece. It was fought in 431 B.C. between the Delian League, led by Athens, and the Peloponnesian League led by Sparta. According to Thucydides, Athens’ imposing hegemonic status and its overwhelming quest for more power made the Peloponnesian War and Athens’s eventual fall from power inevitable. Despite the Athenians having a far more superior navy and being considerably wealthier, they were defeated and made subjects of Sparta. In this paper, I will discuss Thucydides’ and Socrates’ reasons for why

Leonidas was the king of the Spartans during the time of the Persian War. The Spartans were the elite of the elite when it came to military strength. One of the greatest displays of his courage and honor was in his last battle, The Battle of Thermopylae. At the Battle of Thermopylae the Persians were trying to come down into Greece through the mountain pass Thermopylae. The odds were heavily against the Greeks with the Persians numbering in the hundreds of thousands and the Greeks only having a couple thousand Athenians and only 300 Spartan warriors under the command of King Leonidas. The Greeks stopped-up the pass with phalanxes and were slaughtering the Persians. The battle was looking like a major victory for the Greeks until the Persians discovered a back-road on a mountain pass and were about to surround the Greeks. King Leonidas told the remaining Athenian Greeks to flee back to Athens while he and his 300 hundred Spartans held off the Persians. The Spartan army caused massive damage to the Persian army by killing off thousands of them. All the Spartans died in that battle, along with Leonidas, but this weakened the Persians and allowed the

Through the manuscripts of Herodotus, an ancient historian who hailed from the mountainous lands of Greece, modern day historians have been granted the ability to piece together the multitude of events that supposedly transpired during the years 480 and 479 BC between the Persian empire and the city-states of the classical Greece (Herodotus). The second Persian invasion of Greece, which took place in the previously mentioned years, was a part of the many series of battles and encounters that made up the Greco-Persian Wars. This invasion in particular, however, probably saw one of the most distinguished battles in ancient European warfare befall. As a whole, the second Persian invasion of Greece consisted of several battles that transpired within a close proximity of one another chronologically. The war itself was fairly short-lived, even for its time, lasting only the course of approximately one year. The battles themselves took place in Thermopylae, Artemisium, Salamis, Platae, and Mycale (Setzer). The Persian invasion forces were led by King Xerxes I of Persia, the son of Darius I of Persia. Prior to the reign of Xerxes I, King Darius I had wanted to take control of ancient Greece. As such, he ordered two campaigns which made up the first Persian invasion of Greece. Much to his hindrance, however, Darius I breathed his last breath before he was presented with the opportunity to carry out a second invasion.

The battle of Thermopylae was the Greek’s first stand against the massive army of King Xerxes, and was the most influential battle of the entire war. Up to this point, the Persian army was seen as too massive and powerful to be stopped. The once warring city-states of Greece knew they couldn’t stand against the Persians alone, and knew in order to defend their homeland they would have to unite. A unity of command was agreed upon; King Leonidas of Sparta was chosen to lead the Greek forces. He was chosen to lead because of the unsurpassed warring abilities the Spartans were so well known for made him perfect for the objective of stopping the Persians.

This essay examines the evolution of the Athens strategy from the beginning to the end of The Peloponnesian War (431 to 404 BCE). The Strategy will be evaluated in the context of the relationship of ends, means, and ways by testing the suitability, acceptability, feasibility, and risk.

The Battle of Thermopylae goes down in history for being one of the most heroic feats of bravery in any war. The Spartan King Leonidas led 300 Spartan warriors in a fight to block the Persian Army from passing into Greece through a two meter wide pass through the mountains of Thermopylae. The Persian army that vastly outnumbered the Spartans was beat back for two days and during those defeats they suffered heavy losses that outweighed the Spartans 20 to 1. All was lost on the third day after a traitor revealed to the Persian King Xexres that

“But we trust that the gods may grant us fortune as good as yours, since we are just men fighting against unjust, and that what we want in power will be made up by the alliance of the Lacedaemonians” (Thucydides 270). The Melians should have acted sensibly instead of being naïve and submit to the imperial power seeing that the odds were against them. The Athenians give them a choice, but they decided to act irrational and respond emotively. “They underestimated Athens’ military power, judging the issue by the clouded eye of volition rather than calculations based on security and followed the human tendency to back their desires with uncritical hope and use of sovereign reason only to reject what they find unpalatable” (Bosworth 36).