Gulf Of Tonkin Research Paper

Upon the French’s exit, the American involvement and commitment escalated with the use of the political establishments in South Vietnam to assist in the curbing the spread of Communism. This presented America an opportunity for them to significantly integrate themselves in the South Vietnamese government to further delay the reunification election from taking place in 1954. The attacks on the US naval vessels during the Gulf of Tonkin incident provided the U.S, under the Johnson administration, another justification for the escalated involvement of the conflict in Vietnam. In which, the U.S responded with the Gulf of Tonkin resolution to launch a full-scale military effort towards the North until their withdrawal from Vietnam in 1969. The desolate gradual departure of America in Vietnam was summarised by Senator James Buckley as “that damning silence of those who cannot find even a single word of compassion for those under Communist tyranny”. It can be inferred from this context that as the situations in Vietnam continue to evolve, the American’s participation also varied to align with these conditions.

“In August of 1964, in response to the American and GVN espionage along its coast, the DRV launched a local and controlled attack against C. Turner Joy and the U.S.S. Maddox , two American ships on call in the Gulf of Tonkin” (Brigham 2). This resulted in the United States government giving Lyndon Johnson the ability to make war under the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. President Johnson then gave orders to perform air raids on Northern Vietnam pushing the United States further into the war. Compared to 1962 when only 9,000 soldiers supported the South Vietnamese, by June 1965 82,000 soldiers occupied the country. The number only continued to rise exponentially, and by 1966 370,000 soldiers had been sent in to prop their South Vietnam allies. President Richard Nixon withdrew American soldiers from Vietnam and as part of the “vietnamization” of the war. Over and 60,000 American soldiers had been lost in a war to preserve the status quo, not to win.

In 1960s, the US was faced with another crisis of communist expansion in the war between North and South Vietnam. The Kennedy Administration decided to further pursue their containment strategy out of fear being seen by the international community as weak towards communism. During the Johnson Administration, an attack against American vessels that happened in the Gulf of Tonkin led to President Johnson being granted the ability to conduct broad military operations without congressional approval. The American public began to largely oppose American intervention in Vietnam because the optimistic statements made by the government ran contradictory to the reports of the violent fighting by American news outlets. During the Nixon administration, the US switched to a policy, later known as Vietnamization, where the main goal was to strengthen the South Vietnamese forces and provide them with better armaments so they can better defend themselves. Vietnamization proved to be ineffective as the South Vietnamese forces were unable to hold their own against the North without US air support as proven during Operation Lam Son 719 and the Easter Offensive. The signing of the Paris Peace Accords officially ended US involvement in the Vietnam War. The US followed containment policies during beginning of the war due to the underlying fear of the spread of communism and since the policies were inherited from previous

The Gulf of Tonkin incident was a series of reported confrontations between the USS Maddox on August 2nd and August 4th, 1964. The second of the two confrontations, on August 4th, was later proven to have never happened, and the legitimacy of the first confrontation on August 2nd is in question. The USS Maddox reported that on August 2nd, while patrolling in international waters, it was attacked by three North Vietnamese Torpedo Boats. President Johnson went on live television on August 4th saying that the USS Maddox and the USS Turner Joy were attacked again by Vietnamese boats. He used these attacks as reason to pass the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution that granted him the use of conventional military force in Southeast Asia without a formal

D. disappeared at sea with no trace, but newspaper reporters claimed that Spain had ordered it sunk

The Vietnam War lasted longer, bloodier, and more hostile than any U.S. President or American citizen imagined. Lyndon Johnson faced many other enemies during the war such as the duration, the immense number of deaths, and for the first time in most American’s history, failure. Through deep evaluation of Lyndon B. Johnson’s foreign policies as President during the Vietnam war, failure was a recurring outcome, as he faced military and political difficulties over having complete authority over political decisions made leading to the misuse of his respective power, receiving split support through torn Americans at home, and his accord to deport so many troops into combat in Vietnam.

That view did not last long, by April 14 it was believed that the sinking of the USS Maine was not a mere accident, The Atlanta Wesleyan Christian Advocate first believed that "Spanish perfidy" had caused the catastrophe but later decided some "hotheads"

Gulf of Tonkin Resolution – The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was a resolution that stated that the president could take any and all action necessary in Vietnam. This was spurred by a supposed attack on a United States gun boat in the Gulf of Tonkin. A point of comparison to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution could be the declaration of war following the bombing of Pearl Harbor. On December 7th, 1941, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) launched a large bombing mission against the ships and the soldiers at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. After this event, the original idea to try and keep the United States out of World War II was abandoned and the United States began to churn out military equipment and supplies to combat the Axis powers. In both cases, the seemingly correct thing to do was considered to be obvious.

A North Vietnamese civilian said, “The Americans thought that the more bombs they dropped, the quicker we would fall to our knees and surrender. But the bombs heightened rather than dampened our spirit.” This shows that congress was not correct in approving the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution because the results were war, bombing, and deaths.

Many people were against the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution because it sent millions of troops to Vietnam to fight a war many Americans didn’t seem necessary. Americans realized that after the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was passed it was a declaration of war even though no declaration was officially passed. Many Americans did not want to be in any wars and a very large majority just did not want to be halfway around the world in Vietnam, fighting a war that was unnecessary in their eyes. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution gave President Johnson a blank check so he had full control of the military and most of the American taxpayer’s money at his disposal. People were not excited to be in a war considered useless to them and because a war with China

Lyndon Johnson and the Tonkin Gulf Resolution The official rhetoric of Lyndon Johnson’s administration portrayed the Gulf of Tonkin incident as an unprovoked and malicious attack on U.S. ships by the armed forces of North Vietnam, as a result of which the President needed the power to deal militarily with the North Vietnamese. The Gulf of Tonkin incident explicitly encompasses military actions on August 2, and alleged actions on August 4, 1964, between North Vietnamese torpedo patrol boats and United States destroyers and aircraft off the coast of North Vietnam. President Johnson and many top administration officials declared that the United States was innocent of any aggressive offensive maneuvers against the North

The United States did not intend to go to Vietnam before the Gulf of Tonkin incident because the United States needed permission from their citizens and Congress to be involved in the war. They also did not want the war to end up like the war in Korea. The first reason why the United States did not intend go to Vietnam before the Gulf of Tonkin incident was because the United States needed the American people and the Congress’ consent in order to be part of the war. In the Telegram From the Department of State (Rusk) to the Embassy in Vietnam (Lodge), May 22, 1964, it says, “Once such publicity occurred, I think you can see that the finger would point straight at us and that the President would then be put in perhaps a far more difficult position toward the American public and the Congress.” This means that the United States cannot be part of the war because they do not have the consent of the people and the President would get a lot of negative backlash if there was one.

Those attacks, and the ensuing naval actions, known as the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, were used by President Lyndon Johnson to get congressional enactment of the Southeast Asia Resolution (better known as the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution) on August

The United States issued the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964. It said that Congress empowered the President, as Command in Chief, "to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the U.S. and to prevent further aggression." Most importantly, the memorandum gave the President the permission to retaliate North Vietnam's threats to international peace, as the attacks were reason enough for further American involvement in Vietnam, as well as an escalation of military forces.

In 1965, the United States of America officially enter the war against North Vietnam. After the Gulf of Tonkin incident where North Vietnamese attacked two U.S. ships on August 2nd and 4th, 1964, this event was a chance for U.S. President Lyndon Johnson to give authority for U.S. to enter war in Vietnam. United State involvement in Vietnam War was an approach to seize the communist aggression. A campaign authorized by President Johnson called “Operation Rolling Thunder” which started on February 24th, 1965 is a series of extensive bombing directed towards the North Vietnamese predicted to be eight weeks long until the North Vietnamese surrender to U.S. power. However, this campaign lasted two years longer than expected.