Haack On Fuzzy Logic Essay

In this section she argues against the strengthened disquotational principal which Saul Kripke introduces in his article “A Puzzle about Belief”. The principal entails that, if a normal and sincere speaker of English doesn’t agree with or assent to a sentence “p” then that person does not believe that p. For example, if a person sincerely doesn’t assent to the sentence “Bruce Wayne is Batman”, we can conclude by the principal that, that person does not believe that Bruce Wayne is Batman. Marcus does not accept this particular tenet of the strengthened disquotational principal and provides

To understanding how we use language to describe the world, we need theories to describe and explain our reality. The title quote is taken from Willard Van Orman Quine’s, “On What There Is”, in which he presents a theory of ontology and a position on the problem of universals. The problem of universals questions the existence of universals. Universals are properties and relations which are held in common by shared qualities. In comparison, particulars are concrete entities. The debate is centred around two opposing viewpoints – nominalist and realists. Realists believe in universals, nominalists do not. While realists endorse both universals and particulars, nominalists reject the notion of universals and only accept the existence of particulars. Consequently, there is disagreement among philosophers whether universals exist. Discussion of the titled quote follows an examination of the One Over Many argument which leads to the problem of universals. In this essay, I show that I agree with the title statement and will argue in favour of a nominalist account of universals. I will focus primarily on Quine’s argument for nominalist semantics. This argument will be presented by questioning the universal ‘redness’ and the role of meanings. In examining arguments made by Armstrong and subsequently presenting a response to these critiques via the analysis of Devitt, I will also discuss the infinite regress problem and the validity of the One Over Many argument. My conclusion will be

After explaining where ideas come from, and how they connect to one another, Hume is now free to delve into the actual objects of human reason and enquiry.  Here, Hume divides all the objects into two categories:  Relations of Ideas and Matters of Fact.4  The first idea can be defined as those ideas that arise from pure logic, such as arithmetic and spatial

In this paper, I will discuss the truth-belief-justification conceptual analysis of knowledge, which I will refer to as TBJ, Gettier cases, and an example that refutes TBJ. Conceptual analysis is an analysis of a proposition P with given premises to acquire knowledge of that P. The truth-belief-justification analysis of knowledge fails to provide sufficient conditions for someone to possess knowledge. For a condition to be necessary, it has to be satisfied to have knowledge of a proposition. If a condition is sufficient, then the person x will have some information to know something about proposition P. Jointly sufficient conditions are conditions that all need to be satisfied together to have knowledge about some P. They are necessary and supposedly jointly sufficient, but Gettier cases prove that extra conditions on top of TBJ are required to be jointly sufficient.

“Logic: The art of thinking and reasoning in strict accordance with the limitations and incapacities of the human misunderstanding.”

Abstract ideas pertaining to epistemology in philosophy are almost as old as the concept of philosophy itself. Dating back to thinkers such as Aristotle, carrying on throughout the medieval period and into modern philosophy, abstracts have always been grappled with. George Berkeley’s epistemology about abstract ideas has historically been one that has drawn the attention of many other scholars and philosophical thinkers. His thoughts on ideas, specifically his expansion of Locke’s general abstract ideas, are still argued to this very day. His critique of Locke’s view of abstract ideas and ideas in general, is successful in refuting his claims, and is validated in the Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, and can be expanded upon in another one of Berkeley’s works, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge.

In chapter 2 of If A then B, Shenefelt and White explain the difference between what it is to have a logical argument and also explain the means of persuasion. The authors show the difference between the logical argumentation and persuasion by explaining how the Ancient Greeks and the Ancient Indians studied arguments. In other words, the main focus of chapter two dealt with distinguishing between what is logic and what is rhetoric. It was discussed that the means of persuasion involves getting people to agree with one by using techniques such as rhetoric. In contrast, logic depends on being rational. Persuasion is connected to rhetoric and logic is connected with rationality. In the example with the Ancient Greeks and the Ancient Indians,

Besides being a solution to the Gettier Problem, the No Essential False Lemmas is important because it eliminates the possibility of having a false foundation of knowledge. In selecting what is considered knowledge, it also seems

In this paper, first I am going to introduce the criterion of verifiability. With the help of the criterion of verifiability, Ayer is able to test whether any sentence has factual significance or not. He then concludes that metaphysical propositions lack factual significance because they fail to satisfy even the weaker sense of verifiability in principle. Ayer proceeds to argue that metaphysical propositions are nonsensical since they neither have factual significance nor belong to the category of a priori propositions. This argument is mainly successful as to eliminate metaphysics from sensible knowledge, except there are two parts susceptible to attack. One may argue that the process of applying the criterion of verifiability to

But this premise is the very idea most in need of proof. It is especially controversial because__________________.

31-32). So, in this paper, identities will be called unqualified (or basic) primary truths, and definitions will be called qualified (or derivative) primary truths.

Strawson and Grice find Quine’s proposal that there is no differences between synthetic and analytical truths to be absurd and in their paper “In defense of a Dogma” explain not only why Quine is wrong, but why there is in fact a differences between the two. Their main problem with Quine’s reasoning is that his standards are set far too high and he sets forth too strict of definitions. They point out that all components of Quine’s arguments in Two Dogmas of Empiricism are very radical and it seems that many times within his paper he makes multiple leaps of

In recent times, the discussion regarding the ontological status of properties has been imbued with renewed interest. Indeed, one’s understanding of properties has significant implications and consequences on their metaphysics of philosophy of the mind. In this essay, I will largely bypass the debates disputing the realness of properties altogether, and instead focus on trying to find a satisfying conception of properties. The reason is twofold: 1) I would like to entertain accounts of property realism that do not suppose properties to be universals; and 2) objections against properties as universals fail to offer adequate alternatives. First, I will provide a traditional account of properties as universals, and the objections against properties due to this characterization, as well as some simple rebuttals against the objections. Then, I will discuss some stances regarding the nature of properties, mainly property minimalism and maximalism, and provide my personal interpretations towards them. I hope to show that although properties as universals can be problematic, the alternative of constructing them as particulars has issues of its own.

ABSTRACT: Spohn's decision model, an advancement of Fishburn's theory, is valuable for making explicit the principle used also by other thinkers that 'any adequate quantitative decision model must not explicitly or implicitly contain any subjective probabilities for acts.' This principle is not used in the decision theories of Jeffrey or of Luce and Krantz. According to Spohn, this principle is important because it has effects on the term of action, on Newcomb's problem, and on the theory of causality and the freedom of the will. On the one hand, I will argue against Spohn with Jeffrey that the principle has to be given up. On the other, I will try to argue against

The term “Logic” hails from the ancient Greek word logike and is a discipline which utilizes and studies valid reasoning. It is heavily relied upon in a number of subjects such as mathematics, philosophy and computer science, its roots being traced to ancient civilizations including Greece, India, China and Persia.