Hannibal vs. Rome

Another ancient one-sided perception of Hannibal is in the source: “Hannibal turned back once more towards Placentia, and after marching about ten miles went into camp. The next day he advanced against the enemy with twelve thousand foot and five thousand horse. [2] Nor did the consul Sempronius, who had now returned from Rome, decline the combat. That day there were only three miles between the two encampments. On the following day they fought, with great spirit and with shifting fortunes. At the first encounter the Romans had so far the best of it that not only were they victorious in the battle, but they pursued the beaten enemy to his camp, and were soon attacking the camp itself. Hannibal stationed [p. 177]a few defenders on the rampart and at the gates1 and received the rest in a crowded throng within the enclosure, where he bade them watch intently for the signal to sally forth.” [2] This written source perspicuously outlines the chronology of the Second Punic War, and Livy’s one sided perception, on how they fought with ‘great spirit and shifting fortunes’, in order to embellish the Roman Empire’s image, ultimately resulting into him going into great length to demonise Hannibal. A final source to quintessentially exemplify the ancient Roman depiction of Hannibal is: “Hannibal moved out of his winter encampment. He had tried before this to cross the Apennines, but had failed because of the intolerable cold. [2] And the delay had been

The Battle of Cannae, between the Carthaginian General Hannibal and the larger Roman army under the command of Lucius Aemilius Paulus and Gaius Terentius Varro in 216 B.C. serves as one of the most influential tactical battles in history. Two enemy forces faced off using very different tactics. The Roman Empire had succeeded in amassing over 50,000 infantry troops and an estimated 6,000 cavalry troops. The Roman army planned to use its vast numbers to subdue the smaller numbered forces of the Carthaginian army using sheer force. Hannibal’s army, though lesser in quality and quantity compared to the Roman army, was composed of seasoned fighters. Hannibal plan was to use the fighting techniques of the Roman army to his benefit.

Many of the states of Italy that Rome had conquered a century before now joined Hannibal. This was a threat to Rome, so the Roman general Publius Cornelius Scipio took a Roman army to north Africa and then Hannibal went back to defend Carthage. In the battle at Zama, near Carthage, in 202 BC the Romans finally defeated Hannibal.

They swiftly maintained support of the Scipios campaign in Spain as well as re-establishing their dwindling army to 250,000 strong by the end of 216 BC through expanding recruitment. Two urban legions were formed from volones, young men (17) and criminals in addition to allies increasing their quota of troops. The senate ingeniously payed for such a force by issuing an edict where, for the first time, troops were provided at the expense of private citizens. Additionally, the senate learnt from their failures of fighting Hannibal in the field and agreed to adopt the once ridiculed ‘Fabian Strategy’ to keep Hannibal under control for the next 16 years. The cutting of Hannibal's supply lines and conducting raids and ambushes thinned out his reach, resulted in the loss of his allied land. Additionally, the Carthaginian Government failed to both maintain reliable manpower and support Hannibal. Throughout the course of the Second Punic War, “The Carthaginian Government’s failure to support Hannibal was extremely costly, especially considering they

Rome’s main military opposition was Carthage, a kingdom located on the northern coast of Africa. Carthage and Rome fought in a series of three wars known as the Punic Wars. The second Punic War, fought from 218-202 BC was led by Hannibal on the Carthaginian side and Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus with Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus on the Roman side. The Battle of Lake Trasimene 217 BC was a major battle in the Second Punic War. Under Hannibal, the Carthaginian army defeated the Romans, who were lead by the consul Gaius Flaminius. This battle helped the Carthaginians to bring the Romans close to defeat, Hannibal was able to execute his father Hamilcar’s strategy perfectly in this battle. In the Battle of Cannae, the Carthaginians were just as lucky. Rome’s larger army, under Lucius Aemilius Paullus and Gaius Terentius Varro, was efficiently and easily defeated by the Carthaginian forces. Though Carthage surprised Rome with many victories, the Punic War ended in 202 BC with the The Battle of Zama. Scipio lead the Roman army and defeated the Carthaginian army led by Hannibal. Though Hannibal's army had more men than Scipio's, and he had eighty elephants, Rome showed their superiority and skill in ending the Second Punic War with this battle. Many years after this, another kingdom of North Africa, Numidia, fostered a connection with Rome. King Jugurtha of this region was able to benefit from the Roman soldiers through bribery and connections with them.

The end of the second Punic war, carthage were forced to cede spain and the islands of the mediterranean still in their control, give up their navy, and pay taxes to Rome.

Hannibal was very successful in the numerous battles but he knew he would not take Rome. Hannibal turned to politics to gain the support of Rome's allies, but he did not receive enough. While Hannibal was moving through Italy Rome was preoccupied on another front. They had enter their Macedonian wars and were spread thin. For several years the two empire engaged in open battles, raids, and skirmishes. By 202 B.C., Hannibal's resources were depleted and he had no choice but to return and hold a defensive position against Rome. Rome regained a large amount of land through the peace treaty and Carthage lost the advantages they once

Hannibal was born in 247BCE, he was the son of a Carthaginian general named Hamilcar Barcareerred, who rallied his North African nation-state from defeat in the First Punic War (264–241 BC) to conquer much of Iberia. Hannibal grew up in military service, and following the 221 BC assassination of his brother-in-law Hasdrubal, who had replaced Hamilcar, Hannibal took charge of the Carthaginian army. He soon proved a brilliant field commander who applied his intellect and martial skills to the singular end of winning battles. Hannibal, a sworn enemy of all things Roman, declared war against them and this was the start of the Second Punic War (218–201 BC). Victory in Italy was Hannibal’s sole objective. To achieve it, he marched the bulk of his army in Iberia across southern Gaul and over the Alps into the Roman heartland. Hannibal’s strategy was to attack Rome. Although his tactics for battle were superior he had strategic failures which would eventually lead to his campaign in failure.

Finally on the 15th day, after a journey of five months from Cartagena, with 20,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry, and only a few of the original 38 elephants, Hannibal descended into Italy, having surmounted the difficulties of climate and terrain, the guerrilla tactics of inaccessible tribes, and the major difficulty of commanding a body of men diverse in race and language under conditions to which they were ill fitted (wsu.edu).      Hannibal's forces were now totally inadequate to match the army of Scipio, who had rushed to the Po River to protect the recently founded Roman colonies of Placentia (modern Piacenza) and Cremona. The first action between the two armies took place on the plains west of the Ticino River, and Hannibal's Numidian cavalry prevailed. Scipio was severely wounded, and the Romans withdrew to Placentia. After manoeuvres failed to lead to a second engagement, the combined armies of Sempronius Longus and Scipio met Hannibal on the left bank of the Trebia River south of Placentia and were soundly defeated (December 218). This victory brought both Gauls and Ligurians to Hannibal's side, and his army was considerably augmented by Celtic recruits. After a severe winter (in which he contracted an eye infection), he was able to advance in the spring of 217 as far as the Arno River (wsu.edu). Although two Roman armies were now in the field against him, he was able to outmanoeuvre that of Gaius Flaminius

Rome used its military aggressively. The Roman army had started from mainly farmers, and gaining new farming lands from other countries, for the its growing population or later retiring soldiers, was often one of the military’s main objectives. Only in the late Empire did the Roman military's goal become keeping control over its territories.

In 288 B.C. a group of mercenaries known as the Mamertines was hired by the city of Syracuse that was undergoing a revolt. Soon they were defeated by the loyal inhabitants of Syracuse and applied to both Rome and Carthage for assistance. Carthage, acting first, offered a garrison to protect the Mamertines, but they found this offer to be unappealing and turned to Rome to see their offer. However at this point in time the rivalry between Carthage and Rome became so fierce that there would be no feasible way to accept assistance from both powers, Rome acted by sending two legions to occupy Sicily and defeat the

In October of 218 BC, he crossed the Rhone river and ventured into what made him so famous. Snow was already on the high passes of the Alps. Hannibal started his march across the Alps with 40,000 men along with a calvary and a large number of war elephants carrying supplies. After the crossing only 26,000 of his troops were still alive due to the harsh weather and skirmishes with the local tribes. To make up for his losses, Hannibal recruited Gallic people of Northern Italy. In December 218 BC Hannibal got victories against Romans and secured the Padus Valley. In the spring of 217 BC Hannibal handed the Roman Counsel Gaius Flaminius, who was killed in battle, a huge loss at the battle of Lake Trasimene. After his victory Hannibal crossed the Apennines and invaded the Roman provinces of Picenu, and Apulia and then back into Campania. Instead of storming Rome, Hannibal marched through Italy in to Apulia and destroyed as he proceeded, but suffered heavy losses in manpower. Hannibal spent the winter of 217 BC in the Apulian plains and in the following summer faced a 54,000 strong Roman army. Hannibal circled around the Romans forcing them in to each other confusing the Romans, then easily destroyed then with his calvary. More than half of the Roman Army was lost. After that huge victory many Indian tribes aligned with Carthage. Syracuse left the Roman cause and Philip V of Macedon became an ally even though he never gave any aid. Many argue that Hannibal's

In this critique of Julius Caesar’s book, The Gallic War, I will be discussing the purpose and accuracy (or in this case, inaccuracy) over his adventures and military campaign against the Gallic tribes. There is a constant debate between historians: The Myth of Certainty. History is all about interpretation and finding truth out of subjectivity. History can often be lost in time as the firsthand accounts will eventually fade out. Even if firsthand accounts remains intact, it is not completely objective. Every person has their own agenda and is biased in one shape or form, no matter how much they try not to be; Julius Caesar is not an exception. I will start this critique by stating the author’s main purpose for writing his book. Secondly I will attempt to decipher the accuracy and inconsistency of Julius Caesar’s account. Finally, I will express my opinion over his commentaries over the Gallic War.

The military might of Rome was second to none in its prime. Victorious battle after battle did

The second Púnic war (herein after referred to as, “the War”) came to a close in 201 BCE, following Scípio’s victory over Hánnibal at the battle of Záma. After seventeen years of warfare, and at a great loss of life on both sides, Rome defeated Cárthage and came out on top as the new superpower in the Mediterránean region. The outcome of this war brought consequences to Cárthage and created opportunities for Rome (Morey, 1901).