Health Alternatives Aids Task Force

2. The outcome of this issue is governed by Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965) Outrageous Conduct Causing Severe Emotional Distress. The elements of this cause of action are (1) the wrongdoer's conduct was intentional or reckless, that is, he intended his behavior when he knew or should have known that emotional distress would likely result; (2) the conduct was outrageous, that is, as to go beyond all bounds of decency, and to be regarded as odious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community; (3) the conduct caused the emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress was severe.

Can plaintiff Ron Arnett state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) under Pennsylvania law given that Arnett was located twenty feet from the accident that injured Sarah Nolan, saw Ricky Landis running toward the pool and realized immediately after the impact what had happened, but viewed the impact while underwater; and though they share an emotional bond, Arnett and Nolan are not biologically or legally related?

Issue: Under Kentucky tort law, does intentional infliction of emotional distress occur when a person suffers severe insomnia and anxiety as a result of witnessing a friend¡¦s child being injured by a vehicle that is out of control due to being driven at a high rate

Yandrich v. Radic, plaintiff was not successful in his claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff’s father committed suicide allegedly due to his depression from another son being killed by a car. 495 A.2d 460, 246 (Pa. 1981). The Court found that the father was not a witness because he was not in the immediate vicinity of the accident, and thus could not find for the plaintiff in this case. The differences between Yandrich and Ms. Nordlund’s claim outweigh their legal similarities, as the father in Yandrich did not see the scene of the accident like Ms. Nordlund did. Ms. Nordlund’s poor vision is a weakness in her claim, but having heard and seen the accident, (despite her blurry vision), may be strong enough to overcome

In her complaint, the Parents allege that the Defendants are liable to her on a theory of Intentional Inflection of Emotional Distress (“IIED”). “IIED claims are ‘rarely viable in a case brought under Maryland law.’” Takacs v. Fiore, 473 F. Supp. 2d 647, 652 (D. Md. 2007) (quoting Robinson v. Cutchin, 140 F. Supp. 2d 488, 494 (D. Md. 2001)). In order for an IIED allegation to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) The conduct must be intentional or reckless; (2) The conduct must be extreme and outrageous; (3) There must be a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress; [and] (4) The emotional distress must be severe.” Lasater v. Guttman, 194 Md. App. 431, 448 (2010).

The Plaintiff, Keller, sued the defendant, DeLong. DeLong was driving Kellers car at Tyngsboro, Massachusetts at approximately 11:40p.m. on April 14, 1963, DeLong collided with a utility pole at the side of the highway. The Trial Court ruled that the sole cause of the accident was the fact that the defendant dozed off to sleep and did not awaken in time to avoid collision with the pole. The driver showed no sign he was going to fall asleep. Defendant, Carl DeLong, suddenly and unexpectedly dozed at the time of the occurrence of the accident. Defendant, DeLong, was not found negligent. Vacated; reversed, affirming trial court’s judgment.

“A factor, by itself, may not be sufficient to cause injury but if, with other factors, it materially contributes to causing injury, it is clearly a cause of injury.”. This quote, stated by Lord Salmon in McGhee v National Coal Board is an example of the difficulty that can arise when determining if a defendant had materially contributed to the plaintiff 's injury when the medical evidence is inconclusive. It is argued that the material contribution test has changed the path of the law and as we will see when analysing both McGhee and Fairchild, it has blurred the distinction between legal and factual causation.

Intentional infliction of emotional distress - the Court states that because Texas law places a duty on Briles and McCaw, the Plaintiff 's negligence claim will fill any gaps.

Nurse Rodgers did not know the substantial risk of harm. She was uninformed and ill-trained when she analyzed the x-ray. Negligent about potential risks, she mistakenly did not perform a follow-up examination and promptly diagnosed Jones’ wrist as a sprain. She did, however, give him a brace. A brace that Emerson Jones did not wear on his own accord when he was playing basketball perfectly fine, as testified by Senior Guard Burgundy and Emerson Jones himself. It was for that reason that Nurse Rodgers’ negligently denied Emerson Jones medical

Alex Johnson was injured as a result of Craig's negligence, which he admitted to and settled. Alex's injuries were not caused by Bethlehem Ice Solutions. There is a clear case for contributory negligence, because both skiers were at fault, Alex for the assumption of risk and Craig for breach of duty of care because he failed to take precautions on the ski slopes.

Several questions were raised by the defendant after his trial, which resulted in him filing an appeal of his conviction. Although he admitted to shooting Mr. Villella, Kusmider alleged that there was negligence upon the EMT’s for failing to properly restrain Mr. Villella while being transported to the hospital. During the trial, “a pathologist testified that Mr. Villella’s death was caused by the gunshot wound to his throat, however, the wound could have been survivable (Brody & Acker, 2010, p.116). The issue of proximate causation came about during Kusmider v. State (1984). Judge Johnstone “precluded Kusmider from pursuing the issue of proximate cause before the jury as he ruled that negligent failure to provide approximate medical assistance could not interrupt the proximate causation” (Kusmider v. State, 1984).

The first option is to determine whose negligent driving caused the accident between Deb and Abe. Although Cal’s injuries were minor from the initial crash, without this action, Ann would have not hit the two cars injuring Cal further and losing his legs. Since Cal was in the car with Abe and could see his actions, it can be assumed that Deb was the negligible drive that caused the collision. It would be recommended that Cal and Abe collaborate to bring a law suit against Deb for negligible

The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress has four elements: 1. the defendant must act intentionally or recklessly; 2. the defendant's conduct must be extreme and outrageous; and 3. the conduct must be the cause 4. of severe emotional distress. This is exactly what happened din this case. Steve Steel not only knocked the phone out of Prudence’s hand but also broke down the door and threatened Prudence with force and made her scared for her life. I do believe that negligence is a part of this case. A person who engages in activities that pose an unreasonable risk toward others and their property that actually results in harm, breaches their duty of reasonable care. Steve Steel did not show a proper care of duty with Prudence. I think that Steve Steel should also be responsible for all of the physical and mental damages since he did not show reasonable care. I think the tort liability in this case would be assault and battery. An assault involves three things that we see in this case. An assault occurs when an intentional, unlawful threat or "offer" to cause bodily injury to another by force; under circumstances which create in the other person a well-founded fear of imminent peril; where there exists the apparent present ability to carry out the act if not prevented. A battery is the willful or intentional touching of a person against that person’s will by another person, or by an object or

In this case, the accident is the proximate cause of Mrs. Smith’s injuries and the medical providers are the intervening cause, as their breach of duty exacerbated Mrs. Smith’s injury to the point of permanent disability and disfigurement.

It is apparent that Steven was not paying enough attention when crossing the road on the night of the accident. Thus, Steven was, to a degree, also negligent as he did not adequately check that the road was clear. When deciding the degree of contributory negligence the courts must look at what reduction of damages pay-out is "just and equitable having regard 's to the claimant 's share in the responsibility for the damage". In order to reach a percentage of blameworthiness for each side, a broad comparison must be made of both the individual contributions from the pursuer and the defender, looking at both the causation of damage and the blameworthiness.