Helen Palsgraf, Respondent, v

It is the government’s ordained and foremost right to provide its citizens with reliable protection and security, especially in the face of an emergency. However, the government’s failure to provide equitable care, causing damage, injury, or death, results in legal negligence, or a person not acting to their given standard resulting in damage. In the case of Riss v. The City of New York, Linda Riss experienced negligent conduct from the New York City police department when, after she was repeatedly threatened by a rejected suitor, they did nothing to protect her until after she was mutilated with acid. With protection and ongoing investigation, Riss would have been kept safe under the responsibility that the police failed to adhere to.

Social value of the defendants action is took into consideration in certain cases. If the purpose of the actions took by the defendant is of value to society, abnormal risk is justified. In Watt vs Hertfordshire 1954, a victim was trapped under a vehicle at the scene of a road accident, A heavy duty jack was needed to lift the vehicle but the vehicle used to transport it was unavailable. Whilst holding the jack on place on a vehicle unsuitable for the transportation, a fireman injured his back. The fireman sued his employers for negligence but failed in his actions because the social values of the defendants’ action were valuable as lives were at risk.

Mr. Foster is student at Jacksonville State University. 2014 was his second year at Jacksonville, and he was taking a year off from studies to work and save money. Mr. Foster had gone home to Georgia for Christmas, but was returning to Jacksonville to pick up some Christmas gifts he had left at his apartment. He had stopped at Walmart in Jacksonville and was headed to his apartment in the late afternoon. He thinks he may have dosed off at the wheel he rounded a curve off of the town square, and “next thing I know” the traffic light was red and his vehicle struck the vehicle of the plaintiff. Mr. Foster concedes running a red light, but says it was raining and the asphalt was slick.

The plaintiff accompanied his son and son’s friend and knowing the fact that the driver (McNeilly) is inexperienced so he drove himself where the road was hilly and difficult while he allowed both the defendant and his son occasionally for some drive spells when it was clear two lane track with no obvious corrugations.

In our analogy I may choose to move through a city where laws exist. If I break any of those laws, I may suffer consequences. However, the consequences affect me independently of my being aware of the violated laws that bring them about. In this analogy, I could be ignorant of natural laws; driving at excessive speed may take my car off of a cliff, and the horrible accident may take my ability to move away from me through severe injury or the loss of my life. My irresponsibility may not have been severe enough to have caused a mishap, but I may have been in violation of imposed rules or law, as in driving recklessly or speeding too fast. In this case governing authorities, themselves, necessary extensions of the imposition of law, may choose to imprison me after making a determination of my intentions and my cognizance of the law. Such imprisonment will deny me of the fourth principle, the unfettered power of choice. Through imposed law, I can be denied my ability to move even though my careless actions may not have been serious enough for me to have denied that ability to myself through the effects of a incapacitating

Today, I am presented with a case that puts in question the violation of individual’s Fourth Amendment rights. This case also puts in question the rights of the authority placed in our streets, neighborhoods and towns to perform actions directed towards certain citizens in an effort to serve and protect the overall population. There must be a careful analysis in order to interpret the records of the incident that occurred to conclude who holds the most justified position in this case under the applicable laws. The Court of Appeals of the State of New York must also take into careful consideration the circumstances discussed and the ruling given by the District Court assigned to this case, which I

Historically, the transferred intent doctrine has been applied to five intentional torts. The five torts are battery, assault, false imprisonment, trespass to chattel, and trespass to land. Under transferred intent, if the defendant intends any of these five torts, but her acts, instead or in addition, result in any of the other five intentional torts, the defendant is liable, even though she did not intend the other tort. The transferred intent rule may have emerged because these five torts were historically associated with a single action for trespass. The concept of trespass was not limited to the contemporary meaning of trespass to land, but embodied many types of direct injuries. It is important, consequently, Torts, is a large area of private law concerned with compensating those who have been injured by the wrongdoing of others to recognize that courts have applied the concept only to these five intentional torts. The law of torts is mainly judge-made law; courts over the centuries have defined people 's rights and obligations with respect to their fellows. These are constantly in flux and change to meet new technological and social concerns. The example for our case would be the case law of Donoghue v. Stevenson. This is one of the most important cases in English tort law history. The judges determined that each citizen has a duty of care for his or her fellow citizens where it is

Applicant (Geico) proved that Respondent 2 (USAA) impacted the rear of their insureds vehicle by failing to maintain proper distance and control. Applicant (Geico) did not prove that Respondent 2 (USAA) pushed them into Respondent 1 (Geico) vehicle. Review of the statements obtained by both Applicant (Geico) and Respondent 2 (USAA) from Respondent 1 (Geico) indicate that Applicant (Geico) impacted the rear of Respondent 1's (Geico) vehicle prior to Respondent 2 (USAA) impacting the rear of Applicant's (Geico) vehicle. Respondent 1 (Geico) stated he felt only one impact from the Applicant (Geico) vehicle and who was not pushed back into them. Review of the Applicants (Geico) vehicle photos indicates Applicant (Geico) was braking at the time

The law did not protect us. And now, in your time, the law has come an excuse for stopping and frisking you, which is to say, for furthering the assault on your body (Coates p. 17)

The defendant’s mother owned the property, where he removed a gun from his belt and threw it under a bush as he fled from approaching police. The court found that a public easement gives the right to the public of freedom of use and should be enjoyed without any infringing action by the owner of the freeholding land. Marrow at 11. In this case, the interaction occurred on a public easement. The interaction occurred on the strip between the sidewalk and street. The strip includes a city-owned fire hydrant and a tree that was paid for and owned by the city. It is necessary that a resident seek permission to cut down any tree. The land is a public easement because it has city-owned trees and fire hydrants. The police officers were on the public easement in the interaction with Mr. Pitt. Mr. Pitt may argue that, because he takes care of the land and is the owner of the freeholding land, it is not a public easement. However, the city has access to the land and Mr. Pitt must comply with the public’s right to freedom of use of the easement. The court would find that the interaction between the officers and Mr. Pitt occurred on a public

The plaintiff, Mrs. Palsgraf, stood on a Long Island Railroad train platform after buying a ticket for her desired trip. Around the same time, two men ran to catch their departing train. The first man made it safely into the train as it was moving. The second man was carrying a nondescript package that was wrapped with newspaper, and had trouble getting onto the train. Two workers of the Long Island Railroad tried to help him into the train, one by pulling him in the train car and the other by pushing him from behind. During this process, the man dropped the package onto the train tracks, which caused an explosion due to the unknown fact that it was filled with fireworks. The explosion on the tracks caused the scales on the other side of the platform to fall and injure Mrs. Palsgraf.

Instead of confining itself simply to the mischief which the statute was intended to correct, the court resolves ambiguities by reference to the statute’s overall purpose. Indeed, many modern statutes are not simply intended to correct mischiefs in the common law but have a wider social agenda. Under the purposive approach the courts should try to give effect to this wider statutory purpose in interpreting ambiguous provisions in statutes. For the purposive approach the example case can be Knowles v Liverpool City Council (1993). Knowles was employed by the Council and was injured at work whilst handling a defective flagstone. He claimed damages from them under the Employers’ Liability (Defective Equipment) Act 1969. The Council claimed that they were not liable as a flagstone could not be “equipment” within the Act. The House of Lords held that it could. The purpose of the statute was to protect employees from exposure to dangerous materials. The words “equipment” should be interpreted in this context. The Council were therefore liable for Knowles’ injuries (Paul, 2002).

This paper will be discussing the concept of strict liability along with the concept of absolute liability within the R. v. Sault Ste. Marie (1978). In doing so, this paper will explain how strict liability offences strike a good balance between the policy rationales for absolute liability in regulatory offences and the criminal law principle that only the morally blameworthy may be punished, and how the courts have interpreted absolute liability offence and their relationship with the Charter of Rights.

The first point to note when analysing occupiers’ liability is that originally it was separate to the general principles of negligence which were outlined in Donoghue v Stevenson .The reason for this “pigeon hole approach” was that the key decision of occupiers’ liability, Indermaur v Dames was decided sixty six years prior to the landmark decision of Donoghue v Stevenson . McMahon and Binchy state the reason why it was not engulfed into general negligence, was because it “… had become too firmly entrenched by 1932 … to be swamped by another judicial cross-current” Following on from Indermaur v Dames the courts developed four distinct categories of entrant which I will now examine in turn.

The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom’s decision in Mohamud represents a subtle yet fundamental change to the area of vicarious liability. Vicarious liability derives from a combination of legal principles and judicial discretion. It is not the result of a clearly developed, logical legal principle . The moving landscape of vicarious liability, as evidenced in Mohamud, can be attributed largely to the courts desire to protect vulnerable plaintiffs. This has occurred by liberal application of existing legal principles and expansive use of judicial discretion.