Hobbes on Institutional Sovereignty

1088 WordsJul 17, 20185 Pages
A right, or power, institutional sovereignty is said to have addresses protest against the sovereign. Hobbes makes extremely clear that actions of the instituted sovereign are wholly protected. This particularly lucid in the following: Thirdly, because the major part hath by consenting voices declared a sovereign, he that dissented mu8st now consent with the rest . . . or else be justly destroyed by the rest. For if he voluntarily entered into the congregation of them that were assembled, he sufficiently declared thereby his will . . . to stand there to what the major part should ordain; and therefore, if he refuse to stand thereto, or make protestation . . . he does contrary to the covenant, and therefore unjustly . . . he must submit…show more content…
It is also important to note that Hobbes brings to light the solvency, or legality, of both types of sovereignty, as both are rooted in fear. That is to say, it is held that “ . . .all such covenants as proceed from fear of death or violence [are] void,” meaning neither sovereignty should maintain legitimacy. However, Hobbes reconciles this by stating that it is after sovereignty is established that fear of death or violence cannot oblige people to agree. (127) Furthermore, simple the presence of fear cannot invalidate covenants, as commonwealths would be impossible to create. (127) Combined with the fact that there exists choice in both institutional and acquisitioned sovereignty, there is support for the legal groundings of both and they are consequently placed on equal footing for asserting their relative claims of right. (128) With regard to the claims of right sovereignty through acquisition has, it shares all of those demonstrated in institutional sovereignty. Hobbes lists these rights that are reflected in sovereignty by acquisition: But the rights and consequences of sovereignty are the same in both. His power cannot, without his consent, be transferred to another; he cannot forfeit it; he cannot be accused by any of his subjects of injury; he cannot be punished by them; he is judge of what is necessary for peace, and judge of doctrines; he is sole legislator, and supreme judge of controversies, and of the
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