How Did Australia Contribute To The Battle Of Kokoda

The Kokoda campaign was the more physically demanding and dangerous campaign. The trek the Australian soldiers had to do from Port Mosby to Gona and Muna was a trail that even the most experienced hiker would have been challenged by. Let alone the Australian troops that were manned there were not the most experienced or well-trained soldiers, with most of them being young teenagers that were expendable. The climate was hot and 100% humidity everyday. Also having thick mud plagued with

On the 9th of February 1942, three divisions of Japanese soldiers landed in Singapore, which was at the time a major British military base and presence in the Pacific. Six days later, over 90 000 British, Australian and Indian troops were forced to surrender. It had been believed that Singapore guaranteed the security of Australia during the war, consequently, the fall of Singapore opened Australia to invasion. The fall of Singapore was significant in causing relations between Australia and the United States to increase as in lieu of Britain’s inability to provide economic and military assistance when it was required most, the United States’ capability to provide what Britain could not was instrumental in strengthening bonds.

Kokoda was an insignificant campaign that didn’t have a major impact on the result of the war in comparison to the

The Battle of Kokoda is remembered as being the most significant battle fought by the Australian’s in World War II. Prior to World War II Australian’s realized if if Japan wanted to strike into Southeast Asia to secure raw materials they could easily do as Britain was preoccupied by a European War. Australians were afraid of the looming invasion from the Japanese. The advancement of the Japanese attacking the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor in December 1941 was shocking to the western world. They also secured the Malay Peninsula with the fall of Singapore by February 1942. Their next planned to advance to Port Moresby weaken the Allied line of communication from the United States to Australia.

The Battle of Pozieres is known as one of Australian soldiers’ greatest sacrificial conflicts. To understand the sacrifice involved, it is firstly important to outline what the tactics of the Australian defence force were in their attack on the Germans. Secondly, the response of the German forces is significant to understand the conflict at Pozieres. Thirdly, a comparison of the performance of the Allies and the opponent is explored, analysing the significance of both parties strategies in practice. Finally, an exploration of the factors which determined the final outcome is conducted to understand the battle further and the consequence for both sides. Thus, it is revealed the significance of the Battle of Pozieres for Australia, and the overall effect the won

The entry of Japan into World War was accompanied by a shifting relationship between England and Australia. Up until the fall of Singapore on the 15th of February 1942, England enjoyed the unconditional support of Australia in fighting the war in Europe. The fall of Singapore and Britain’s subsequent surrender in the region brought the war closer than ever to Australia. This new perspective on the war resulted in a reconsideration of Australia’s position in the commonwealth and forged a new relationship with America. In order to understand these changing perspectives, it is essential to look at Australia’s relationship with England pre-World War 2, why Australia looked to America, how America responded to Australia’s appeal for support and subsequent changes to Australia’s foreign policy.

An Overview In the years since 1945, it has become increasingly evident that the Grand Alliance forged between the British Commonwealth and the United States was often beset with disagreement over the correct strategy to insure the final defeat of the Axis powers. Early on, both British and American staffs could agree that Germany represented a greater military threat than Japan, but they did not often see eye to eye on the strategy that would most efficiently defeat the Reich.

General histories of the war, which examine the war's origins, military history, and consequences, include John Keegan, The Second World War (1989); C.L. Sulzberger and Stephen E. Ambrose, American Heritage New History of World War II (1997); and Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II (1994). Valuable reference works include I.C.B. Dear and M.R.D. Foot, eds., The Oxford Companion to the Second World War (1995); John Ellis, World War II: A Statistical Survey (1993); and John Keegan, ed., The Times Atlas to the Second World War (1989). To understand the war's

Singapore was also renowned known for its strategic location within South East Asia and capturing the base would provide a significant boost in capabilities of naval invasions to other islands (Bergland, 2014, Online). Taking over Singapore would have crippled the Allies’ offensive capabilities within the South East Asian and Pacific regions while Japan could proceed to invade the oil rich islands of the Dutch East Indies with much more ease and less fear of counter-attack. On the 8th of February 1942, the Japanese put this strategy into effect and invaded. General Tomoyuki Yamashita, nicknamed “The Tiger of Malaya”, was in command of the Battle of Singapore, he and his soldiers were outnumbered at a one to three ratio. His men were also limited to just two bowls of rice each and 100 rounds of ammunition a day. Yamashita’s strategy, or more famously known as “Yamashita’s Bluff”, was an ingenious tactic to fool the Allies into believing the Japanese had more troops, supplies and equipment than what the soldiers really had. Yamashita himself also stated “My attack on Singapore was a bluff – a bluff that worked. I had 30,000 men and was outnumbered more than three to one. I knew that if I had to fight for long for Singapore, I would be beaten. That is why the surrender had to be at once...” (Ron Taylor, 2011, Online) Soon however Yamashita’s bluff had paid off as he and his men marched into Singapore

Australia and Japan. Once world war enemies, the two nation states’ relationship has grown considerably in the past 7 decades to become mutually invested economic and strategic partners. However, although there are numerous benefits to seeking a security alliance with Japan, both now and in the future, Australia should not seek such an arrangement. There are multiple reasons behind this strategy including Australia not taking a side in the rivalry between China and Japan and because the mutual security ally of both nations - the United States - provides them with an already-existing quasi-alliance. This essay will be utilising the following definitions from the oxford dictionary: 1) Security alliance defined as a formal agreement or treaty between two or more nations to cooperate for security purposes. 2) Remilitarisation is to re-equip with armed forces, military supplies, or the like. This essay will discuss the costs and benefits associated with Australia seeking a security alliance with the slowly remilitarising Japan and illustrate why such an arrangement is an attractive and viable option. First,

We stopped quite regularly and for supplies and to rest where quite regular and once every 6-7 hours and we would normally stop in the closest town for the night, to rest, eat and prepare for the next day. So it took us just under 4 days to get to Melbourne. That’s where the war really started for us. Suddenly we knew why they chose Tasmania over a place like Melbourne. It was infested; we where on the freeway on the outskirts of the city, but from this distance we could still see the smoke. As we got closer we decided to get off the freeway and go into some backstreets, reasons being that they where packed with cars, and the occasional zach, we figured that they all went into the city. Our destination was Port Melbourne, where we were told there would be a boat waiting for us.

The US-Australia alliance under ANZUS has widespread and bipartisan support as one of the key pillars of Australian foreign policy (Brereton, 2001:347, see also Fraser, 2005:345). The alliance is also reflective of the continuing persuasion of middle power diplomacy in Australian international relations regardless of Liberal claims not to adhere to the doctrine for one characteristic of middle powers includes using niche opportunities to exercise influence and power to affect outcomes in favour of their national interest (Ungerer, 2007:540). For Australia, this opportunity appeared during post-WWII US-Japanese Peace Treaty negotiations, ‘the Australian Government was insistent that [it] would not sign unless [it] had a defence relationship with the United States… Without that leverage, ANZUS would not have existed’ (Fraser, 2005:334). Although Downer does not explicitly approve of the framing Australia as a middle power, it cannot be ignored that his view that the US-alliance ‘…gives Australia much greater weight and relevance... [and] carry more weight in Washington in regional

Australia and Japan expressed their interest in signing a defence technology cooperation agreement after Japanese Prime Minister Abe and Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott ’s meeting during Abe’s visit to Australia in July (Prime Minister of Australia 2014). This is surprising for the international society as the Japanese constitution did not allow Japan to export its military technologies until the Japanese government’s recent change to Article 9 (Nye 2014). Even though the agreement is not signed yet, this news had attracted many attention from around the globe. There are various kinds of explanations and analyzations on why this two states would choose to release such information at this time. The argument for this essay would be that the defence technology cooperation agreement may be one of the many policies that aims on making Japan a normal country, in response in the rising power of China and the threats from Korea, so that it can play a better role in balancing regional security. This essay will try to prove this argument by briefly introducing why Japan is not a normal country within the international society and Prime Minister Abe’s recent efforts to change this situation, how a defence technology cooperation agreement between Australia and Japan can play a critical role on this matter, why Japan and Australia are considering choose to sign such agreement with each other, and the incentives for Australia to support Japan’s goal of strengthening its military

The author stated about the emphasis about planning a strategy attack of Japan in Southeast Asia, including Malaya. This book explained about the attack of Japanese army towards Tanah Melayu simultaneously on 7 and 8 December 1941. The author also discussed about the causes of the Japanese attack in Tanah Melayu which recognized with purposes for getting raw materials to industries such as oil, tin ore, and iron ore. In addition, the Japanese also need industrial output or to export their product into the trade market which needed raw materials and labors. Japanese army attacked from the air of the southern Thai namely Kota Bharu and then heading to south namely Kuala Lumpur and Singapore. Japanese army take approximately 70 days in killing all defense British army assisted by Indian and Australian army.. There is also explained about the British army that had approximately 140,000 people can be easily killed by the Japanese army that approximately about 100,000 people. Among the causes of the defeat of the British army is their confidence in terms of strategic oversight. They are so sure that Japanese army will not attack from the North but will attack from the South from the sea, but the Japanese actually attacking from the North and British army were fooled. Besides, British army is also not very good

All these precise planning made by the Japanese army was the cause of the poor leadership of LT. GEN Arthur Percival. Percival failed in his judgment and was complacent as he underestimate the capability of the enemy, thinking that they are less likely able to attack from the North West due to the tough terrain. This area of the island was mostly mangrove swamp and jungle, broken by rivers and creeks. The British had confidently predicted that the Japanese would attack from the sea. This explained why all the defences on Singapore pointed out to sea. It was inconceivable to British military planners that the island could be attacked any other way – least of all, through the jungle and mangrove swamps of the Malay Peninsula. Therefore, the defence on the North West of Singapore was weak as the Australian forces deployed there was small and the terrain have prohibited the allies in their construction of defence obstacles and also reduction in their fields of fire. Besides, he was also fearfully aware that an attack could come from any corner: land, sea, or air, therefore, he fatally dispersed his forces.