How Did Sokolovsky's Respond To The Berlin Blockade

In 1946, George Kennan sent a “long telegram to the Us State department depicting the Soviets as driven to expand Communism. The following month, Churchill gave his “Iron Curtain” speech, further instilling fears of the spread of Communism (632). Throughout 1946 and 1947 the Soviets backed multiple Communist takeovers in Europe, justifying American concerns of Soviet militance (632). President Truman issued the Truman Doctrine to assure free nations economic support to resist Communist attacks. Shortly after, the Marshall plan was signed to further instill US economic aid in Europe, expanding US influence. In order to oppose the strong American moves, the Soviets cut off all traffic into Berlin. The allies responded by airlifting supplies to help those in need within the blockade (633). As tensions rose with the Berlin Blockade, the US enacted the National Security Act which created the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council. Along with other legislation, the NSA contributed to a large push for defense of democracy (633). The US, along with Canada and ten other European Nations, signed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949 to create a strong alliance of democratic nations. The

The United States entered World War Two in late 1941, and right away they were thrown into a conflict that involved making important decisions that would affect generations of people, in the United States and elsewhere, for years to come. A most notable decision by the Allies, namely the United States and Great Britain, was the combining of the American and British military chiefs of staff. This joint collaboration was appropriately titled the “Combined Chiefs of Staff”. They worked together as one body, and made war planning decisions and strategized together. This type of alliance was an innovation in war planning for the time, and the decisions made collaboratively by the two powers contributed greatly to the Allied victory in 1945. The relationships involved and the disputes that came up are worth noting, specifically the question of the Allies opening up a second front in the west, particularly titled “Operation Sledgehammer”. The relationship between President Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, as well as General George Marshall of the United States and General Sir Alan Brooke of Great Britain were the main actors involved in this undertaking, and they will be the main individuals discussed and analyzed for the purposes of this paper. Ultimately Operation Sledgehammer was delayed and no action was taken upon it. Even though it caused rifts between the USSR, for reasons that will be explained, and the Allies far into the future, in retrospect they may have been

The Invasion was destined to fail from the beginning due to the CIA’s plan being backed on false intelligence. From the Bay of Pigs Invasion, the mass exchange of communist ideas would begin, deepening the Cold War and attributing to the pressure and strain placed upon the United States and Russian foreign relations. Failure and doubt in the United States lead to the exploration of new policy and political ideology, as well as a new era in intelligence, political, and military fields, that continues to affect the domestic and foreign policy of today's

When one can truly understand and uncover the meaning behind these articles and how they fit into one or more of the ‘boxes’ we call paradigms and perspectives. In order to dissect and analyze the case of the Cold War, especially its origins, one must not only skim through the text and uncover main ideas, but also must also relate the readings to these paradigms and establish one’s own ideals and opinions regarding the study of international relations. Personally, I believe the articles associated with the origins of the Cold War along with Professor Katzenstein’s lecture on the topic provide strong arguments for the use of a ‘middle fish’ perspective and a ‘big fish’ paradigm: domestic politics and realism, respectively. Through George Kennan’s personal accounts, experience and analysis at both the time of the Cold War’s inception and forty-plus years later after the fall of the Soviet Union, a point is made regarding the nature of Soviet expansion as an offensive maneuver, which he believed must be contained by a defensive strategy. This point of conflicting strategies by the U.S. and (especially) the Soviet Union provides the reader with a realist argument and perspective. Also, in his second piece, which details remarks made to the Council on Foreign Relations in 1994, Kennan explains that instead of whole-heartedly adopting

Our analysis would be based on scholarly journals by Melvin Small and Geoffrey Warner, with one going against both the containment and detente policies while the second would actually consider Kissinger as being the savior of the Nation from exiting the war, dirty. Towards the end, we have Thornton book review of Savienery and rather considering that the containment policy actually made a big difference on the outcomes of the war.

The Kennedy Doctrine, which was to “Respond flexibly to communist expansion, especially guerrilla warfare” (Roskin & Berry, 2010, p. 58), was executed in this history-making event to the letter. Kennedy could have, and had the power to cease the unfolding events with an all out air strike on the Soviet Union. Some say it is due to bureaucratic politics and the accessibility of information that was provided to the National Security Council by the CIA and air force that this did not occur. In responding flexibly to what The Soviet Union and Cuba were planning, America assessed the volatile situation, forethought possible outcomes and negated all their options albeit under a tight time constraint. America’s forces were mobilized and ready to strike, had word been given nuclear war was on the cards. Kennedy wanted to give The Soviet Union an out and put a halt to a possible war, rethink the situation and allow an alternative to occur. Due to this diplomacy, The Soviet Union entered into negotiations “the Kremlin offered a deal: no Soviet missiles in Cuba if Washington promised not to invade” (Roskin & Berry, 2010, p. 87). By using the flexible response tactic, Kennedy was

In the early phase of the Cold War, both superpowers, the US and the USSR, had to face the threat of rising tensions and rivalries between each other. They wanted to prevent the expansion of hostile ideologies and simultaneously act in favour of their own interests. Such desires, in the example of the US, resulted in the establishment and subsequent development of the policies of containment and brinkmanship. Generally, the former was operating on the principle that communist governments will eventually fall apart as long as they are prevented from expanding their influence and it was adopted by H.S. Truman’s administration in 1947. While the

After World War 2, faith in the United States government was at an all time high. A brief, superficial, and weak understanding of the history on the aftermath of World War 2 leads the reader to understand that not only did the United States help defeat the evil Nazis, the fascist Italians, and the imperial Japanese. In the wake of World War 2, the United States of America ended up cementing itself as a world power – if not the world power, usurping the empty throne previously held by Great Britain and subsequently sharing it with the Soviet Union. Yet as is typical, there can never be two champions. There can never be two reigning super victors – one of the two powers had to lose. So began the conflict that never was, the cold war – a global chess match of attrition. Neither the USSR nor the USA would outright engage in conflicts with one another, but in the thirst and pursuit for more influence and power, they continually opposed each other through pawn states on a global scale for approximately 44 years. This type of warfare was known as ‘proxy’ warfare, and though the dates specifically for the Cold War are not known, the common dates for the war range from 1947 to 1991. With this understanding, it can also be inferred that it was not just a war for power, it was a war of ideologies.

The British troops helping the Grecian government were strangled of supplies due to poor economic times in Britain. Also, further territorial requisitions to Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria were being made. Seeing the deteriorating U.S. - Soviet relations, Truman issued two statements about "agreements, violations, reparations, and Soviet actions threatening U.S. security." "1.

With this book, a major element of American history was analyzed. The Cold War is rampant with American foreign policy and influential in shaping the modern world. Strategies of Containment outlines American policy from the end of World War II until present day. Gaddis outlines the policies of presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon, including policies influenced by others such as George Kennan, John Dulles, and Henry Kissinger. The author, John Lewis Gaddis has written many books on the Cold War and is an avid researcher in the field. Some of his other works include: The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War

George Kennan did not make any detailed policy recommendations in the Long Telegram of 1946, although he made it clear that he did not regard the Soviet Union as the same type of threat as Nazi Germany. He opposed the ideas of National Security Council Memorandum 68 (1950) as a hysterical overreaction, and thought that global containment was a serious strategic error, especially in peripheral regions like Indochina. Unlike Hitler, Stalin's aggression and expansion were unplanned and opportunistic, and its leaders did not wish to risk a general war with the West. For this reasons, the Soviets were highly sensitive to the "logic of force" and would retreat if confronted with resolution (Kennan 1946). Internally, it was a police state ruled by a Communist Party oligarchy and bureaucracy, but one that was always insecure in its power. Although Marxism had no real emotional appeal to the masses, the elites were guided by the assumption that the imperialist powers were always attempting to encircle the Soviet Union and that the contradictions within capitalism would always lead to wars. They would attempt to exploit these differences within the capitalist nations, while at the same time attempting to weaken their hold on the colonial areas. Kennan was well aware that the main problem in Western Europe was war-weariness and economic insecurity, and the U.S. would have to take the lead in reviving these countries or the "Russians certainly will" (Kennan 1946). In this case, though,

Soviet leaders probably did not enjoy reading George Kennan’s famous “Long Telegram,” abbreviated LT for short. A 1946 State Department cable sent from the American embassy in Moscow to Washington, D.C., the LT provided the intellectual foundations for the U.S. policy of containment. Although containment did not necessarily advise officials to eradicate communism’s existing footholds, the policy did make the Cold War “hot” in many countries in an attempt to stop communism’s spread – Vietnam (1965 – 1973), Korea (1950 – 1953), and Greece (1946 – 1949), to name a few. Somewhat less importantly from a policy standpoint (but arguably more so for the individual kingpins within Russia), the LT attacked the USSR’s leaders on a personal level, calling

The traditional, orthodox interpretation places the responsibility of the Cold War on Stalin’s personality and on communist ideology. It claims that as long as Stalin and the authoritarian government were in power, a cold war was unavoidable. It argues that Stalin violated agreements that he had made at Yalta, imposed Soviet policy on Eastern European countries aiming at political domination and conspired to advocate communism throughout the world. As a result, United States officials were forced to respond to Soviet aggression with foreign policies such as the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. Yet revisionists argue that there was “no proof of Stalin promoting communism outside Russia” and that Stalin’s decisions were first and foremost, pro-Soviet and not of communist intentions. Up until 1947, it is evident through Marshall Plan as well as statements and interviews made by Stalin that he was still thinking of cooperation with the United States, Britain and France. Despite post-war conflicts and instability of Soviet-American relations, the USSR’s initial embrace of the Marshall Plan at its announcement expressed

This caused the US to believe that Soviets had mainly expansionist aims. The US was “not prepared to see the opportunity for future investment [in Eastern Europe] foreclosed” (Crockatt 67) and this belief sparked the development of the containment policy directed by George Kennan, outlined in the Long Telegram (Lightbody 5). In addition, “the west had to oppose the Soviet Union for its own survival” (Lightbody 5) as the nuclear race between the US and USSR ensued and the USSR strived to equal the already well-established program of the US. This tension did not recede as Soviets sent spies into the US Manhattan Project, the nuclear development program (Lightbody 5). When the Soviets refused to join the Baruch Plan – which controlled nuclear weapon development – the USSR became even more openly viewed as a threat to US security. The growth of communism in Asia within the countries of Korea, Vietnam, and China along with tensions between the “Iron Curtain,” or divide, between Eastern and Western Europe also contributed to increasing threat towards capitalism and the Cold War’s inevitability.

The historian’s belonging to this school see the Truman doctrine from 1947 as the point when the Cold War started. They put the responsibility for the Cold War on the Soviet Union and its expansionist policy. According to them, this is the reason, why Soviets broke promises from the negotiations during the World War II, especially the Yalta agreement. On the other hand, the U.S. politicians wanted to continue the cooperation between the Allies even after the defeat of the Axis. They put a lot of hope to the newly created organization – United Nations – and the principle of collective security. However, the U.S. needed to react to the Soviet aggression in Europe. They adopted the policy of containment. The orthodox scholars view this policy as necessity because without it “the Soviet Union would have become the master of all Europe, instead of only the eastern Europe” .