How Do Military Hilitorians Explain War?

In Carnage and Culture Victor David Hanson expressed a slanted perspective about the crucial battles in western history in order to support his theory that western militaristic strategies are superior to alternative forms of warfare. He fostered his sentiments by explaining how specific battle tactics can unify or divide a nation in a matter of moments. However, his reference to the concept that western warriors continuously triumph in war, is expressed in a manner that does not fully evaluate both perspectives of the conflict. Hanson alluded to the message behind Carnage and Culture when he stated “a sense of personal freedom, superior discipline, matchless weapons, egalitarian camaraderie, individual initiative, constant tactical adaptations, and flexibility, preference for shock battle of heavy infantry— were themselves the murderous dividend of Hellenic culture at large… Yet for the past 2,500 years— even in the Dark Ages, well before the “Military Revolution,” and not simply as a result of the Renaissance, the European discovery of the Americas, or the Industrial Revolution— there has been a peculiar practice of Western warfare, a common foundation and continual way of fighting, that has made Europeans the most deadly soldiers the history of civilizations (Hanson 5-6).” Although Hanson is able to give an overview of valuable battles that express western confidence and reflect the west’s brutal military tactics that established the region as an unstoppable

There are no universal theories to explain the true nature and character of war, and any war theories are not a fact or absolute truth. All strategic principles are dynamic and contextual, so “every age had its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions.” The battlefield environment of the 21st century will be the volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous, and nature of war will be completely different because of the Revolution in Military Affairs. Highly advance communication and information technologies, a dramatic increase in computing capabilities, developed of precision munitions, dominant air and space power ‘war could be waged by the projection of

The rules of Jus in Bello, otherwise known as conduct during war, represent guidelines for fighting a just war once it has begun. Such rules of warfare are intended to safeguard the lives of humans and their fundamental human rights. Walzer, within his novel Just and Unjust Wars, presents a series of rules known as the War Conventions, for soldiers to follow in order to maintain the justice of a war. The war convention holds a permissive and prohibitive aspect with this essay focusing specifically on the permissive aspect. The first principal of war convention is that once is war has begun, soldiers are subject to attack at any time (unless they are wounded or captured). This essay will investigate the grounds that provide the foundation

Carl von Clausewitz, born in Burg bei Magdeburg, Prussia, was a general and a military theorist. He was influenced by the Napoleonic wars in which he fought. He served in both the Prussian and Russian army, and played an important role in initiating an alliance between Prussia, Russia and Great Britain against Napoleon. He served as the director of the Prussian War College and wrote his masterpiece On War, a work on the philosophy of war. His main goal was to examine war in all its aspects. Clausewitz includes a chapter in his book where he explains and discusses his ideas about the concept of “people’s war”.

Warfare is a devastating quality of the human condition. Nowhere in nature do other species hunt and kill their fellow members for political reasons and at a mass scale. Attempts to systemize and standardize the rules and regulations of warfare are difficult if not impossible to appease every key player involve. The purpose of this essay is to examine the rules of engagement of warfare as a guiding principle that is subjective and not uniform throughout the system of war itself. This inconsistency will be discussed by presenting the Vietnam War through six different levels of perception located in the chain of command. This exercise will prove that each segment of the war fighting contingency has its own subjective reasons to follow rules of engagement.

Reading from the three essays: “from The Art of War” by Sun Tzu, “from The Prince” by Niccola Machiavelli, and “Warfare: An Invention” by Margaret Mead, all have same but different perspectives. The three readings all revolve around war, violence and aggression. Reading these three essays can give a different perspective on warfare. The ways of the three components in these readings, war, violence and aggression and the way the human body works as to how people work, is amazing. The authors show war, violence and aggression through these pieces to compare and contrast their ideas and moral of warfare.

Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz’s theories offer valued perspectives that are essential to understanding warfare. The concepts of Jointness/Unified Action and Knowing your Enemy/Culture awareness are worthy of exploration because favorable outcomes to war are dependent upon understanding and actively using them. All our military forces must be capable of unified action

In closing, it was evident that the west had a dramatic influence on the world and as it still does today. It’s important to note that possessing all the elements of the Western way of war does not guarantee success, it is the application of all the elements along with experience, the government and the will of the people. Army professionals today must understand that the ability of the United States Army ability to win decisively embraces these three fundamental characteristics of the Western way of war to sustain dominance across the full range of military

'Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare: The Triumph of the West' published in 1995, edited by Geoffrey Parker has explained a number of factors that have played a part in the dominance of the western way of war. The western way included in here is more about the dominance of the western culture or the European culture in wars as compared to the other factors that may include technology or finance. Five main foundations according to Parker can define the western way of war. These factors include being superior in military and war based technology, superior military training and discipline, increased reliance on military theory, an increased competition between European states that lead to increased military innovation and lastly, military innovation by adoption of new and better technology (Parker, 2005, p. 67).

Many elements define and theorize modern strategy; several best demonstrate the foundations that reveal the limits of predictability in war. The main elements of strategy that demonstrate the limits of predictability in war are the will of the people, power and culture. Throughout history, many civilian and military leaders studied doctrine and theory concerning warfare with Clausewitz being the most read and quoted of that academic group. Although history has shown that modern warfare is violent and volatile, however, the desire for a more comprehensive study and predictability in war is understandable. Although, during Clausewitz’s time war was very predictable and his life shaped by expectable results. His theory and thinking have guided man into conflict and exposed war a violent ever-changing event that may provide some framework for determining the outcome of war. In discussing the limits of predictability during war and the desire for the aforementioned, it would difficult to discuss without Clausewitz; however, several other theorist and political leaders provide sage advice and will lend to this discussion.

He believes “the deployment of indiscriminate violence against noncombatants went against the trends of continental warfare which saw combat as an activity led and managed by professional soldiers to achieve the more or less limited goals of sovereign nation-states”(21). Porch argues that supporters of counterinsurgency have embraced these specialized and more practical styles of warfare as “a refutation of modern, intellectual, more strategically sophisticated analytical and technological approach to warfare”(50). Porch believes that the modern doctrine of COIN “denies the interactive nature of conflict as manifest in the will, chance, and anger of conflicting parties as in the

War is generally considered a to be a heinous act, a harbinger of death, destruction and disaster. War is often fought for ignorant reasons such as wealth and property, although defence and fighting for the greater good is often exhibited through history. Its facile to claim that war is unjustifiable under personal or political reasons, or that it’s a waste of human life and that passive resistance is the key. Nevertheless, in opposition, there are particular circumstances in which war is justifiable. Examples of this are: Under international bodies of law (Geneva and Haug conventions), the principals of the ‘just war theory’ which is in stark contrast to 2 other approaches on the concept of war, being ‘Pacifism’ and ‘Realism’, as well as Islamic reasoning on the conduct, “darurah” (necessity) and justifications of initiating or continuing conflict as well as theoretical and historical understandings of what it means for a war to be just. An ongoing example being the war on Israeli occupation by the Palestinians, another example being the British interference in the Second World War against the belligerent Nazi regime. Although, in retrospect, the Second World War is also used in pacifist ideologies, against war justification. Various academic enumerations interpret and apply the renowned “just war Theory” including Peter S.Temes’s “The just war: an American reflection on the morality of war in our times as well as discussions on the Islamic etiquettes of war in Youssef H.

Military theorists Carl von Clausewitz and Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini both fought during the Napoleonic Era. However, their experiences created completely different theories of the nature of war. Because Clausewitz understood that war is not static or systematic and that commanders and soldiers influence the outcome of war, Clausewitz best distinguishes the nature of war, specifically through his concepts of strategy and morale. This will be illustrated through the events and actions taken during Operation ANACONDA.

The purpose of this essay is to evaluate the relevance of Just War Tradition (JWT) in contemporary warfare. It will do so through critical analysis of the condition of Just ad Bellum (JAB) because arguably if one carefully considers the moral conditions that make going to war justifiable then the same cautious, moral assumptions apply in Jus in Bello. Firstly it will briefly discuss the history of JWT and thusly the inherent problems within JAB applied in the contemporary world. Secondly it will discuss the principles within JAB and the use of these in the decision to invade Iraq. Finally, the usefulness and relevance of JWT as a framework for the application of Jus in Bello is examined, or whether militarized masculinity has prevailed. Therefore it will argue that JWT is relevant to contemporary warfare only when applied as a moral framework in the international community. It should not be used as a tick list of conditions for states to justify going to war.

Following the First World War doctrine and concepts became heavily scrutinized from both sides of the war. Several advocates attempted to initiate change based off of the countless lives that were lost during the war. Many advocates’ concepts were ignored during their time as they tried to change doctrine and organization; however, their ideas still managed to set the pace for the future. This essay will discuss the influences of J.F.C. Fuller, Liddell Hart, Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukhachevsky, and J. Walter Christie.