How Nontraditional Threats Is The Pentagon 's National Security Policy

Over the course of history, the strategic environment has changed rapidly and is now more complex than ever before – it is currently characterized by unpredictability and disorder, and may yet manifest itself in the collapse of nuclear armed nations, destabilizing conflict in geo-politically vital regions, and humanitarian crises. A world of disparate actors – not all nation states – now exists. Unpredictable events will continue to cause strategic surprise. The widespread effects of past conflicts such as World War II, Vietnam and the Iraq war are still being felt and have created significant strategic repercussions. The failures of these conflicts are the result of our military and political leaders’ failure to quickly adapt to wartime conditions. This occurs because of a general refusal to commit to a military culture of learning that encourages serious debate, critical assessments of our military operations, and challenges to our doctrine in the face of emerging change. Additionally, leaders have struggled with the critical responsibility of forecasting and providing for a ready force, one that is well-resourced and prepared to conduct future operations. It is the responsibility of our military and political leaders to send our military to war with a ready force, and a strategy that will ultimately result in victory. But understanding war and warriors is critical if societies and governments are to make sound judgments concerning military policy.

The concept of war as a static and unchanging occurrence is an outdated and dangerous miscalculation. More accurately, war is a fluidic, evolving and shifting phenomenon constantly reinventing itself, rendering stagnant, inflexible principles potentially disastrous. Consequently, as students of war and future players in this transforming theatre, the study of eras of significant development is an extremely relevant pursuit. Recognizing the need for adaptation and the creation of doctrine is now a prerequisite for any effective modern commander. War is unpredictable in nature and particularly so in current theatres of operation, in which change is rapid

The ways in which the United States has conducted its military operations since becoming an independent nation has largely depended upon the overall political and military objectives of each individual conflict. The United States first three hot wars after the end of World War II display the marked difference in US objectives and the operations used to achieve them better than any other modern wars in which American troops participated.

In a 2015 article, “Is U.S. military becoming outdated?” written by Stuart Bradin, Keenan Yoho, and Meaghan Keeler-Pettigrew, the authors argued that despite the U.S. military maintaining a position of global dominance “without peer” during conventional operations, it is not the ideal force against current and future threats. The authors claim that there are several negative factors arising due to the past sixteen years of war against several state and non-state elements, inferior cultural differences of government bureaucracy compared to commercial firms, and a misallocation of defense spending that leaves the US military waging war inefficiently while simultaneously losing technological dominance against current and future threats.

From the time when the first English colonies were established in North America until now, there has been some form of armed fighting force in place to protect the interests of the United States and its colonial progenitors. During the roughly four centuries in which this fighting force has existed, it has undergone numerous changes of varying degrees of significance. Technological advances have changed the nature of both defensive and offensive warfare, political advances have changed the nature of the relationship between the civilian population and its protectors, and geostrategic shifts have changed the role of the United States military with respect to the rest of the world. The most lasting and meaningful changes have occurred

Whether events in the 1970s and 1980s have borne out President Eisenhower's warning to the American people. During the 1970s and 1980s, America spent more money on military security than the net income of all United States corporations. The government was building up armed forces to combat the Soviet Union until its collapse.

The Cold war, a threatening competition between the United States and the Soviet Unions, kept going from the late 1940 's until the breakdown of the Soviet Union in 1991. The war was "icy" just in that the United States and USSR never battled one another in an immediate military encounter, however both superpowers debilitated one another with atomic destruction and partook oftentimes in "intermediary wars" by supporting associated countries in various "hot" wars set up like Korea, Vietnam, and Angola. The Cold War characterized both nations ' outside strategies through the a large portion of the twentieth century, as the Americans and Soviets sought partners to keep up and enlarge their separate effective reaches around the globe. Every side saw the chilly war as a fight between the developments, in the overall conflict between the American free enterprise, and Soviet socialism, one and only could win. For over forty years, the Soviet-American clash hung overwhelming over worldwide issues, forming the world with gigantic military developments, an endless atomic weapons contest, serious surveillance, and furious mechanical rivalry as every side attempted to pick up the high ground in planning for the nuclear "hot war" all people dreaded would some time or another come.

First off, after WWII America’ military demobilized and the public’s opinion swayed to becoming more concerned with public affairs. Relations with Russia were deterioration and communism in other countries, the U.S. step in and pushed them out. The Korean War raised military purchases to an unknown level for “peacetime” and continued to fluctuate afterwards, even during post-war periods money was spent on real defense spending. The expenses of the Korean War and Vietnam wars came almost entirely at

Through its beginning, NSC 68 performed its duties to militarize the Cold War by April of 1950. Months later, the Korean War delivered its creation as the entrance of the factual front on the War on Communism. It was an overstatement of the military hazard to the Soviet Union. It advocated Preventive War, Isolationism, and or a rapid buildup of the Military as possible options to counter the threat. The Third option of building up the Military was implemented in American Policy during the Cold War. After all, China in 1949 fell to the Communists after a four-year Civil War and the Russians tested their first atomic bomb in that same time frame. Conservatives believe in small government

The contentment strategy implemented by the Truman administration was unprepared to deal with these new developments. The Korean War forced Truman to abandon containment through strong point defense, and shift to perimeter defense, even though the U.S. lacked the military capabilities to defend every region boarding communist held territory. The size of the U.S. military at the start of the Korean War was unable to effectively implement a policy of perimeter defense. If the Truman administration had been able to successfully peruse perimeter defense, key regions such as Western Europe and Japan would be increasingly vulnerable to Soviet aggression. Also, without any forms of deterrence in place, a U.S. perimeter defense would be faced with the possibilities of multiple large scale

At the start of Why We Fight we are presented with President Dwight Eisenhower’s farewell address or his warning. “We now stand ten years past the midpoint of a century that has witnessed four major wars among great nations...we yet realize that America 's leadership and prestige depend, not merely upon our unmatched material progress, riches and military strength. (Eisenhower, 1961) Eisenhower states that we should be proud of our great country; however he warns us of the “military-industrial complex” that we will create and how it has now set its foot in American warfare. He urged that we build a strong national defense and create a diplomacy with the USSR. (Jarecki, 2006) His prophecy of this vast military-industrial complex was true.

Clearly by the mid-1950s, the consequences of Truman’s decisions cast long shadows over the nation’s political, economic, and cultural landscapes. From that point forward, even after the Korean War had ended in July 1953, the United States’ military and national security spending remained at levels unthinkable prior to Korea. Indeed, the decisions made in 1950 stood practically unchallenged for nearly two generations. The historical significance is that it left a legacy of resentment and the imperfection of the United States domestic and foreign policies. Over the long haul of the Cold War, the Korean rearmament effort and the precedents it set came at a very high price, a price that went far beyond actual military expenditures. The economic, social, and political costs resulting from the decisions made during Korea are perhaps immeasurable, for there was no real “peace dividend” at the end of the Korean War. Pierpaoli references, Robert H. Wiebe observation that the Korean conflict resulted in the permanent institutionalization of an ongoing trend in twentieth-century American history which

Clausewitz defines war as an “act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” The nature of war is enduring yet the character of war changes over time. Current US strategic guidance is advancing the point of view that since the character of war has changed to focus on irregular wars then the US military should prepare for a future of irregular wars. This shift in focus forgets that the nature of war is enduring and in order to be successful, we must prepare for all types of conflict. This paper will define the types of conflict and the likelihood of each followed by a discussion of US strategic guidance and ending with an analysis of the training resources and force structure requirements needed to achieve success for all types of

Giulio Douhet, in his seminal treatise on air power titled The Command of the Air, argued, “A man who wants to make a good instrument must first have a precise understanding of what the instrument is to be used for; and he who intends to build a good instrument of war must first ask himself what the next war will be like.” The United States (US) military establishment has been asking itself this exact question for hundreds of years, in an attempt to be better postured for the future. From the Civil War, through the American Indian Wars, and up until World War II (WWII) the American military’s way of war consisted of fighting traditional, or conventional, wars focused on total annihilation of an enemy. Since that time, there has been a gradual shift from the traditional framework towards one that can properly address non-traditional, or irregular wars. While the US maintains a capability to conduct conventional warfare, the preponderance of operations where the US military has been engaged since WWII have been irregular wars. Therefore, this question articulated by Douhet, as to understanding the character of the next war in order to properly plan, train, and equip, is certainly germane to the current discussion of regular war versus irregular war. In today’s fiscally constrained environment, the questions remains, which will dominate the future and therefore, garner further funding and priority. Based on the current threats and the US role as a superpower, the US

The connection between military expenditure and economic growth has been analyzed from several perspectives, at the industrial, national and private-sector firm levels. Other issues have been researched, such as relationships between civilian and defence research and development and the potential for development of scientific and engineering