Whole foods offer large bonuses to managers based on store performance. Whole foods also offer a maximum executive compensation equal to 19 times the average employee salary. Executives had the right to take time off without pay, therefore, increasing the amount of bonus they could be paid within the cap. I don’t think that this compensation strategy is very motivational. It essentially gives executives motivation to take time off work and still receive the same compensation. The stock compensation for Whole Foods is too arbitrary. They should have specific financial metrics that executives should try and meet, and receive stock compensation based only when those metrics are successfully met.
I would argue that the unlimited upside and downside of a manager’s bonus potential based on a single business unit’s performance causes great chaos because it may be driven by factors beyond one’s control and not necessarily as the result of “true” strong performance. Yes, the upside is great! In 2000, the Dermatology group stands to pocket 200+% of their target bonus due to a competitive exit. However, Dermatology’s favorable EVA was driven by unsustainable share gains, a fluke in the market.
Compensation systems can take on many forms, all of which have positives and negatives related to it. However, certain components are noted to be determinants of solid compensation plans. One agreement of a solid compensation system is the use of incentives. “Clearly a successful companies set objectives that will provide incentives to increase profitability” (Needles & Powers, 2011). Incentive bonuses should be measures that the company finds important to long-term growth. According to Needles & Powers (2011) the most successful companies long term focused on profitability measures. For large for-profit firms, compensation programs should offer stock options. The interweaving between the market value of a company’s stock and company’s performance both motivate and increase compensation to employees As the market value of the stock goes up, the difference between the option price and the market price grows, which increases the amount of compensation” (Needles & Powers, 2011). Conclusively, a compensation plan should serve all stakeholders, be simple, group employees properly, reflect company culture and values, and be flexible (Davis & Hardy, 1999; The Basics of a Compensation Program).
I appreciate that the banking sector is vital to the strong health and growth of our nation’s economy and directly affects each of us, however, many of these financial institutions took the funds and immediately paid out senior executive bonuses instead of using the money to back loans to the public. These executive bonuses were public record and created a massive outcry from the taxpayers, but even this seemingly greedy use of power was overlooked by the federal and state governments.
This situation can lead to negative consequences for a business when its executives or management direct the organization to act in the best interest of themselves instead of the best interest of its owners or shareholders. Stockholders of the enterprise can keep this problem from arises by attempting to align the interest of management with that of themselves. This normally occurs through incentive pay, stock compensation, or other similar incentive packages that now cause the managers financial success to be tied to that of the company (Garcia, Rodriguez-Sanchez, & Fdez-Valdivia, 2015; Cui, Zhao, & Tang, 2007; Bruhl, 2003; Carols & Nicholas,
2.Shareholders want high long-term profits. Managers want job security and wonderful perks and amenities. Since risk and return tend to be positively related, managers may wish to avoid risks that shareholders want the managers to undertake. To encourage managers to take on risks, compensation committees can place a greater weight of their compensation on long-term incentives such as stock, options to buy stock, and bonus based on surpassing the performance of comparable firms over several years. When all
2. A principal-agent relationships involves the owners (principals) delegating decision-making authority to managers (agents). A conflict occurs when the agents pursue acceptable levels of shareholder wealth and profit rather than a maximization of profit. They are pursuing their own self-interests. One way that the agents act in their own self-interests would be by focusing on long-term job security. This could cause the agents to limit the amount of risk taken by the firm. The firm may have an opportunity that is considered a riskier venture that could produce high profits if successful. If the venture proves to be unsuccessful, then the agent is at risk of dismissal. Therefore,
Americans are outraged. Billions of taxpayer dollars were committed last year to rescuing firms such as Citigroup and the American International Group (AIG). Earlier this year, several companies who received Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) assistance were awarding top executives with extravagant bonuses. According to the Wall Street Journal, the U.S. government lent $238 billion in TARP taxpayer funds to almost 700 banks; 44 of these banks have repaid a $71 billion (Johnston, para 6). There remains $167 billion invested in banks. Some critics argue that a “mere” $167 billion is not significant to warrant public indignation against bonuses. However, the issue is not about specific bonus amounts but the principle of
It was reasonable for a CEO’s compensation to increase as the company expanded and became a larger entity, and the newly-granted shares and increasing stock options further aligned the CEO’s personal interests with those of the company and shareholders. In this sense, the second compensation package was also well-structured and not excessive. Seeing Sunbeam’s revenue rising and stock price climbing steeply upwards, Sunbeam’s shareholders and directors were fully convinced by Dunlap’s leadership, so they might perceive the increase in compensation amount necessary to retain and better motivate Dunlap to enhance the company’s value. Nonetheless, they neglected the fact that the increased portion of the equity-based compensation also further motivated the CEO’s dangerous behaviors pertaining to improper earnings management.
Executives receive bonuses for many reasons. These reasons may be due to a growth in business, a very successful quarter or year, and in the case of AIG, it is their actual salary. In the article on CengageBrain, some of the executives worked for $1 per year and only received bonuses if the company or financial department did well. I believe, in this case, it is ok for the individuals to receive bonuses as their pay; however that’s not the whole story. These executives received bonuses even though they knew their business was failing and in the end took a bail out from the federal government. This is not okay. If a company is failing and they know it, they need to use the resources they have within the company, to bail themselves out.
In this essay I will be addressing the “Too Big To Fail” (TBTF) problem in the current banking system. I will be discussing the risks associated with this policy, and the real problems behind it. I will then examine some solutions that have been proposed to solve the “too big to fail” problem. The policy ‘too big to fail’ refers to the idea that a bank has become so large that its failure could cause a disastrous effect to the rest of the economy, and so the government will provide assistance, in the form of perhaps a bailout/oversee a merger, to prevent this from happening. This is to protect the creditors and allow the bank to continue operating. If a bank does fail then this could cause a domino effect throughout
Meanwhile, Goodwin ignored warnings of the worsening crisis while at the same time failing to conduct a due diligence assessment of ABN’s assets and in October 2007 the consortium secured the takeover for €71bn18,19. The deal was unanimously approved by the RBS board and the payment made in cash from the bank’s reserves. This led to a fatal mismatch of the long-term assets and short-term liabilities.