Hr 3364 Case Study

“We shall pay the price, bear any burden, to assure the survival and the success of liberty.” (John F Kennedy) Before the Cold War, Russia and the United States fought next to each other in World War II. The U.S even gave them millions of dollars worth of weapons and other support to help defeat the Nazis. But when Joseph Stalin took over, created the Soviet Union and started spreading communism the U.S had to do something about it. During the Cold War the United States and the Soviet Union were pitted against each other, each with hopes on spreading their own but very different governments and requirements, taking extreme measures like containment, the Truman Doctrine, Berlin Blockade, or the Cuban Missile Crisis.

The Cold War was a state of political and military conflict that tested the vigor and fortitude of a multitude of United States presidents. Throughout the Cold War, various different strategies and foreign policies were tried and tested by US presidents. However, the environment in which these policies operated in did not stay consistent. Correspondingly, the Soviet Union’s potency fluctuated consistently, meaning that during some periods the “Red Scare” was not nearly as threatening as others. The ever-changing state of affairs throughout the Cold War was spawned from a number of reasons, including both the belligerency of what was then the current Soviet administration and the acting effects of previously implemented American foreign policy.

My group and I have not decided on which roles we are taking; the plan is not finalized. We are planning to create posters together and each of us will play a role during the video. I plan to contribute by making posters, asking my group when we are meeting up, and help my group members if they need any assistance.

After World War 2, faith in the United States government was at an all time high. A brief, superficial, and weak understanding of the history on the aftermath of World War 2 leads the reader to understand that not only did the United States help defeat the evil Nazis, the fascist Italians, and the imperial Japanese. In the wake of World War 2, the United States of America ended up cementing itself as a world power – if not the world power, usurping the empty throne previously held by Great Britain and subsequently sharing it with the Soviet Union. Yet as is typical, there can never be two champions. There can never be two reigning super victors – one of the two powers had to lose. So began the conflict that never was, the cold war – a global chess match of attrition. Neither the USSR nor the USA would outright engage in conflicts with one another, but in the thirst and pursuit for more influence and power, they continually opposed each other through pawn states on a global scale for approximately 44 years. This type of warfare was known as ‘proxy’ warfare, and though the dates specifically for the Cold War are not known, the common dates for the war range from 1947 to 1991. With this understanding, it can also be inferred that it was not just a war for power, it was a war of ideologies.

The objective of ‘the U.S. foreign policy’ course is to develop personal ability for applying IR theories to the U.S. foreign policy. Then, students will be able to understand the direction as well as the grounds of the U.S. foreign policy. To achieve this objective, I will discuss major the theoretical issues through the brief history of the U.S. foreign policy until the Cold War. After that, I will examine the challenges which the U.S. confronts.

Toronto, Canada---- Since the end of World War Two, the United States and the Soviet Union have experienced a number of political clashes. From the Marshall Plan to the Korean war, to testing nuclear weapons, and to the use of missiles, the United States and the Soviet Union have definitely established a divide between the two empires. The growing dependence of the United States in Europe and Great Britain has increased imperialist speculation from the USSR. However, the United States justifies their presence though the policy of Containment, in its attempt to defend democracy. Also since post World War Two, there has been a massive increase of arms in both the Soviet Union and the United States. From the booming economy of the war and the devastating atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the United States became a global superpower. The need for efficient nuclear weapons suddenly became an obsession. In 1952, the USSR managed to develop their own Atomic bomb, which threatened the position of the United States. And from there an arms race began. The use of nuclear weapons is an extreme that neither empire wishes to reach, however, the public is not certain.

Cohen juxtaposed Trump administration’s contradicting statements on their knowledge (or lack thereof) of pre-election contact with Russia to clearly articulate the suspicion that sanctions were indeed discussed. By separating the notion that these discussions occurred before Trump’s inauguration and that a fundamental contradiction exists within the administration into separate sentences connected by a transition, Cohen draws the connection between the two pieces of chaos-proving evidence, thus strengthening his

The United States came out of World War II ready to concentrate on domestic issues, but unfortunately, the more pressing issue of the Cold War needed addressing. Democracy and communism challenged the world order and the United States and the USSR took center stage on determining the world’s economic, social and political future for the next forty-five years. Each American president handled the power differently, acted on what he thought was in the best interest of the United States, and took on the Cold War through words and actions that often translated to real war but never directly with Russia.

Instead of becoming closer to Russia, the United States should make sure that Russia does not threaten their power, and keep them in constant military check.

The end of the cold war obligated the United States once again to face the old problems which weren’t based on containment of communism. Like in the aftermath of World War 2 when America’s influence in the world was expanded, the end of the Cold War did much of the same. The problem’s the Soviet Union once had of controlling and influencing smaller countries under its thumb, now were inherited by the last super power standing, which at the time was the United States. Debate began to rise on what path America should take next on foreign policy, should the U.S commit itself to small problems or hold back its fire until a greater threat emerged?

According to Cnn, Sanctions imposed on Russia because of its support for separatists in Ukraine could shrink the economy by as much as 9% over time. This comes to show that our sanctions have worked in the past and successfully inflicted damage on Russia’s economy. This will allow Russia to realize that we are serious about these hacks that have been occurring and imposing these sanctions will act as a warning to Russia. As seen, it is effective to impose sanctions on russia and if we do pass this bill, it will allow us to become a safer and more secure

The current international system is fragmenting rapidly since the end of the Cold War. A lot of regions in the world are still trying to find the balance of power in the international system, which the U.S. often intervenes to provide its brand of “global leadership”. Some countries like China are emerging as a global power since a few years ago. Subsequently, this will lead to a major threat to the U.S. status as a global major power. The rise of power by China in the international scene signifies the unpredictable nature of the international system. I would argue that the three most critical challenges for the U.S. arising out of this environment are the future world globalization that will cause a conflict between its domestic and foreign policy, the rise of China as a global power, and the ever globalization of terrorism. I believe that the U.S. should be pragmatic in handling its foreign policy and handle each situation independently without a fix doctrine in order to minimize the unintended consequences produced by the globalization of the world.

The state of the Russian economy does not make the situation any better. Oil makes up two-thirds of the total exports from Russia, despite multiple discussions to diversify resource reliance (David, 2017). The global financial crisis of 2009, coupled with “falling oil prices, international sanctions, and structural limitations pushed Russia into a deep recession in 2015, with the GDP falling by close to 4%.” (CIA World Factbook, 2017). The contracting economy continues into 2016, with the GDP falling another 0.6%, expecting to fall by another 5% in 2017 if oil continues below $40 per barrel. Without an immediate negotiation to either lift trade sanctions or find an alternative resource dependence, the economic decline will continue. Trade sanctions emplaced after the Crimea incident in 2014 were implemented by the European Union (EU) and the United States to target the Russian financial, energy, and defense sectors (Lee, 2016). The continued devaluation of the Russian ruble multiplied the effect of strain on the fledgling nation. Currency values fell approximately 50% since the middle of 2014; in turn, making it more expensive for Russia to import from other countries. The future of Russia’s economy is uncertain. Unless their leadership

Economic sanctions have become a common tool of international relations and an important yet controversial foreign policy tool. In fact, economic sanctions have been gathering attention recently, such as the United States and European Union (EU) against Russia 's Crimea Annexation, and United Nation (UN) against North Korea and Iran based on the Nations Security Council Resolutions. In the field of international politics, economic sanctions have been one of the significant and controversial issues. However their structure and the success conditions of economic sanctions are not elucidated.

Economic sanctions provide states and international institutions with an invaluable instrument of coercion. Without having to resort to violence, at least in the traditional sense, states can gain concessions and compliance from the target state. Economic sanctions are, however, not always successful. An analysis of 204 cases of implemented economic sanctions, from the start of the Cold War to 2000, revealed that economic sanctions were “at least partially successful” a mere 34% of the time (Hufbauer). While all economic sanctions have financial implications, there is a distinction to be drawn between economic sanctions—which include both trade and financial sanctions—and financial sanctions, as a standalone term. Financial sanctions can be defined as “restrictions that limit the provision of certain financial services or restrict access to financial markets, funds and economic resources in order to achieve a specific foreign policy or national security objective” (Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation HM Treasury). As the international financial system has become more globalized, and as a result more difficult to avoid while engaging in practically any form of economic transaction, the efficacy of financial sanctions has increased over more traditional forms of economic sanctions. Modern financial sanctions also have the added benefit of being more precise than their alternatives. This enables initiator states to institute sanctions in a more stylized manner and